

**COLLECTIVE ACTION OR COLLECTIVE INACTION:
THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
IN TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY**

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This dissertation examines influence and decision-making within the transatlantic security regime, focusing on the four major member states of NATO. Two cases of post-Cold War transatlantic military intervention are examined in which regime member states sought to develop and adopt a single, collective policy on the use of military force outside of NATO's traditional (i.e. collective defense) area of operations: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. These cases illustrate the "puzzle" that the dissertation attempts to solve: why did the transatlantic security regime adopt a common military intervention policy relatively quickly in one case (Kosovo) but much more slowly in the other case (Bosnia) despite the fact that deep policy differences were initially present in both cases? The dependent variable in the dissertation is thus the likelihood of the transatlantic security regime adopting and successfully implementing a common policy regarding the use of military force in a given case.

Relative distribution of power among regime members has no effect on collective policy congruence whatsoever. Collective risk analysis and ideological compatibility, however, strongly influenced regime policy cohesion (or lack thereof) in both case studies. This seems to indicate that regime policy cohesion is a function of actor rationality and yet also through rather socially constructed ideological compatibility. These variables are mutually supportive. That is, strong correlation in each is necessary to precipitate collective regime policy cohesion. Thus, both a similar view among the major regime states of the costs and benefits of military intervention and a significant level of ideological compatibility among their national leaders is necessary to create and maintain regime policy cohesion.

The active presence and involvement of an international institution had moderate effect in both cases. However, while the active engagement of NATO may not, in itself, be a causal factor in regime policy cohesion, the institution may help to more rapidly facilitate policy cohesion as long as the influence of variables four and five is present. This variable is thus rather interesting; however, additional case studies are necessary to explore its role and function in this issue-area.

Finally, collective threat perception and collective domestic pressures have mixed results, with domestic pressures being the stronger of the two. Again, this seems to indicate that notions of collective state cooperative behavior based primarily (or even solely) upon perceived external threat is not accurate. Like the institutional variable, collective domestic pressures plays an uncertain and yet interesting role. It is also certainly not a causal factor in itself but may play a much stronger role dependent upon the strength of the other variables.

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PREFACE

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daily basis. I dedicate this body of work to her memory. Mom, you are sorely missed by so many people—and you always will be. But I know you would have been proud.

1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing.
Edmund Burke

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The transatlantic security relationship has come under increasing stress since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The end of the old bipolar global power structure and East-West competition freed the United States and the countries of Europe to pursue more narrow national interests with less fear of offending allies or endangering national security than during the Cold War era. Now, the shared ideals and institutions of the Cold War era, while still present, must also compete with more significant differences in: 1) security problem perceptions and definitions; 2) specific policies of security implementation; and 3) the roles of both the traditional Westphalian state and modern international institutions in security. These differences are not only evident in the relationship between Americans and Europeans but can be found in the interstate and inter-organizational politics of the European Union (EU) and within the national/domestic level politics of individual states as well.

This dissertation examines such differences and decision-making among the major member states of the transatlantic security regime.¹ It explores the conditions under which the major regime member states adopt a single, collective policy with regard to using military force² outside of their sovereign geographic territories when there are different opinions about the specific policy option that should be adopted at the outset of such a circumstance. Recent post-Cold War experiences of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU demonstrate that such a collective policy is not easily or readily achieved. While the United States still enjoys tremendous influence in Europe (even after the end of the Cold War), it often fails to shift European policy with regard to the use of military force in particular instances. Conversely, Europeans have had varying degrees of success or failure influencing either American policy or each other's national policies with regard to the use of military force.

The dissertation first develops an argument explaining why the transatlantic security relationship may be analyzed at a regime level of analysis. Second, it presents the research design used to study the central question in the dissertation (what conditions or factors increase or decrease the likelihood of the major member states of the transatlantic collective security regime developing and adopting a single, collective policy on the use of military force outside of the regime's territorial boundaries? And third, it provides the hypotheses used to test rival explanations for levels of transatlantic cooperation and/or discord in military intervention policy.

¹ My use of the term "regime" is derived directly from the commonly accepted definition of an international regime given by Stephen D. Krasner: "International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area," in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1. The "major members" of the regime are the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany. See chapter three for further explanation.

² In using the phrase "military intervention" or "use of military force," throughout this work, I use the commonly understood definition: "Armed interventions entail the introduction or deployment of new or additional combat forces to an area for specific purposes that go beyond ordinary training or scheduled expressions of support for national interests." See Richard N. Haas, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), pp. 19-20.

What emerges in the dissertation is an understanding of the process of regime policy formation (or lack thereof) in which the collectively perceived cost-benefit risk analysis of using military force to intervene, the ideological compatibility of the major national leaders within the regime, and the collective domestic pressures (supporting or opposed to intervention) in major member states are all far more important to achieving regime policy cohesion regarding military intervention than are the distribution of material power among major regime members states or the collectively perceived perception of a security threat to those states. Additionally, and the role of an international institution, such as NATO, while not sufficient in itself to achieve regime policy cohesion, may aid as a “promoter” or “facilitator” to speed or ease the formation of collective policy, assuming the other important conditions are also present.

After the Introduction, the second chapter provides a brief overview of the modern (post-World War II) history of transatlantic security relations, with the firm belief that present phenomena can best be understood and explained by first having some degree of understanding of the past. Chapter Three discusses relevant topics and literature related to regime-level analysis and collective military intervention. Chapter Four contains a brief overview and explanation of the six independent variables tested in the dissertation. Chapters Five and Six each consist of an analysis of a separate case study. And finally, the concluding chapter contains a brief summary of the findings of the research and some final thoughts on policy making and policy processes, as well as possible future developments.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

Shifting from its Cold War role as a purely *defensive alliance*, NATO exercised military power beyond its member states' borders, for the first time in its history during the Bosnian Civil War. This was done initially only to a limited extent in Bosnia, primarily in order to protect United Nations (UN) peacekeepers and pressure the Yugoslav government into accepting UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions aimed at ending the war. The regime's intervention in this conflict, followed by the Kosovo War (NATO using military force without UNSC approval) are instructive, because they reflect apparent shifts in collective regime intervention policy (or lack of it) over time. In Bosnia, various political-military policies and implementation approaches were both debated and attempted. Diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and (eventually) limited military force were utilized through the UNSC, the (then) European Community (EC), the Contact Group,³ and finally NATO. By contrast, in Kosovo, the regime acted almost exclusively through NATO, without the specific authorization of the UNSC.⁴ An analysis of the responses of the major regime actors to these crises provides particular insights into major change over time in the formation and implementation of transatlantic and European security policy.

The critical research and policy question, then, is: "What conditions or factors increase or decrease the likelihood of the major member states of the transatlantic security regime adopting a common, collective policy with regard to military intervention in a given case?" This

³ Created specifically to develop a response to deal with and (if possible) end the Bosnian war. It originally consisted of the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Italy was added later, when the Contact Group was reconstituted to attempt to deal with the Kosovo crisis.

⁴ Although the Security Council had unanimously voted in September 1998 to demand a halt to the Serb attacks against civilians in Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serb security forces, a new resolution authorizing NATO to enforce compliance with these demands faced a certain Russian and probable Chinese veto.

dissertation seeks to answer that question by testing several possible alternative explanations drawn from relevant academic literature.

1.3 WHY IMPORTANT AND INTERESTING

This dissertation topic is important and interesting for a number of reasons. First, an understanding of transatlantic cooperation in this policy area is crucial for international security because not only are most military interventions that take place in the world conducted and led by the major members of the transatlantic security regime, but also because the regime represents the most powerful concentration of military power in the world. Furthermore, both NATO and the EU are simultaneously struggling to develop policy guidelines regarding out-of-area use of force and military intervention—to a degree complimentary but potentially competitively.⁵ This increasingly important policy debate affects a wide range of related issues, including the future role and institutional structures of both NATO and the EU, shaping the national security policies of individual regime member states, and determining current and future national defense planning and expenditures.

Second, scholarly work on this subject by social scientists is rather limited. The topic does enjoy widespread attention from political policy advocates and military analysts. However, the political implications of and motivations for collective military intervention at the regime

⁵ After a decade of (primarily) French-led efforts for a distinct and independent EU security and defense capability, a joint declaration was adopted by NATO and the EU on December 16, 2002, opening the way for closer political and military cooperation between the two organizations. The landmark *Declaration on the European Security and Defense Policy* (ESDP) provides a formal basis for cooperation between the two organizations in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. It outlines the political principles for NATO-EU cooperation and gives the EU assured access to NATO's planning capabilities for its own military operations. However, these measures have not yet been put to a "real world" test beyond the EU taking over passive peacekeeping missions in Macedonia and Bosnia from NATO, and it remains to be seen how effective cooperation would be and how smoothly decision making (political and military) would occur across and between the two organizations in a real crisis situation.

level have remained largely unanalyzed. Most previous studies of intervention policy investigate one of three factors: 1) national decision-making (without regard to collective regime policy formation and change); 2) the impact of a given intervention on the people or country in which it takes place; or 3) analysis of the purely military successes and/or failures of the operation. Most studies also focus on cases purely at the state level of analysis. Because regime-level debate over military interventions has increased only recently (since the mid-1990s), scholarly work on the subject remains somewhat deficient.

Third, in examining this issue, the dissertation explores valuable questions in both the field of international relations (in terms of states' collective action dilemmas and rational choice decision making) and also in the field of public policy (in terms of implementation of collective policy).⁶ And, in addition, the conclusions of the study should offer a wider contribution to the body of literature examining international versus domestic influences on foreign and security policy formation and change.⁷

Finally, this study will add to understanding of the overall transatlantic relationship in the post-Cold War era. If one believes that it is important or desirable for the members of the security regime to maintain that regime and to pursue compatible policies, then this study may offer important insights. By examining the successes and failures of collective intervention policy in the past, this dissertation hopes to provide some lessons for current and future policy-makers for transatlantic and European security. Conversely, even if one does not believe in the

⁶ An often-overlooked area of study in traditional international relations literature is policy implementation. Despite a huge body of literature studying foreign policy decision-making and even a significant body of work studying coalition or alliance decision-making, the successful implementation of collective foreign policy decisions is widely overlooked in the current literature. By including implementation as a component of a "successful" intervention policy, I also seek to make a clear distinction between actual effective policies and those that are simply "lowest common denominator" agreements that leave the initial security problem essentially unchanged or untreated.

⁷ See J. David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations" in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1961, pp. 77-92.

importance of regime members pursuing some degree of policy coordination and cooperation, this study may still be valuable in showing under what conditions it might be fruitful to facilitate or attempt cooperation and coordination and under what conditions such actions might very well prove to be futile (or at least a significant waste of valuable time and resources during the outset of a future crisis).

1.4 CASE SELECTION

Military interventions generally occur in one of three distinct forms: 1) war (organized force exercised from the outside in order to change the policies of an adversary or to destroy it); 2) less extreme coercive attempts to change the internal political balance of another state; or 3) as a mechanism for the promotion of purportedly universal norms, such as human rights.⁸

In this dissertation, two cases of post-Cold War transatlantic military intervention are examined in which the NATO allies and the EU and its member states sought to develop and adopt a single, collective policy on the use of military force outside of NATO's traditional (collective defense) and the EU's territorial area of operations: the diplomacy and ultimate military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991-1995) and the diplomacy and ultimate military intervention in Kosovo (1998-1999).⁹ These two cases illustrate the "puzzle" that the dissertation attempts to solve: why does the transatlantic security regime adopt a common

⁸ S. Neil MacFarlane, *Intervention in Contemporary World Politics*, Adelphi Paper No. 350 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 7.

⁹ In deciding which cases to study for analysis, it is obvious that there are numerous other possibilities. Specifically, during the post-Cold War period thus far (1991-2006), I counted fifteen separate crises in which member states of the regime either actually used military force or considered/debated using force: 1) Gulf War (1991); 2) Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995); 3) Somalia (1992-1993); 4) Haiti (1994); 5) Rwanda (1994); 6) Kosovo (1999); 7) Macedonia (2000); 8) Afghanistan (2001); 9) Congo (2002); 10) Sierra Leone (2002); 11) Ivory Coast (2002); 12) Liberia (2003); 13) Iraq (2003); 14) Haiti (2004); and 15) Sudan (2005-2006).

military intervention policy relatively quickly in some cases (such as Kosovo) but much more slowly in other cases (such as Bosnia), despite the fact that deep policy differences were initially present in both cases? And how and why are political or operational differences within the regime overcome in some cases but not in others? In selecting these two cases, I have chosen cases that represent a combination of two specific types of military interventions listed above—a combination of coercive use of force short of full-scale war and humanitarian intervention—but yet that also retained the possibility of leading to the first type: full-scale war.¹⁰

To test the various explanatory variables, I examine the behavior of the four most important regime members (the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany) with regard to each case. Two main criteria guided my selection of those states for this study. First, all are members of NATO, which is the primary institution for the regime. And second, the four countries represent the core of the regime's political leadership. As a result, consensus among those four members is almost always sufficient to sway the remaining members of the regime, while dissension among the four nearly always results in inaction. In short, these are the states that have had and will continue to have the most impact on out-of-area military interventions for the regime.

¹⁰ Humans live in a constant state of social and political conflict. Indeed, it is impossible to have a human social organization without some form of conflict. Even in the most peaceful community, social organization is maintained because the controlling group can force people to join the organization and then force members to obey the organization's rules (i.e. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "Social Contract"). The amount of force is subject to limitation, but the ability to coerce is real. Therefore, no social organizations are ever truly "at peace"; they are always engaged in some level of conflict. The amount and level of conflict vary, but it is always present. To illustrate this, the United States Army developed a concept in the early 1970s, after the Vietnam War. The Army realized that its mission was changing, and it had to be prepared to fight any number of different styles of war. Conflict could range from low-level "brushfire" wars to nuclear devastation, and the meaning of war was nebulous at best. To clarify this situation, the U.S. Army began speaking of a *spectrum of conflict*. This spectrum is a continuum that ranges from low-intensity conflict to full-scale war. This scale more correctly reflects the human condition than the belief that we are either at war or at peace. It also helps us to understand military intervention. See Appendix Two for the Spectrum of Conflict.

1.5 FINDINGS

In this dissertation, I attempt to demonstrate the following conclusions. First, that out of the six independent variables tested across the two case studies, variable one (relative distribution of power among regime members) has no effect on collective policy congruence whatsoever. This would seem to indicate that in terms of regime cohesion regarding questions of using military force, relative power is not helpful in influencing policy changes among fellow regime members. This tends to support neoliberal/regime literature and discount realist literature regarding such factors.

Second, two independent variables (variables four and five—collective risk analysis and ideological compatibility) strongly influenced regime policy cohesion (or lack thereof) in both case studies. This seems to indicate that regime policy cohesion is a function of actor rationality (determined through traditional cost-benefit analysis, whether intended or abstract) and yet also through rather socially constructed ideological compatibility. I posit that these two variables, rather than being mutually exclusive, are mutually supportive. That is to say that strong correlation in each is necessary to precipitate collective regime policy cohesion (i.e. each variable can act as a “spoiler” of policy cohesion by itself). Thus, both a similar view among the major regime states of the costs and benefits of military intervention and a significant level of ideological compatibility among their national leaders is necessary to create and maintain regime policy cohesion. A change in either variable (for instance, a change in the cost-benefit ratio due to changing circumstances “on the ground” or a change in ideological compatibility due to a change in national leadership of one or more major members) can precipitate a degrading or even collapse of regime policy cohesion.

Third, the active presence and involvement of an international institution had moderate effect in both cases. This seems to argue against neoliberal institutionalist literature regarding the role of such bodies. However, there are two caveats to this conclusion. First, the unanimity rules in each institution in question reduce the power of each institution to function in a stronger enforcing role. And second, while the active engagement of NATO or the EU may not, *in itself*, be a causal factor in regime policy cohesion, *the institutions may help to more rapidly facilitate policy cohesion as long as the influence of variables four and five is present*. This variable is thus rather interesting; however, additional case studies are necessary to explore its role and function in this issue-area.

Finally, variable two (collective threat perception) and variable six (collective domestic pressures) have mixed results, with domestic pressures being the stronger of the two. Again, this seems to indicate that realist notions of collective state cooperative behavior based primarily (or even solely) upon perceived external threats is not accurate. This dissertation attempts to demonstrate that states that are members of a security regime will be led or driven to increasingly cooperative behavior by other factors having little or no direct relation to perceived threat. Like the institutional variable, collective domestic pressures plays an uncertain and yet interesting role. It is also certainly not a causal factor in itself but may play a much stronger role dependent upon the strength of the other variables.

In short, this dissertation is meant to be primarily an exploratory project. It certainly raises more questions than it can answer. But it does attempt to demonstrate that the issue of collective regime policy cohesion regarding the use of military force is a highly complex dynamic in international relations and one deserving of greater research and analysis. This body of work is only meant to open the door and shed light on this complex puzzle—one that is likely to be increasingly relevant in both the academic and policy world in the near future. As such, its

primary aim is not necessarily to provide concrete answers for this important research topic and policy issue but rather to *develop the appropriate questions for further research*.

2.0 CHAPTER TWO: PAST TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS: COOPERATION AND DISCORD

NATO was designed to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.
Lord Hastings Ismay, the First Secretary General of NATO, 1951

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The history of the transatlantic security relationship is inextricably tied to the East-West confrontation arising from the end of World War II and to the consequent development of the U.S. policy of containment and the formation of NATO. It was inevitable, therefore, that the dramatic changes that swept the European continent in 1989-1991 would cause a fundamental reassessment of both American and European security perceptions and needs. The United States still has strong interests in Europe, however, just as Europeans have strong historical, cultural, and economic ties to the U.S. And despite some differences and difficulties, present and future security policies on both sides of the Atlantic will undoubtedly retain clear elements of continuity with the past.

This focus on the evolution from past to present is the primary foundation for this chapter, as understanding the past may provide a key to preparing for the future. The chapter describes and explains transatlantic security relations and policies since the end of World War II—origins, development, changes over time, the new directions these relationships seem to be

heading toward, and the various measures and organizations attempted and developed (successfully or unsuccessfully) in order to coordinate and implement collective security policy in the transatlantic region.

The chapter provides an overview of the Cold War origins of NATO, its development and expansion over the years, and, finally, how the recent events of September 11, 2001, have impacted transatlantic security. The chapter has two primary purposes: 1) to inform the reader about the historical development of transatlantic security relations, institutions, and policies; and 2) to illustrate the fact that at any given time (even in times of commonly perceived great collective danger), the NATO allies have had varying degrees of agreement or disagreement. In practice, collective international policy-making can be very difficult and painstaking, and these difficulties are by no means limited to the current transatlantic political environment or even specifically to U.S.-European relations. As I hope the historical review in this chapter will demonstrate, one might perhaps very well be more surprised when a common policy is achieved and adopted than when one is not.

2.2 BEDROCK OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY: THE ORIGINS OF NATO

After World War II, immediate European security and stability was challenged by a number of factors. A massive Soviet military presence dominated Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union consolidated its wartime gains by creating communist puppet regimes in occupied countries. Western Europe was economically devastated and militarily weak. Economic disaster, fragile democracies, and demoralized populations also made the West European states

vulnerable to internal, Soviet-backed, communist influence. At the same time, the U.S. was dramatically reducing its military presence in Europe.

Toward the end of the war, Britain had considered alternative postwar international developments and sought to institutionalize the integrated wartime cooperation between the combined U.S. and British military staffs.¹¹ On November 9, 1944, the British chiefs of staff issued a classified report concluding that Britain's security interests lay in the formation of a West European security group that would cooperate with the British Commonwealth and the U.S.; such a security group would begin with an Anglo-French alliance and expand to include closer cooperation with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.¹² By early 1946, sustained Allied security cooperation took on a greater sense of urgency. American involvement in postwar European security had become increasingly important for the Europeans because of the immediate concern over Soviet intentions, the potential for a renewal of German nationalism, and Britain's inability to maintain its traditional stabilizing influence on the continental balance of power.

The North Atlantic Treaty thus was not an idea originating in the United States but rather in West European countries—particularly Great Britain and France. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain and France decided that no real Western European security assurance could be constructed without U.S. participation in an alliance that would guarantee American involvement in combating any future aggression on the continent (whether from the Soviet Union or possibly from a resurgent Germany). To address the German question, Britain and France signed a bilateral mutual defense pact—the Treaty of Dunkirk—on March 4, 1947. The

¹¹ This close wartime cooperation marked the origins of the Anglo-American “special relationship.”

¹² See John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) and Joseph Smith (ed.), *The Origins of NATO* (Exeter, United Kingdom: University of Exeter Press, 1990).

treaty committed them to mutual assistance in the event of German aggression and to cooperate in their postwar reconstruction efforts.¹³ At the same time, the decline of British influence on continental affairs became apparent in Greece, where the Western-oriented Greek monarchy became engaged in an intense civil war against Soviet-backed communist rebels. Britain could no longer afford to provide military and economic assistance as it had been doing, and it hoped that the U.S. would fill in the void.

The U.S. responded with the Truman Doctrine, announced on March 12, 1947, in a presidential address to Congress, in which President Harry Truman specifically promised American economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. In June 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall also announced a plan of economic assistance for all of Western Europe designed to prevent the rise of nationalism, promote democracy, and establish economic containment of the Soviet Union. This European Recovery Program (dubbed the Marshall Plan) implicitly recognized the growing convergence between interdependence, stability, and security.

On December 15, 1947, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin met with Marshall in London, following the collapse of the four-power (the U.S., Britain, France, and the USSR) talks over the future of Germany, arguing for an increased U.S. commitment to Western Europe. Marshall generally supported Bevin's ideas; however, he was adamant that Bevin proceed under the same structure as the Marshall Plan and that the Europeans should first institutionalize a defense community in Western Europe.¹⁴ Thus, the U.S. established that any peacetime alliance with Europe should enhance the Europeans' responsibility for their own security and not replace it.

¹³ See John Baylis, "Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, June 1982, pp. 236-247.

¹⁴ Charles E. Bohlen, *Transformation of American Foreign Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), pp. 92-93.

After Soviet-backed communists took over Czechoslovakia in late February 1948, and the pro-Western Czech Foreign Minister Thomas Masaryk was murdered on March 10, 1948, Western European states became increasingly fearful of so-called “fifth column” Soviet aggression. Such Soviet actions might use covert activity to rally communist forces in a fragile democracy and overthrow the elected government or otherwise subvert government authority and policy from within. Western concerns were also heightened by the ongoing civil war in Greece, the possibility of a communist victory in Italian elections scheduled for April, and Soviet pressure on Finland and Norway to declare neutrality and sign non-aggression pacts with the USSR.

French concerns were particularly intensified, as there was a large communist minority in the French National Assembly. France had few options at the time for increasing its national security. It could not isolate Germany (as it had in the early 1920s) out of fear that such a policy could push western Germany into the Soviet orbit. Going it alone was no longer an option, as the Soviet threat was much too great for the resources that France could bring to bear alone. Establishing bilateral alliances with Eastern European states was not possible as long as the Soviet Union occupied the region—nor was political accommodation with the USSR a viable option, as this would increase the domestic power and influence of French communists. France was thus left with little choice but to seek hard security guarantees from both Britain and the U.S.

Thus, Britain and France enlarged the Dunkirk Treaty by including the Benelux countries and created the Brussels Pact or “Western Union” (which would later become known as the Western European Union) on March 17, 1948. Formally, it sought to promote integration and mutual assistance in a range of political, economic, and military activities. But informally, it was

designed to establish a framework for a broader, transatlantic institution leading hopefully to some sort of American security guarantee. Worried about a potential isolationist backlash at home,¹⁵ the Truman administration was careful to not associate publicly with the formation of the Western Union. However, the administration privately encouraged the Europeans and saw a Western European alliance as a necessary prerequisite for negotiating any transatlantic security agreement. It was soon viewed by both the U.S. and the Europeans as inadequate in light of increasingly aggressive Soviet behavior.

Thus, on March 22, 1948, American, Canadian, and British officials began secret discussions at the Pentagon about the prospect of creating a formal transatlantic alliance based on the Brussels Pact. These three-way talks were preliminary but resulted in a draft working paper presented by the U.S.; the central recommendations included having the President invite thirteen other countries (the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy) to negotiate a collective defense agreement for the North Atlantic area.¹⁶ Formal negotiations began in Washington by the Brussels Pact members with the United States and Canada about possible defense cooperation began on July 6, 1948, shortly after Soviet Premier Josef Stalin initiated a blockade of the U.S., British, and French occupation sectors in Berlin. On March 18, 1949, the treaty was made public and was officially signed on April 4, 1949, by twelve of the participants: the United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

¹⁵ The United States had never entered into any formal, permanent alliance with any country in its history.

¹⁶ Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (Lanham, Colorado: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), pp. 20-21.

Norway, Denmark, and Sweden had actually hoped to create a regional (Scandinavian) collective security institution of their own, based on shared cultural identity, commonality of interests, and (at Sweden's insistence) neutrality.¹⁷ This neutrality policy suited Sweden, which had not been occupied by Germany during World War II, but it was less appealing to Norway and Denmark, which had suffered under German occupation. Additionally, Norway shared a border with the Soviet Union and was thus directly threatened with possible Soviet military aggression. Thus, recent Norwegian and Danish historical experiences made Sweden's insistence on neutrality quite unappealing. At the same time, the U.S. and Britain wanted Iceland, Norway, and Denmark in the new alliance because of their geo-strategic importance for the North and Baltic Sea regions. Early in 1949, Norway came under strong pressure from the USSR to sign a non-aggression pact (as had been previously signed between the Soviet Union and Finland). This Soviet pressure caused the collapse of the Scandinavian defense pact discussions and pushed Norway and Denmark toward the Atlantic alliance.¹⁸

The Republic of Ireland was also invited to join the discussions on membership. The Irish government responded that it would join the negotiations only as a representative of a united Ireland; but while the U.S. was interested in using the island state as a base for anti-submarine warfare, the Irish government's linkage of the partition issue was unacceptable.¹⁹ The U.S. neither wanted to incorporate the problems associated with Ireland's partition into the treaty nor offend its most important ally, Great Britain. The U.S. and Britain also wanted Portugal as one of the original treaty members. The Azore Islands and the position of the Iberian Peninsula placed a strong geo-strategic priority on Portuguese membership. However, the authoritarian

¹⁷ Nicholas Henderson, *The Birth of NATO* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 83-89.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Kay, *op. cit.* in note 16, p. 28.

dictatorship of Antonio Salazar stood in direct contrast to the Western democratic ideals upon which the treaty was supposed to be based. In this early test of political ideals versus strategic priorities, however, the latter won, and Portugal was admitted as an original member.

Italy, Greece, and Turkey presented additional problems for the negotiators. There was a general concern among the principal negotiators that if Mediterranean states were admitted, it would reduce the “North Atlantic character” of the pact.²⁰ Having secured Scandinavian participation, there was also a legitimate concern that extending the geographic scope of the treaty could harm the principle of mutual aid. Broadening the geographic membership raised a fundamental question of collective defense; would Norway and Denmark go to war to defend Mediterranean states or vice versa? Also, would an institution covering too large an area be able to make effective decisions, or would it lose cohesion and collapse in a crisis? Today, nearly sixty years later, these same questions are still relevant in NATO.

The negotiators agreed that Italy had an important role to play in Central Europe and should be invited to join the final treaty negotiations.²¹ Greece and Turkey were not invited because of concerns that they would dilute the North Atlantic element of the alliance and stretch the alliance too far to the borders of both the Soviet Union and the troubled Middle East. There was, however, a general understanding that the Truman Doctrine made Greece and Turkey part of the area covered by the treaty. Greece and Turkey would thus be defended by the U.S., whether or not they were members of NATO, because it was in America’s interests to do so.

The greatest difficulty in negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty was finding an institutional structure that would satisfy the Europeans (who wanted a U.S. commitment that

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

²¹ France initially opposed Italian membership, believing that since Italy had been disarmed after World War II, it would not offer any tangible military contribution to Western defense plans. However, the French position changed due to events in Algeria (which France wanted covered by the treaty). The French government felt that giving the alliance a Mediterranean element (via Italy) might help its position *vis-à-vis* Algeria.

would be sufficient to deter the USSR) but would not prevent the U.S. government from having time to deliberate before going to war (a key U.S. domestic requirement). In other words, the U.S. was prepared to enter into a permanent military alliance for the first time in its history, but it was not prepared to enter any such alliance that had an “automatic war trigger.”

In a compromise, Article 11 of the treaty (which stipulates that the treaty’s provisions will be carried out in accordance with the “respective constitutional processes” of the signatories) gave the U.S. the clause it desired, but the final wording adopted in Article 5 contains a strong commitment to mutual defense:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

This was a revolutionary commitment by the United States, in view of its long-standing political tradition of isolationism and avoiding “entangling alliances” during peacetime. At this time, however, the North Atlantic Treaty was seen as little more than a short-term mutual defense commitment that would deter Soviet aggression and reassure Western Europe during its crucial post-war economic recovery period. It was assumed (by nearly everyone) that the West Europeans would rebuild their defense capabilities relatively quickly, and that, after a few years, they would bear the major burden of balancing Soviet military power in Europe. To this end, the United States encouraged the countries of Western Europe to initiate a process of political and economic integration. Thus emerged an alliance whose primary *raison d’etre* was never officially stated but was often (informally) repeated: keeping the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.

2.3 THE COLD WAR: NATO HOLDS THE LINE

From its beginnings, the NATO alliance was conceived of by its members as primarily a political alliance (embodied by the Washington Treaty in its principal decision making body, the North Atlantic Council)—only to become effectively a military organization if war actually broke out. The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, however, convinced the NATO allies of the necessity of organizing an integrated military command structure during peacetime and the necessity of a large, long-term U.S. military presence in Europe. Many experts and analysts in both the U.S. and Europe feared that the North Korean invasion was simply the opening act of a massive communist move toward global domination. The attack was seen as evidence that the communists (then seen as a unified, monolithic bloc) were prepared to resort to armed aggression, and some hypothesized that the attack against South Korea was perhaps but a prelude or distracting feint before an all-out Soviet-led attack against Western Europe. The United States and its allies responded. In December 1950, General Dwight Eisenhower (who had served as the Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe in 1944-1945) was appointed the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). In April 1951, Allied Command Europe (ACE) became operational, with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at Roquencourt, near Paris.

The United States still hoped that the magnitude of its defense burdens in Europe could be minimized through greater West European efforts. The Federal Republic of (West) Germany had been founded in 1949 but was still under formal occupation, with no armed forces of its own and with legal responsibility to the three occupying powers (the U.S., Britain, and France). Furthermore, the Soviet Union continued to press its “rights and responsibilities” regarding any ultimate, permanent resolution of the German question. But after the outbreak of the Korean

War, leaders in both the U.S. and Europe became convinced that only with a rearmed West Germany could the Soviet threat in Europe be countered. In September 1950, the United States proposed that West German armed forces be established, and France immediately advanced a counterproposal for a European Defense Community (EDC), which would subordinate any West German military forces under common European command.

While France understood the strategic rationale for rearming West Germany (the threat of Soviet aggression in Europe), it nevertheless sought firm constraints on any such armed forces. Defense Minister Jules Moch said that France could never “accept the creation of German divisions”; German soldiers, he suggested, should be organized in “battalion units of about 1,000 men” that would be distributed throughout the proposed European army.²² During a bitter debate from 1950 to 1954, French proponents of the EDC presented it as the only alternative to “a new *Wehrmacht*.” EDC opponents in France argued that it would reconstitute German armed forces while subordinating the French military to a supranational European organization. Strong U.S. and West German support for the EDC made the French quite suspicious, as well.²³

When the French opponents of the EDC effectively defeated it in the National Assembly in August 1954,²⁴ another framework for the establishment of West German armed forces was devised. At Britain’s suggestion, the 1948 Brussels Treaty was used as a basis for an Anglo-French agreement in 1954. Italy and West Germany would be admitted to the Western Union (to be renamed the Western European Union or WEU). The failure of the EDC, though, reaffirmed

²² Edward Fursdon, *The European Defense Community: A History* (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 91.

²³ The U.S. and West Germany each had its own reasons for supporting the EDC. For the U.S., creation of the EDC was seen as a way to get the Europeans to begin to provide more for their own defense, which could possibly lead to reducing the American military presence in Europe. For West Germany, the EDC (like the European Coal and Steel Community) was seen as a reluctant but necessary step on the road to eventually recovering full German sovereignty.

²⁴ In fact, the EDC was never directly voted on in the French National Assembly, nor was a full-scale debate even held. The EDC was defeated on a procedural motion before such a debate could even be held. Fursdon, *op. cit.* in note 22, pp. 295-297.

the centrality and importance of NATO. The WEU would provide a means to incorporate West Germany into the active defense of Western Europe, and it served as the bridge by which the Federal Republic could be integrated into NATO, but NATO remained the principal West European security institution.

Under the agreement, the United States, Britain, and France ended their formal occupation of West Germany. In exchange, the Federal Republic renounced the production of nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons on its territory, accepted numerous restrictions on its conventional armed forces, and was invited to join the WEU (and subsequently to join NATO); NATO would oversee the “operational aspects” of the West German military, while the WEU supervised the political and legal steps necessary for German rearmament.²⁵ The United States, Britain, and Canada agreed to maintain ground and air forces in Germany, subject to certain conditions. In a concession to France, the Federal Republic pledged to pursue a peaceful foreign policy and to never “have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany.”²⁶ With these assurances, France finally agreed to the Federal Republic’s entry into NATO and the establishment of independent West German armed forces in 1955.

West Germany became the alliance’s first new member since Greece and Turkey had joined in 1952. The entry of these two states demonstrated the importance of American leadership within the Alliance.²⁷ Ostensibly as a response to the creation of NATO and its

²⁵ For a more detailed explanation of the treaty provisions, see Arie Bloed and Ramses A. Wessel (eds.), *The Changing Functions of the Western European Union (WEU): Introduction and Basic Documents* (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994).

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands opposed Greek and Turkish entry, because the two countries were perceived to lack the democratic credentials of other members and would “dilute” the cohesion of the Alliance. Other members, especially France, were concerned about the potential for an intra-alliance conflict between the two states. Nevertheless, the United States was able to convince the other members to accept the necessity of membership for the two countries as a means of securing NATO’s Mediterranean flank. See Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (London: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 79-82.

subsequent enlargements, the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact in 1955 (within days of West Germany's admission to NATO). And, at the end of 1955, the USSR established a puppet communist regime in its occupied section of East Germany, thereby politically splitting Germany until the end of the Cold War.

For Europe, the period from the mid-1950s to the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989-1991 was generally one of political and strategic stalemate, with little change in formal political-military alignments. Europe, Germany, and Berlin remained divided, and communist rule in the Warsaw Pact countries was maintained through Soviet military power and a network of internal security organizations. Yugoslavia maintained a unique status throughout this period. Ruled by a communist dictatorship under Josep Broz Tito but not a member of the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia enjoyed good relations with the West. Partly because of its geographic isolation and lack of economic value, Albania succeeded in leaving the Warsaw Pact in 1968. Romania, like Albania, declined to participate in the Soviet-led suppression of democratic reform in Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact in 1968. Romania was reluctant to participate in the Warsaw Pact's integration and managed to achieve a certain degree of foreign policy autonomy—in part because it had persuaded Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev to withdraw Soviet forces from its territory in the late 1950s. On the Western side, Spain joined NATO in 1982, following the end of the Franco dictatorship there. Spain and Portugal were invited to join the WEU in 1988, and they did so in 1990.

Despite intermittent phases of *détente*, in which East-West tensions relaxed, the Soviet Union provided a solid incentive for cohesion in NATO. Soviet interventions in satellite states (East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979) and Soviet-provoked crises (the Berlin Blockade and Cuban Missile Crisis) reinforced consensus

in NATO on the necessity of organized collective defense. Soviet advances in military technology (the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile, for example) and occasional Soviet declarations calling for global Marxist-Leninist revolution also reinforced Western resolve.

NATO's collective defense planning during the Cold War focused almost exclusively on how to deter the Soviet Union from undertaking aggression or coercion against the West and (failing that) how to defeat an outright Soviet-led attack.²⁸ Although the United States was taking on more and more foreign responsibilities around the world, President Eisenhower cut the U.S. defense budget for conventional forces and decided to depend almost solely on nuclear weapons for deterrence against any Soviet conventional military attack. In this, the U.S. yielded to pressure from its NATO allies, who did not want to spend large sums on conventional military forces instead of social welfare programs. Because the protection afforded to NATO allies by U.S. strategic nuclear commitments was seen as a decisively important element of deterrence from the earliest days of the Alliance, a primary issue throughout the Cold War was the credibility of what came to be known as U.S. "extended deterrence" or the American "nuclear umbrella"—that is, the prevention of aggression or coercion against U.S. allies or security partners through the threat of U.S. strategic nuclear retaliation. Contentious issues that arose from U.S. nuclear deterrence included the level of Allied involvement (or lack thereof) in U.S. decision making in the potential operational use of nuclear weapons, the types and roles of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, and the utility and functions of the British and French independent nuclear forces.²⁹ Nuclear controversies were closely tied to American-European debates about

²⁸ See Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1993) and Laurence Martin, *NATO and the Defense of the West* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1985).

²⁹ David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983).

the proper level of investment in conventional forces and burden sharing, about how to assess the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional military force balance, and about what approaches to arms control to pursue in negotiations with the Soviet Union.³⁰

2.4 POST-COLD WAR RESTRUCTURING: FROM COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY

By the late 1980s, military overextension and internal economic crisis forced the Soviet Union to withdraw from the Cold War stalemate of Europe. This process began in December 1987, when the U.S. and Soviet Union eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons in Europe through the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. A year later, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev announced a reduction of 500,000 personnel from the Soviet military, including a significant withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. In November 1990, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed by all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Conventional reductions were followed by agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to reduce strategic nuclear weapons through the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II).

In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, signaling the beginning of the end of the Soviet bloc, and in 1991, the Cold War officially ended with an unquestionable communist defeat. The Warsaw Pact formally dissolved on April 1, and eight months later, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev announced the forthcoming dissolution of the Soviet Union. In a very short period of time, the Soviet military threat to Western Europe disappeared, and for

³⁰ See Simon Duke, *The Burden Sharing Debate: A Reassessment* (London: Macmillan, 1993).

the first time in its history, NATO found itself without an enemy. While Russia could still pose a threat to its neighbors and/or regional stability, the most serious danger posed by post-Cold War Russia is not expansionism but internal instability, potential disintegration, and the proliferation of NBC weapons, technology, and materials—very different threats from those conceived at NATO’s creation. The reunification of Germany also renewed historical concerns about German power and the potential for security competition between Germany and Russia. Furthermore, while democracy was spreading through Central and Eastern Europe after the dramatic post-communist revolutions of 1989, regional stability was by no means assured.

At the point of its greatest triumph and the defeat of its main external threat (the Soviet Union), NATO also faced its most significant challenges as an institution. The end of the Cold War called into question the continuing utility of NATO and its role in the security of Europe. But contrary to many assumptions or predictions about alliances dissolving in the absence of a threat, NATO moved to the core of an emerging post-Cold War European security architecture. Meeting in London in July 1990, the NATO heads of state stressed the continued institutional task of collective defense, while acknowledging that challenges to that mission had been radically transformed:

We recognize that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians, and Americans work together not only for the common defense, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.³¹

NATO invited East European leaders (including Gorbachev) to address the NAC and to establish regular diplomatic liaison with the alliance.

³¹ “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” July 1990, NATO Office of Information and Press.

The Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 demonstrated the potential for events outside of NATO's traditional geographic scope to impact European security. The war also demonstrated the overwhelming military superiority of the United States in terms of advanced weaponry, command and control assets, and strategic lift capability and that no European country had the capability to deploy large numbers of combat and support troops as quickly and efficiently as the United States could.³²

The Persian Gulf War was followed by a series of events that demonstrated that while the direct military threat to Western Europe was gone, there was a number of emerging new threats that European leaders had to consider. These included: 1) ethnic and religious conflict in Europe; 2) new threats from the Middle East and North Africa; and 3) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Many of these challenges to European security were not necessarily "new," but they received new attention after the Cold War ended, since they emerged as the most significant threats for Western European peace and stability.

At the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO adopted a new strategic concept, its members agreeing that the primary challenge to their security was uncertainty and instability in Eastern Europe:

...the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.³³

³² See Bruce W. Watson (ed.), *Military Lessons of the Gulf War* (London: Greenhill Books, 1991).

³³ "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," agreed upon by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991, NATO Office of Information and Press. The communiqué also specified potential challenges arising from the Mediterranean region and nuclear proliferation.

NATO outlined four “fundamental tasks” for the alliance after the Cold War:

1. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolutions of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
2. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
4. To preserve the strategic balance of power within Europe.³⁴

During the drafting, there were serious divisions among the member states.³⁵ Some members opposed the emphasis on preserving the strategic balance of power in Europe, believing that this gave NATO an appearance of wanting to maintain the previous status quo at a time when the Warsaw Pact was collapsing. Additionally, some alliance officials and member states were deeply divided on whether NATO’s successful adaptation would require changing its mission to include action outside of its territorial area. Among many NATO officials, there was considerable enthusiasm for giving NATO an out-of-area role—some even arguing that NATO’s future depended on it. However, France especially opposed any out-of-area language in the document, insisting that NATO should be maintained as a purely defensive alliance and not take on any new missions. NATO did agree to establish an Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), but this was to respond only to Article 5 challenges within the NATO territorial area.

Hoping to promote a more direct relationship with NATO and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, NATO also created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ See Kay, *op. cit.* in note 16, p. 62.

(NACC) at the Rome Summit. An American initiative, the NACC represented NATO's first attempt to go beyond "military contacts" and "regular diplomatic liaison" with the states of the former Warsaw Pact and to develop "a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues."³⁶ The Alliance invited the foreign ministers of all the former Warsaw Pact states to meet with their NATO counterparts, and the first meeting of the NACC was held in December 1991. The disintegration of the Soviet Union later that month led to the expansion of the NACC to include all former Soviet republics.

It was agreed at the founding of the NACC that its members would meet annually at the foreign minister level, and every two months at the ambassadorial level, with further meetings at these levels "as circumstances warrant."³⁷ The Allies and the other NACC states (which were known as "liaison partners") agreed to hold other meetings under the auspices of NATO committees with regard to security-related issues such as "defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes," and with regard to NATO's "third dimension" programs on science and the environment.³⁸

NACC membership was limited from the outset to NATO members and former adversaries (the Warsaw Pact states and their successors), because it was envisioned primarily as a specific instrument to overcome the divisiveness of the Cold War. However, the NACC's limitations soon became apparent. In the beginning, NACC discussions included specific problems such as the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the Baltic States and the dispute

³⁶ "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," November 1991, NATO Office of Information and Press.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. It soon became apparent to the governments that raised these issues, however, that the other NACC participants were unwilling to do more than simply listen to their complaints, and that the NACC was incapable of taking any real action about such matters. The focus of attention thus shifted to more general topics such as peacekeeping, scientific and environmental cooperation, arms control verification, and the conversion of defense industries. These topics were also of greater interest to states that were not original members of the NACC, and discussions soon followed about designing an institution that would be more inclusive and encompass activities beyond simply holding regular meetings—what would become known as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The NACC was finally replaced in May 1997 by an organization including all NACC and PfP participants—the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

By 1993, several Central and Eastern European states felt that only full NATO membership would resolve their perceived security dilemmas, promote stability to attract economic investment and eventual membership in the EU, and provide reassurance for democratic and market reform-oriented political leaders. The U.S. under President Bush had previously ruled out any NATO enlargement beyond absorbing the recently reunified East Germany. But by mid-1993, the U.S. (under a new presidential administration) had seriously begun to consider the possibility. Germany had begun to quietly but assertively push for NATO expansion in order to stabilize its eastern border and provide economic stability and reassurance for the growing free markets in the region. Germany thus proposed Associate Membership in NATO for some Central and Eastern European countries. Defense Minister Volker Rühe, in

particular, argued that Associate Membership could speed full entry into NATO for the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia).³⁹

Senior officials in the U.S. State Department (most notably Ambassador to Germany Richard Holbrooke) and the National Security Council (most notably National Security Advisor Anthony Lake) also began to support NATO enlargement, arguing that it could promote stability, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and democratic reform in the East.⁴⁰ In particular, they also felt that by integrating new members into NATO's transparent, multilateral planning process, post-communist states could avoid costly and competitive national defense build-ups that could lead to new security competition in the region. The advocates in the U.S. also hoped that NATO enlargement might push the EU to open its doors to new members in areas where it otherwise might not in the absence of NATO membership coming first.

However, opposition to enlargement in the U.S. came from both the Department of Defense (namely the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and Russia experts in the State Department (especially Deputy Secretary of State for Russian and East European Affairs Strobe Talbot).⁴¹ The former feared NATO expansion would lead to "overreach" of U.S. and allied military capabilities and strength and that any new members would bring more liabilities to the Alliance than assets. The latter opposed enlargement on the grounds that it might anger or upset the Russian government and be seen by it as a hostile move. Such concerns led to a compromise within the various agencies of the U.S. government: the Partnership for Peace (PfP).⁴²

³⁹ Kay, *op. cit.* in note 16, pp. 68-69.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁴² The name Partnership for Peace grew out of discussion in SHAPE about giving the NACC a "Partnership for Peacekeeping" function. While the PfP was the result of considerable interagency debate in the U.S., the primary impetus came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Among the NATO allies, there was a general agreement that some sort of compromise was necessary that would allow the Central and Eastern European countries to go beyond the NACC but stop short of full NATO membership, and there was no consensus at that time on NATO enlargement. Thus, the PfP seemed like the perfect compromise within NATO as well. The Partnership for Peace was first proposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany, in October 1993, and it was formally approved three months later at NATO's January 1994 Brussels Summit. Its purposes were clearly defined as follows:

At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.⁴³

Ultimately, several PfP members would go on to become full NATO members in two post-Cold War rounds of enlargement. (See Appendix One.)

By this time, all of the former communist states had significant ethnic minority problems that ranged from outright armed conflict (Yugoslavia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, etc.) to questions of legal citizenship (nearly everywhere else). The most pressing problems arose in the former Yugoslavia, where widespread conflict eventually prompted peacekeeping missions, armed intervention, or peace enforcement deployments in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia.⁴⁴ These conflicts threatened European security on several levels. They led to the greatest loss of life in Europe since the Second World War (with a majority of the casualties being civilians). The brutality of the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia

⁴³ North Atlantic Council Declaration, January 11, 1994, NATO Office of Information and Press.

⁴⁴ See Chapter Five.

and Kosovo approached nearly unthinkable proportions, as Serbs and Croats sought to “ethnically cleanse” areas populated with people of a different religious affiliation. The strife caused enormous refugee problems. And the conflicts threatened to reawaken centuries old European political rivalries, as several European countries politically backed one side or another.

3.0 THE POLITICS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.
Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Few national or international security issues are as controversial as the use of military force. While all member state governments of NATO and the EU would agree that national military forces should be prepared to defend their home country from direct attack, there is much less consensus on how and when (or even whether) military forces should be used in situations wherein the threat to a given friend or ally is less clear, less imminent, or even non-existent. This is understandable, as the decision to deploy military forces imposes tremendous risks on both the individual countries committing forces and to friends and allies, as well. The use of force is also inherently controversial because there are often significant risks if force is *not* used; for example, NATO and/or the EU could lose vital interests and/or credibility in international affairs. Finally, there is considerable disagreement over whether military force is effective in many situations for which it is proposed or used.

The end of the Cold War has made military intervention even more controversial because the fall of the Soviet Union eliminated the main guidepost that NATO allies relied upon for

planning for the use of military forces. During the Cold War, NATO policy for the use of military force was linked to U.S. containment policy, and the (then) European Community had no real military/security policy distinct from NATO. Nearly all NATO forces were dedicated to deterring or defeating a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe. Even U.S. policy for military operations outside Europe was oriented specifically toward the Soviet threat.

With the collapse of the Soviet threat, much of the traditional rationale that underpinned NATO military policy was suddenly invalid. Yet, even before the Cold War ended, there were signs that the NATO allies needed to focus on more than just the Soviet conventional and nuclear military threat. Events in the Middle East (including, for example, the various Arab-Israeli Wars and the 1979 Iranian revolution) highlighted how instability outside of the traditional NATO-Soviet confrontation could affect transatlantic security. A second factor was the rise of “low intensity conflict” (LIC) in the 1970s and 1980s. LIC includes operations such as counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and illegal narcotics interdiction—missions that require combat forces but fall short of full-scale war.⁴⁵ NATO leaders soon realized that the heavy armored and mechanized forces designed to defeat the Soviet threat were often poorly suited for LIC. More recently (in the 1990s), another set of contingencies began to emerge: situations in which armed forces are called upon to provide non-combat services in the form of humanitarian relief or disaster recovery.

Two types of guidelines affect the use of force.⁴⁶ The first set addresses the question of *whether* to use force. They help determine what kinds of situations lend themselves to being affected by intervention. In particular, they help determine what interests are involved and whether they are sufficiently important to justify sacrificing “blood and treasure” on their behalf.

⁴⁵ See Appendix Two.

⁴⁶ Haas, *op. cit.* in note 2, pp. 67-68.

In the terminology of public policy analysis, this first set of guidelines may be considered *policy-making*. The second set of guidelines address the question of *how* to use force. These guidelines are concerned with tactics, operational approaches to the use of force, and useful or necessary political concomitants. In the terminology of public policy analysis, this second set of guidelines may be considered *policy implementation*. While at first glance, the two sets of considerations are distinct, they cannot be effectively analyzed separately. The question of *whether to use force* cannot be separated from the question of *how to use it effectively*. If there is no satisfactory answer to the latter question, there can be no commitment to the former. The decision to use force cannot be made in the abstract; it must be grounded in implementation considerations.

Thus, in the attempt to understand and explain collective transatlantic policy formation and change regarding military intervention, I have incorporated both sets of considerations into an “intervention advocacy matrix.” Expanding upon a model of different post-Cold War American grand strategies proposed by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, I have identified three primary advocacy groups, within the transatlantic security regime.⁴⁷ Posen and Ross argue that “four grand strategies, relatively discrete and coherent arguments about the U.S. role in the world, now compete in our public discourse. They may be termed neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy.”⁴⁸

I argue that a typology matrix similar to these American grand strategies may also be utilized in order to identify the basic policy choices within the transatlantic security regime to be found at any given time with regard to any given crisis wherein military intervention is being or could be considered. Certainly, within the two cases presented here, the three advocacy groups

⁴⁷ Barry L. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1996.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

reflect (albeit very broadly) the primary policy choices available to political leaders. The neo-isolationist group identified by Posen and Ross in the United States corresponds with a “non-intervention” policy choice within the Euro-Atlantic regime. Similarly, their selective engagement group corresponds to a “limited intervention” policy choice. And finally, Posen and Ross’s cooperative security group corresponds to an “active intervention” group in transatlantic security policy-making. Their “primacy” group does not correspond to any policy choice regarding the use of military force in these two particular cases, as will be shown later.

Simply put, “non-intervention” represents a choice made by political leadership within the regime to not intervene with any type of *military force*. This does not preclude other types of intervention, such as political/diplomatic or economic influence; however, such policy tools are beyond the scope of study of this dissertation. Both “limited intervention” and “active intervention” reflect a decision made by political leadership within the regime that some level of military intervention is the preferred policy choice. Using Richard N. Haas’ classification scheme, “limited intervention” policy advocacy shall entail any policy preference for military intervention of the following types:⁴⁹ 1) peacekeeping;⁵⁰ 2) interdiction;⁵¹ 3) humanitarian assistance;⁵² or 4) indirect use of force.⁵³ “Active intervention” policy advocacy shall entail any

⁴⁹ Haas, *op. cit.* in note 2, pp. 49-65.

⁵⁰ Peacekeeping involves the deployment of unarmed or at most lightly armed forces in a peaceful environment, normally to buttress a fragile or brittle political arrangement between two or more contending parties. Peacekeepers are supposed to be impartial and relatively passive and to only use force as a last resort and then only for purposes of self-defense.

⁵¹ Interdiction involves the discrete and direct use of force to prevent specific equipment, resources, goods, or persons from reaching a port or terminal. It can be done to enforce sanctions or for law enforcement purposes.

⁵² Humanitarian operations involve the deployment of forces to save lives without altering any existing or ongoing political conflict. They can entail the delivery of basic human services where the central authority is unable or unwilling to do so, the evacuation of peoples, and/or the protection of a people from hostile forces.

⁵³ An indirect use of force involves providing military assistance in the form of training, arms, intelligence, etc. to another party so that it may employ force directly for its own purposes. It involves military instruments, but it is not a military intervention per se.

policy preference for military intervention of the following types: 1) preventive/preemptive attacks;⁵⁴ 2) punitive attacks;⁵⁵ 3) war fighting;⁵⁶ or 4) peace-making.⁵⁷

3.2 REGIME-LEVEL ANALYSIS

The term “transatlantic (or Euro-Atlantic) security regime refers to the construction of a system of interlocking institutions comprised of NATO, the EC/EU, and the WEU. As discussed in the previous chapter, the origins of this process of building a transatlantic security architecture lie not so much with the end of the Cold War but with the end of the Second World War. As much as “interlocking institutions” may be a post-Cold War concept, its primary function is the preservation and promotion of an Atlantic security community inherited from the Cold War.

An Atlantic security community, in Karl Deutsch’s terms, is essentially a transatlantic community that evolved from an accumulation of defense and security cooperation among its party states during the Cold War.⁵⁸ However, this defense and security cooperation is not entirely confined to the technical/military level; there is a broader socio-cultural aspect. The Atlantic community, as such, is not just NATO, although it was built around the existence of NATO and the East-West divide. The components of this transatlantic security community are

⁵⁴ Preventive/preemptive uses of force are those that seek to either stop another state or party from developing a certain military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it thereafter.

⁵⁵ Punitive actions are uses of military force designed to inflict pain and cost, that is, to make the opponent pay a price for his behavior.

⁵⁶ War fighting is the “high end” of military intervention and involves full-fledged combat operations. It brings to bear whatever forces are available and deemed necessary to dominate a confrontation by attacking enemy forces on the battlefield and those forces located elsewhere that could be introduced to or affect the battlefield.

⁵⁷ Peace-making is an imprecise term that includes a host of activities falling between peacekeeping and war fighting in environments characterized as neither “permissive” nor “hostile” but “uncertain.” Unlike war fighting, where the goal is to inflict significant destruction on the adversary, peace-making is carried out with measurable restraint. Much greater emphasis is placed on limiting the scope of the combat and on restoring or creating an environment in which resistance to a peace accord will become marginal and allow peacekeepers to operate.

⁵⁸ Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957).

also bound together by economic, social, and cultural links, as well as military ones. In this sense, the “culture” of the transatlantic security community goes beyond NATO as a formal institution, because it embodies the preservation of a certain way of life. In this context, countries such as Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden, although not members of NATO, are also part of this transatlantic security community’s culture. In this sense, institutions are simply the skeletal framework that holds the security community together; but the various webs linking this community together have risen above a tangible inter-institutional dimension to the sphere of cultural and social norms.

The transatlantic security community originally evolved from a set of post-World War II conditions that necessitated its existence: 1) the issue of Germany’s reintegration into Europe; 2) the ideological/political division of Europe into East and West; 3) the rehabilitation of the European economy; and 4) the direct Soviet military threat.⁵⁹ These conditions eventually culturally bound a group of states with the common thread of preserving a certain way of life. This way of life was determined by three factors: 1) the values of democracy; 2) the values of free market economies; and 3) U.S. geostrategic considerations.⁶⁰ During the Cold War, the transatlantic security community was bound together by at least two of these factors at any given time—and sometimes by all three. From this web of relations, the transatlantic security community evolved into an international regime over time. And a regime, in this sense, takes on a life of its own, regardless of the erosion of the original conditions that caused or led to its creation.

Thus, transatlantic military intervention policy adoption and change may be studied at the level of international regimes, which function as quasi-political entities. Stephen Krasner

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

defined an international regime as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area.”⁶¹ As such, a regime is quite different from other inter-state interactions, such as formal agreements, alliances, treaties, etc. Regime-based behavior is based on long-term rather than short-term calculations of interest. An actor is willing to give up a certain amount of decision-making flexibility and short-term gain-seeking in return for the assumption that other actors in the regime will reciprocate, to the benefit of all. In this sense, a regime protects and provides a collective good (in this case, security).

The more difficult part of this argument, of course, is attempting to “prove” that a regional security regime exists in the transatlantic geographic region. For this, I turn to Robert Jervis’ essay on security regimes.⁶² Jervis argues that there are essentially four main criteria necessary to establish a security regime.⁶³ First, the great powers want to establish it. Second, actors must also believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation. Third, even if all actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes cannot form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion. And fourth, war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly.

I believe that all criteria apply. First, remember the definition of a regime itself. The United States, its NATO allies, and the member states of the European Union all share a similar set of principles and norms in terms of international security. All share basic values about human rights, democracy, and free market economies. All share a basic belief in national sovereignty (as long as a national government poses no threat to other sovereign states or to its own people). All share a strong desire to avoid the bloody great power wars of the past and to

⁶¹ Krasner (ed.), *op. cit.* in note 1.

⁶² Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes” in Krasner (ed.), *op. cit.* in note 1.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 176-178.

maintain regional stability. They disagree to some degree on the appropriate rules for interaction, but all agree on the norms of intergovernmental negotiations and collective action. In this regard, it can be seen that it does not necessarily matter which institution (NATO or the EU) *implements* regime-wide security policy, since such policy will have *originated* from the shared values and norms of the regime.

As for Jervis' criteria, they also seem to apply. The great powers of the U.S., Germany, UK, and France are all willing participants of the regime, and his remaining three criteria are also easy to justify. All the members of the regime value mutual security and cooperation; this is especially true for the member states of the EU, which are integrated economically, socially, and somewhat politically. None of the states in the regime are currently in favor of any kind of attempt to expand territorially, and this has been codified in several post-war treaties recognizing current boundaries. And finally, (major) war between or among members within the region is certainly viewed as prohibitively costly by all.

3.3 CONTINUATION OF THE REGIME

The survival of a regime depends on how much it is valued by its members. According to Arthur Stein, regimes are maintained as long as the patterns of interest that gave rise to them are unaltered; since the distribution of power determines the patterns of interests, any change in the distribution of power can also lead to change in the regime.⁶⁴ However, this analysis does not explain why, after the end of the Cold War, the regime of the transatlantic security community is still maintained. But Stein goes on to explain that regimes may be maintained

⁶⁴ Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration," in Krasner (ed.), *op. cit.* in note 1, p. 138.

even after the interests that gave rise to them shift or are replaced with other interests. Although Stein's analysis is not based on security cooperation of any kind, it provides a reasonable explanation as to why the transatlantic security community should survive after the erasure of all the patterns of interest that gave rise to it. Stein gives three reasons why regimes are maintained even when the patterns of interests that gave rise to them are no longer existent or relevant:

- 1) It is more costly to dismantle institutions because, once set up, they serve to guide patterned behavior between states, and this cuts down on the costs of continuous recalculation of other states' behavior. In this context, confidence over one another's behavior is valued by states because it breeds stability.
- 2) Changes in interest do not automatically lead to changes in the regime or to its destruction because there may well be uncertainty about the permanence of the observed changes. This may generate a feeling that these institutions could be useful again in the future. In this sense, the regime and its institutions are maintained as an "insurance policy" in an uncertain international environment.
- 3) Actors attach importance to their reputations and are unwilling to break with customary international behavior from fear of damaging their reputations. In this sense, tradition provides the legitimacy for the maintenance of a regime. This stems from the value states ascribe to mutual reciprocity and the maintenance of a certain degree of order in their relations with other states.⁶⁵

The diffuse regime of the Cold War, which gave birth to the current transatlantic security regime, may no longer be valid, but the *principles and norms* of the security community survived, and thus the regime has survived as well.

3.4 HOW TO EXPLAIN: DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND RIVAL HYPOTHESES

National governments frequently attempt to persuade other countries to adopt a particular course of action—one more amenable to their policies and interests. Similarly, countries also

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

occasionally seek to convince others to abandon policies inimical to their interests. Such persuasion is one of the routine aspects of international relations. While much academic and policy literature has been produced on this subject in the economic security field regarding real or potential adversaries or rivals, little attention has been paid (especially in theoretical terms) to attempts at persuasion among governments within a security regime. Yet, for a collective regime policy to be successfully adopted and implemented, some level and intensity of inter-state influence must take place. In such cases, the use or threat of military force against a fellow regime member is unacceptable and unthinkable.⁶⁶ Instead, a government seeking to exert its influence must convince others to cooperate based upon the merits of the particular policy under discussion. Or, it may persuade the target governments that their interests will be better served by shifting course—or even that the interests themselves should be changed. The influencing government might also seek to convince another based upon the nature and strength of the relationship between the two countries.

The member states of the transatlantic security regime are bound together through a complex set of bilateral and multilateral connections. Linked politically, militarily, and economically, the regime members have created a relationship that can truly be described as one of “complex interdependence.”⁶⁷ Moreover, there is no expectation of the use or threat of

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁶⁷ Kevin Featherstone and Roy H. Ginsberg, *The United States and the European Community in the 1990s: Partners in Transition* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 243-247. In brief, the concept posits that when the well-being of a state depends on the cooperation of a second state, the first state is *dependent* on the second; when two or more states are simultaneously dependent on each other, they are interdependent. For a more detailed explanation of the concept of “complex interdependence,” see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd Edition (New York: Longman, 2001).

military force between or among regime members.⁶⁸ Thus, in Karl Deutsch's terminology, a genuine, pluralistic security community (i.e. regime) exists.⁶⁹

That does not mean, however, that the regime members necessarily share identical perspectives and interests. In fact, collaboration on a range of international issues both within and outside of the security issue-area has often proven difficult to arrange, and attempts at achieving cooperation or collective response have frequently served to highlight differences. Even within NATO or within the EU, two "enforcing" institutions within the regime, consensus has been far from automatic. Thus, if a collective policy is desired on a particular issue, member states (even the U.S.) must usually exert diplomatic influence, rather than simply assuming that others will automatically fall in line.

The dependent variable in the dissertation is thus the likelihood of the transatlantic security regime adopting and implementing a common policy regarding the use of military force in any given case. Such an attempt starts at the point where the four major regime members have significantly different views on what policy the regime should adopt and/or how it should proceed. When such a rival difference of views occurs, one or more regime major members must then begin to attempt to influence the others to change their approach to the problem and/or alter their behavior. Only if such an attempt succeeds can a collective policy be said to be truly successful.

Using the typology of military intervention described earlier, it is thus possible to allocate a numerical value to the level of desired military intervention (from lesser to greater levels of escalation): 0=non-intervention; 1=active distribution of (but not necessarily protection of

⁶⁸ It should be noted that there is one glaring exception to this, and that is the continuing tension between Greece and Turkey.

⁶⁹ Karl W. Deutsch, *op. cit.* in note 58, pp. 5-7.

humanitarian aid); 2=peacekeeping forces/observers; 3=surface interdiction (enforcing any arms and/or economic embargoes with military force); 4=defensive air interdiction (using air power to protect peacekeeping forces and/or humanitarian aid deliveries); 5=offensive air interdiction (enforcing a no-fly zone through air-to-air combat); 6=punitive attacks (limited air strikes against small number of ground targets); 7=sustained air bombardment; and 8=indirect use of ground forces (direct arms shipments to a belligerent and training of belligerent's armed forces); and 9=active use of ground forces (i.e. offensive ground combat operations).

To answer the research question, I will examine several independent variables, each of which will be based upon the relevant literature regarding foreign and security policy formation and change. Over the years, much effort has gone into explaining the basic motivations behind state behavior. I drew upon these theories and models to develop specific hypotheses about the conditions under which collective intervention policy formation and implementation are likely to succeed or fail. This should provide a better understanding of the process of collective intervention policy formation, along with the relevance and applicability of these theories.

Briefly, national-level security policy formation and change is usually explained in terms of either international or domestic effects (causal mechanisms). In understanding regime policy formation and change, these causal effects will be examined and tested. One obvious set of conditions that might affect collective policy formation are those found in the international system: its power capabilities relative to those of others, the presence of institutions and other actors that may shape that environment, etc. A second set of possible conditions includes internal (state) domestic factors that may play a role. This level includes the domestic factors that affect the choice and implementation of intervention policy by that state. Thus, the

hypotheses and independent variables will be grouped into two categories: international level and domestic level.

It should be noted that I do not expect (nor will I argue in the dissertation) that any *one* of these various explanations is singly adequate to explain the behavior examined here. What I attempt to do, however, is to examine which of these factors is/are the *stronger and more reliable* predictors/indicators of security regime behavior regarding the collective use of military force.

3.5 INTERNATIONAL LEVEL VARIABLES

The international level variables focus on interactions between states, including the possible influence of changes in the relative distribution of power across states and other non-domestic factors that affect the patterns of bargaining between them. No two actors or groups of actors in a given security policy situation will necessarily have the same, identical sets of interests. This is true whether they are individuals within the same government or leaders of different countries. Consequently, they will try to induce each other to “give in” to some degree to their own favored policy choice through some form of bargaining, persuasion, and/or coercion. In the literature, there are several rival explanations for which phenomena have the strongest influence on bargaining behavior.

Thus, at the international level, the following are possible (i.e. rival) explanations for coherence (or lack of it) in regime policy: 1) the distribution of power among the states within

the regime;⁷⁰ 2) the degree of perceived shared external threat or danger to the members of the regime;⁷¹ and 3) the role and influence of the enforcing institution(s) of the regime,⁷² including a possible “policy entrepreneur.”⁷³

3.6 DOMESTIC LEVEL VARIABLES

The domestic level variables focus on internal factors behind government behavior. Domestic politics almost inevitably affect the security policy behavior of national leaders, even in a collective regime structure. National leaders’ security policy choices are influenced by

⁷⁰ Derived from the realist tradition of international relations and more specifically, the structural realist school. This school of realist thought has two main divisions, but both argue that national policies regarding decisions of peace and war may be explained to a significant degree by major changes in the power structure/distribution in the international system. For an explanation of the “balance of power” school, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979) and Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in *International Organization* Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer) 1988, pp. 485-507. For an explanation of the “preponderance of power” school (also known as hegemonic stability theory), see A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1958) and Robert Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). In this case, I apply the structural realist literature to the transatlantic security regime as a sub-unit of the international system. Some scholars have adopted the concept of a “security complex” that possesses all the characteristics of a global system but is contained geographically to a specific region. In this case, a “security complex” may be analyzed in the same manner as a global system, using the same theories and methods. See Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, 2nd Edition (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 186-229.

⁷¹ The classic work that spawned a significant amount of literature examining the relationship between threat perception/misperception and state behavior is Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). See also Arthur A. Stein, “When Misperception Matters” in *World Politics*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (July) 1982, pp. 505-526.

⁷² Derived from neoliberal institutionalism. See Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Eleanor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). In addition, there is a wide body of literature on European integration that describes and/or explains the relationship between institutionalization and international cooperation. For an excellent study on the subject regarding the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, see Michael E. Smith, “The Quest for Coherence: Institutional Dilemmas of External Action from Maastricht to Amsterdam” in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, and Neil Filgstein (eds.), *The Institutionalization of Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁷³ The concept of policy entrepreneur was originally conceived and developed within the public policy literature; in recent years, the concept has been successfully adopted by EU scholars in their research. In the context that I am applying it, the concept might be more conveniently thought of as “individual level of analysis” in traditional international relations theory. From the public policy field, see especially Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari, “Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Policy Change,” *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1996, pp. 420-434. From the field of EU studies, see especially Andrew Moravcsik, “Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation” in *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 2, 1999, pp. 267-306.

domestic pressures and the effect that the expected policy outcome will most likely have on the leader's domestic position. In addition, at the domestic level, individual leaders generally act on the basis of the reality that they themselves perceive, and not necessarily as perceived by others they seek to cooperate with. In this regard, individual leaders' (and other relevant actors') perceptions (cultural, historical, ideological, etc.) of a specific security problem can also influence their decision-making about how to deal with it.

Thus, at the domestic level, the following are possible (rival) explanations for coherence (or lack of it) in regime policy: 1) the degree of congruence among national governments' perceived risk analysis or cost-benefit ratio of the policy (i.e. the perception of the risks and/or costs involved with the particular policy *vis-à-vis* the benefits to be gained)—also known as an expected utility or risk analysis model;⁷⁴ 2) the degree of congruence of domestic governmental or political alignment/structure of member states (ideological perception, strategic culture, etc.);⁷⁵ and/or 3) the degree of congruence in domestic public opinion and domestic elite support or opposition (for a given policy) of regime member states (domestic political pressures).⁷⁶

⁷⁴ A huge body of literature has been spawned discussing, explaining, and analyzing the rational actor model of human behavior. However, in the context of foreign policy analysis, see especially Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1972) and Jonathan Bendor and Thomas J. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models" in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 2, 1992, pp. 301-322.

⁷⁵ For examples of ideological-based study, see (for example) Katerina Brodin, "Belief Systems, Doctrines, and Foreign Policy," *Conflict and Cooperation*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1972), pp. 97-112; Alexander L. George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making" in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June) 1969, pp. 190-222; Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.), *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993); and Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy" in *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1996/1997, pp. 5-53. "Strategic culture" as an explanation for state behavior has gained much enthusiasm in the post-Cold War era; yet, it has remained stronger at explaining past state behavior rather than explaining and predicting *change* in state behavior. Perhaps the most (in)famous examples of this argument are Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) and (especially for its relevance for transatlantic relations) Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); but see also Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy" in *International Studies Review*, Volume 4, Issue 3, (Fall) 2002, pp. 87-113.

⁷⁶ Again, a huge body of literature also exists covering the influence of public opinion on national decision makers. For some very good examples of some relevance to this dissertation topic, see Richard Eichenberg, *Public Opinion*

4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: ABOUT THE SIX SETS OF VARIABLES

Why this is hell; nor am I out of it.
Christopher Marlowe, *The Tragical History of Dr. Faustus*

4.1 POWER AS INFLUENCE IN SECURITY REGIME POLICY CONGRUENCE

One of the most obvious indicators of a state's position in the international hierarchy is that of power. In much of realist theory, there is an assumption that the more power (i.e. resources and capabilities) a state possesses, the more likely it is to "get its way" with other states. Since states are ultimately self-interested, they should attempt to acquire and maintain increasing power.⁷⁷ In the anarchic world system, power is the ultimate guarantor of a state's freedom of action. A stronger state may use its power either coercively or as a means of influence to restrict another's choices, or the target state, if stronger, may more easily resist coercion or influence from other states.

However, it is not just the use of existing power resources (or influence derived from them) that may affect state behavior. A target state's resistance to influence may be affected by the possibility that an influence attempt will affect the future balance of power. Thus, a state's

and National Security in Western Europe (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989); Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and Eugene Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990).

⁷⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 25.

willingness to cooperate with another (or its willingness to be influenced by another) may depend on whether it believes such action will maintain or enhance its own relative power position; a target state will more strongly resist any influence attempt that adversely affects its current or future power. Thus, the realist literature on relative power and state behavior yields the first hypothesis.

H1: Changes in the relative distribution of power within the regime, among the major regime member states themselves, can increase or decrease the likelihood of successful collective regime policy formation.

This hypothesis is a direct test of realist literature and hegemonic theory. This theoretical approach would predict that changes in the distribution of power among the states within the regime result in changes in national security policies, as national leaders attempt to adjust their policies to adapt to new realities in power dyads and relative power positions. As such, collective regime policy would *increasingly become easier* to form as relative power within of the regime became *increasingly concentrated with the hegemon* (i.e. the U.S.) (H1A). Likewise, collective regime policy would *increasingly become more difficult* to form as relative power inside of the regime *became more diffuse* (H1B). The theoretical explanation for this prediction is that collective regime policy is increasingly easier to facilitate the stronger the hegemon is relative to the other major regime members. (The regime members have an increasingly stronger desire to cooperate due to a “bandwagoning” effect, but see less of a reason to cooperate as the benefits of “bandwagoning” with the hegemon decrease as the hegemon’s relative power decreases.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ See Stephen M. Walt, *On the Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

This independent variable of relational state power, derived from neorealist literature, is perhaps the easiest to measure. This concept refers to two aspects of state power.⁷⁹ One is the ready availability of a state's economic and military capabilities for external use. Consistent with the relative gains concerns of neorealists, the second aspect of strength places those capabilities in the context of similar capabilities available to other powers potentially seeking to challenge systemic norms or global leadership.

The relative strength concept has a long history of operationalization in the literature. Most attempts at empirically observing the relative strength of states first identify a subset of states seen as great powers and then create a "share" measure of some combination of economic and military capabilities. I use a measure fairly commonly used in the literature:⁸⁰ 1) identify a subset of major powers within the regime; 2) assess the size of each state's economy and military spending annually; and then 3) calculate each state's share of the aggregate values of military and economic capabilities using the following formula: $RS = (GDP/Group\ GDP) + (MilSpend/Group\ MilSpend)/2$.⁸¹ Thus, I am able to use the resulting annual values for each state to measure its relational power within the transatlantic security regime over the time covered by my case studies.

⁷⁹ Thomas J. Volgy and Alison Bailin, *International Politics and State Strength* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 43.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ RS=Relative Strength; GDP=Gross Domestic Product; MilSpend=Military Spending; and Group=Aggregate Scores for the Designated Group Powers. Source=Volgy and Bailin, *op. cit.* in note 76.

4.2 THREAT PERCEPTION AND SECURITY REGIME POLICY CONGRUENCE

Aside from balances or imbalances of power, another major international level factor that states may use to convince others to change their policies/behavior is that of shared external threat. Clearly, the shared threat of a potential Soviet attack did much to facilitate and promote collective transatlantic security policy. In fact, the fear that social unrest in postwar Europe could lead to revolution in and thus Soviet domination of Western Europe was a major factor in U.S. support for European integration. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the identity and nature of a common threat was much less clear. Such a common threat may have “rematerialized,” however, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. Thus the changing nature of perceived external threat yields a second hypothesis.

H2: An increase in the degree of perceived shared external threat or danger to the major members of the regime leads to an increase in the likelihood of a collective policy being formed (H2A). Conversely, a decrease in the degree of perceived shared external threat or danger to the major members of the regime leads to a decrease in the likelihood of a collective policy being formed (H2B).

In this case, it is not relative power that influences state or collective decision-making or policy-making; rather, it is perception of individual or shared threat. Simply put, regime members are more likely to cooperate and form collective security policies if they share the same type and degree of security threat. This hypothesis tests the neoliberal and constructivist critique of neorealism that states are concerned more with security than with power.

In order to measure this variable, I have designed a “threat matrix” consisting of four components with which I measure the degree of perceived potential threat that member states felt that they were under throughout the historical period of the study. For the purposes of this particular variable, “threat” will be defined as only potential threats external (to the security regime) that have the potential to cause loss of human life and/or serious economic disruption or

damage to the regime member states. Each component of the threat matrix can be measured as an ordinal measurement, thereby allowing analysis. The four components of the threat matrix are imminence, probability, proximity, and severity. Each is assigned an ordinal value of (in descending order of threat) very high, high, medium, low, or very low. “Imminence” is defined as nearness in time (i.e. the higher the imminence rating, the lower amount of reaction time is available to policy-makers once the threat becomes actual rather than potential). “Probability” is defined as the likelihood of the threat moving from potentially to actually occurring. “Proximity” is defined as the nearness of regime members in geographic space to the source of the threat. And “severity” is defined as the damage that would occur to member states in terms of (primarily) loss of human life and (secondarily) economic damage and/or disruption if the threat became actualized.

4.3 ENFORCERS, FACILITATORS, OR RIVALS? THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN SECURITY REGIME POLICY CONGRUENCE

Another international level condition that may affect the likelihood of collective regime policy formation is the existence of a formal international institution in which relevant countries are active members. By providing consistency, rules of behavior, and dispute resolution mechanisms in a particular issue area, they can reduce state insecurity and conflict to a degree that a state might not achieve by itself. By facilitating the pooling of members’ resources, institutions may also provide more ability to deal with a crisis or threat directly. Thus, it would

be in a state's interest to cooperate within the institution, and, indeed, a state's own view of its interests may come to include the preservation of the institution itself.⁸²

The structure of the international institution not only makes international interaction within the given issue area much easier but also institutionalizes the preferences of the major actors in that issue area. In such cases, institutions may affect how key actors seek to maximize their interests. They may alter the interests themselves, become a source of power to which the actors can appeal, or even change the power capabilities of certain actors.⁸³ Additionally, an appeal by one or more states within the regime to another, encouraging it to change its policy/behavior for the "good of the institution," may have a significant impact, particularly if the very continued existence of that institution seems in question. Thus, the literature on international institutions yields a third hypothesis.

H3: The higher level of participation within an enforcing institution of the regime (including the active participation and influence of an individual "policy entrepreneur" within the institution) increases the likelihood of collective regime policy formation and implementation.

This hypothesis directly tests various neoliberal and institutionalist theories, which argue that the role of institutions as enforcing mechanisms in regimes can transcend simple state-to-state bargaining and negotiating behavior. For this dissertation, there are two (sometimes rival) enforcing institutions for the regime: NATO and the EU. Throughout the period of time covered by the two cases I examine, these two institutions undertook rather significant policy and even structural changes, as they adapted to the new, post-Cold War security environment. To test this hypothesis, I examine diplomatic initiatives that took place within the institutions in attempts to formulate a common policy and attempt to determine what (if any) effect the presence of the

⁸² Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World" in Krasner (ed.), *op. cit.* in note 1, pp. 132, 138-139.

⁸³ Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 5-6.

formal institutional structures had on making collective regime policy formation easier and/or more difficult.

NATO and the EU comprise several sovereign member states. Neither institution has legal sovereignty and lacks a central executive power in the manner that a sovereign state possesses one (such as a president or prime minister). Yet, because of the manner in which each institution was designed, both must make major decisions regarding the use of force or military intervention *by unanimous consent of all member states*. In NATO, unanimous consent is necessary in the North Atlantic Council—NATO’s highest decision-making body for such major policy decisions. Within the EU, only the European Council (the collective heads of government of all member states) can make such a decision. This principle of unanimity at work in both institutions makes collective decisions on major and controversial issues difficult to achieve, and it is within this institutional environmental context that both NATO’s Secretary General and the four largest member states must work in to advance their national policy interests.

Thus in terms of this particular dependent variable in relation to the decision-making procedures of the two institutions, the role of individual institutional leaders (such as Secretary General) in facilitating collective policy formation becomes extremely relevant. The role of individual leaders and bureaucrats in facilitating policy formation and implementation is widely studied in public policy; also, the field of EU studies has increasingly examined such behavior. While one could theoretically examine the “personal diplomacy” and personal relationships of all the national and international leaders throughout this time period, only one position is worthy to investigate in the context of this particular variable/hypothesis: NATO Secretary General.⁸⁴ As

⁸⁴ During the historical period of the dissertation, NATO had three Secretary Generals: Manfred Wörner (1988-1994), Willy Claes (1994-1995), and Dr. Javier Solana (1995-1999). The position of High Representative for CFSP was established by the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union (ratified in 1997) but was not filled until June 1999—after the Kosovo war had ended. Thus, that position was not in existence during this time period.

such, I examine what role (if any) the men who held this position during this time played in facilitating (or hindering) successful adoption of collective regime policy. This particular variable is one of the most difficult to measure, in part because it is nearly impossible to quantify. In order to determine the level of influence that one or both institutions in question may have had during this period, I use two qualitative measurements.

First, I attempt to determine to what degree the institution contributed to or was otherwise a part of policy debate over the case in question. Second, I determine whether and to what degree the institutional leader (Secretary General) in question was supported by the U.S. and/or other major powers. The higher the degree of policy congruence and common support from the major powers at the outset of the crisis, the *less likely* the individual was independently influential. Instead, any such “influence” might be explained by the backing of powerful/influential states within the regime. For an individual to be considered to be a true “policy entrepreneur,” he or she must be shown to wield influence that transcends the power relationships of the relevant actors.

4.4 SECURITY REGIMES AND RISK ANALYSIS

The debate over whether expected utility decision rules explain public policy and foreign policy outcomes has received considerable attention over the years. At the core of the debate are questions about the actual decision-making behavior of political leaders: whether they maximize or satisfy utility, whether they are capable of making detailed calculations or are limited to

simplifying heuristics, and whether they are influenced by framing effects.⁸⁵ According to various “rationality-based” theories (expected utility theory, game theory, rational-comprehensive theory, etc.) decision makers attempt to think about the outcomes that could result from the available choices as well as the chances of those outcomes occurring, and then choose the alternative that seems in some way to offer the best potential for success.⁸⁶ The debate over rationality in decision-making is so omnipresent in all fields of social science that one could venture to say that it has become one of the most fundamental—if not the most fundamental debate. In any case, while this dissertation is in no way meant to be some sort of comprehensive test of the expected utility model, the literature in the field does nevertheless yield a fourth hypothesis.

H4: The perceived risk analysis or cost-benefit ratio of the policy (i.e. the perception of the risks and/or costs involved with the particular policy vis-à-vis the benefits to be gained) increases (H4A) or decreases (H4B) the likelihood of collective regime policy formation.

This hypothesis tests the expected utility body of literature. Simply put, the higher the costs of military intervention (in terms of both monetary costs and loss of human life) in relation to expected benefits, all regime members should be *less prone* to intervene; thus the likelihood of adopting a single collective policy *increases*. Similarly, the higher the perceived benefits of military intervention in relation to expected costs, all regime members should be *more prone* to intervene; thus likelihood of adopting a single collective policy also *increases*. When the two factors balance each other out, or when the costs and benefits of military intervention are perceived or measured differently across major regime members, then the likelihood of adopting a single collective regime policy should *decrease*. In order to measure this rather difficult

⁸⁵ See Michael Brecher, *Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality* (New York: Pergamon, 1993).

⁸⁶ See especially William N. Dunn, *Public Policy Analysis*, 2nd Edition (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1994), p. 275 and Graham T. Allison, *op. cit.* in note 74.

variable, I use a set of qualitative “costs” and “benefits”—both material and political and distinct to each case—in order to generally reflect and measure the expected utility of the outcome (non-intervention, limited intervention, or active intervention) in each case.

4.5 PERCEPTUAL LENSES AND SECURITY REGIME POLICY CONGRUENCE

Examination and analysis of decision makers’ ideology and belief structure has arisen, in large part, as a direct challenge to the rational actor paradigm. Like the rational actor school, this body of literature is widespread and has come from a variety of social science disciplines each viewing the debate through its own (disciplinary) lens. Many such scholars see rational choice theory as being normative and prescriptive rather than an accurate reflection of how actual human decision-making takes place.⁸⁷

One factor that makes purely “rational” decision-making so difficult in any field of public policy—and especially in foreign/security policy—is that, in many instances and contexts, public policy decisions involve an issue of morality. Especially in the area of “high politics” (such as decisions on the use of military force), decisions are necessarily undertaken in such a way that involves making a moral judgment, based on the assumption that some categories of violence are justifiable, whereas others are not. Such decisions then, necessarily involve the moral, ideological, and philosophical perceptual lenses of the decision makers involved in making them. Thus, a fifth hypothesis is presented.

⁸⁷ See, for example, Herbert A. Simon’s studies of decision-making and “bounded rationality” in *Administrative Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1945); *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1957); and *The Sciences of the Artificial* (New York: Wiley, 1970).

H5: A collective regime policy is increasingly likely to be formed as the ideological beliefs and policy views of the major member state leaders are increasingly similar (H5A). Likewise, collective regime policy formation is increasingly unlikely the more dissimilar the ideological beliefs and policy views of the major member state leaders (H5B).

Simply put, this hypothesis will test various scholarly arguments (primarily from constructivist and public policy literature) that purely “rational” decision-making with regard to a given policy is a misnomer, as individual leaders and decision makers view every policy issue or problem through their own ideological perceptual lens. Thus, while a national policy adopted by one state may seem quite “irrational” to others (with regard to power, security, cost-benefit ratio, etc.), that adopted policy may, in fact, be quite rational when viewed through such an ideological lens. As such, collective regime policy formation is easier to facilitate when national leaders share the same or similar ideological/political beliefs and increasingly harder the farther apart such beliefs are.

Operationalizing psychological factors of political leaders (especially on a cross-national basis) is enormously difficult. However, one of the more noteworthy aspects of an individual’s belief system is that it exhibits at least some degree of organization; an ideological belief system is tightly and coherently organized or constrained.⁸⁸ The structuring is deductive in the sense that knowledge of higher-level elements (for example the decision maker’s position on the left-right political continuum) permits the observer to infer lower-level phenomena (specific policy preferences) with a degree of accuracy.

The Bosnia and Kosovo cases thus provide an opportunity to evaluate the applicability of the perceptual lenses and ideological belief structures of individual political leaders outside the traditional context of domestic politics and policy. Expanding upon a model of different post-

⁸⁸ Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 206-261.

Cold War American grand strategies proposed by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, I have identified three primary belief typologies regarding military intervention and the use of military force within the transatlantic security regime.⁸⁹ Posen and Ross argue that “four grand strategies, relatively discrete and coherent arguments about the U.S. role in the world, now compete in our public discourse. They may be termed neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy.”⁹⁰ A model based upon these American “grand strategies” may also be utilized in order to determine the belief typologies of the leaders of the four major member states within the transatlantic security regime during the Bosnia crisis. The neo-isolationist group identified by Posen and Ross in the United States corresponds with a “non-intervention” typology within the transatlantic regime. Similarly, their selective engagement group corresponds to a “limited intervention” typology. And finally, the American cooperative security group corresponds to an “active intervention” typology in transatlantic security policy making. The primacy group is non-existent in this particular case study.

Individual psychological belief systems are the central organizing principle for these typologies. All three typologies have distinctive and very different belief structures. These beliefs can effectively be organized in accordance with specific categories based upon research conducted and published by Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith regarding advocacy coalition groups.⁹¹ Specifically, each policy belief structure/typology has a deep (normative) core,⁹² a set of fundamental policy beliefs,⁹³ and instrumental beliefs.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Barry L. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, *op. cit.* in note 47.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁹¹ Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, *op. cit.* in note 75. See also Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment” in Paul A. Sabatier (ed.), *Theories of the Policy Process* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 117-166.

⁹² Deep/normative core beliefs are belief sets and structures that an individual is unwilling to challenge, negotiate, or sacrifice. They transcend both the specific policy discussion and the overall policy issue-area and may be derived from a wide set of sources, including political, religious, cultural, ethnic, educational, economic, geographic, etc.

4.6 EVERYONE'S WILD CARD: DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES AND SECURITY REGIME POLICY CONGRUENCE

The third aspect of the domestic level of analysis that is important to this study is that of domestic political pressures. Public opinion and/or strong domestic political opposition can certainly be a powerful factor in foreign policy analysis. And when studying a topic as controversial as the use of military force, I do not believe that any serious analysis can reasonably leave out such domestic political pressure as a potential explanatory variable. Thus, the last hypothesis is as follows.

H6: The collective level of agreement of public opinion and opposition political parties among the major regime member states regarding the use of military force can increase the likelihood of adopting a single collective regime policy (H6A). Conversely, strong differences in public opinion among major member states or strong disagreement between domestic political parties of member states can decrease the likelihood of adopting a single collective regime policy (H6B).

In other words, as the collective public opinion and/or domestic political elite support among the member states of the regime for a particular intervention policy increases, the likelihood of the regime adopting that policy also increases. And as the collective public opinion and/or domestic political elite support regarding a given policy declines (or opposition increases), the likelihood of the regime adopting a unified policy will also decline. The key here is that *collective* regime public opinion and/or domestic opposition support must increase or decrease. If significant differences in public opinion or domestic political opposition among

⁹³ Fundamental policy belief structures are views concerning the general issue-area (in this case European security) rather than the specific policy under discussion. They are derived from the core beliefs, and individuals are unlikely to deviate from them—but more willing to do so if their core values/beliefs are threatened.

⁹⁴ Instrumental beliefs represent views about a specific policy under discussion (in this case military intervention and/or the use of force in Bosnia) and are derived from an individual's fundamental policy beliefs. Individuals are more willing to compromise on these beliefs than any others.

member states exist, collective regime policy formation should logically be more difficult (if not impossible) to achieve.

5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: BOSNIA

This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans. If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country, and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.

Jacques Poos, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg and
Chair of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, July 1, 1991

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In June 1991, Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Attempts made by the Yugoslav Army to stop this were ineffectual, and the war soon spread to Croatia. In an uneasy compromise to end the fighting, Slovenia and Croatia gained their independence but did not get back territory seized by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav federal army. The Bosnian Civil War that followed close behind Slovenian and Croatian independence lasted more than two years and left an estimated 150,000 dead and over four million homeless (almost a quarter of the pre-war population).⁹⁵ In the years following these events, the memory of the crisis was made even more bitter because of the nagging criticism that perhaps much of the death and suffering could have been avoided if the transatlantic security regime had used military force more quickly and more effectively. Yugoslavia was not some distant former colonial possession or trading partner in

⁹⁵ Dan Smith, *The Penguin Atlas of War and Peace* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 52.

Africa or Asia. It was in the heart of Europe, and it was a place that had seen political violence too often before.

As the Balkan debacle unfolded, all the members of the transatlantic security regime were characterized by their quick moral outrage over events in Bosnia but also by a shared limited willingness to commit lives, money, and political capital in the Balkans. All of the regime members were also subject to deep confusion and divisiveness over questions about the legitimate and effective use of military force. These common traits would continue to haunt the regime throughout the historical period covered by the case studies in this dissertation—and to a high degree, remain unresolved today.

The shared confusion and divisiveness was particularly striking at the outset of Yugoslavia's breakup. The administration of U.S. President George H.W. Bush had no strong views about how to handle the crisis distinct from the general European view. The only policies the members of the regime could agree on at the outset of the crisis were: 1) not to intervene militarily; 2) to use diplomacy to support Yugoslav territorial integrity; and 3) to keep NATO out of it.⁹⁶ Both Americans and Europeans were preoccupied with the impending disintegration of the Soviet Union and feared the precedent that the collapse of Yugoslavia might set. There was thus a general transatlantic agreement that federal unity should be preserved in both cases—at least until Germany started unilaterally pressing for diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in mid-1991.

The Bush administration was inclined to leave the problem to the Europeans. Bush had spent a great deal of political capital on the prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War but (despite the impressive diplomatic and military victory) was finding his domestic approval ratings steadily

⁹⁶ Dana H. Allin, *NATO's Balkan Interventions*, Adelphi Paper No. 347 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 16 and 102.

declining, due mainly to domestic economic factors.⁹⁷ Moreover, European leaders appeared confident and eager to take on the Balkan crisis by themselves. In addition to the now infamous quote by Luxembourg Foreign Minister and Chair of the EC's Council of Foreign Ministers Jacques Poos, European Commission President Jacques Delors went so far as to actually issue a warning to the U.S. in the summer of 1991 that any active American engagement would be regarded as meddling in European affairs: "We do not interfere in American affairs; we hope that they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours."⁹⁸

For many West European politicians, it was the "wrong war at the wrong time." By any set of objective standards, EC/EU political intervention was a complete failure—except perhaps for the fact that the EU ultimately held together as a semi-unitary international political actor despite the mishandling of its first foreign policy crisis. The priority given by the EU to developing a *compromise* policy (i.e. one accommodating widely divergent national views and interests) came at the expense of developing and implementing an *effective* policy. And this did not conform to the intended new image crafted in the Maastricht Treaty of a new European Union able to assert itself not only in European matters but in global politics, as well. The failure to find a "European" solution to the crisis cast a long shadow over attempts to put a Common Foreign and Security Policy at the heart of the European integration project.

The EU failure, however, was not unique. All international institutions with some role in preserving security and stability within Europe were tarnished in some way by their involvement (or lack thereof) in the Yugoslav crisis. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was very quickly sidelined by virtually all of the major actors. The WEU showed that it could not handle "out-of-area" military operations (for which only NATO had any real

⁹⁷ See David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001).

⁹⁸ Allin, *op. cit.* in note 96, p. 102.

capacity—and then only if led by the United States). And NATO itself was torn between adopting and implementing military operations that were severe enough to influence Serb behavior but not so severe as to risk open warfare with Serbia or an unraveling of the Alliance. And things were muddled even more by a complicated, slow-response UN leadership and command system. The UN Security Council maintained its role at the top of the “hierarchy” of international institutions throughout the crisis, but its impotence in actually implementing its own resolutions derived it of much real credibility. For its part, the U.S. was initially only too happy to let the Europeans take the lead in handling the Yugoslav crisis. However, as the situation escalated beyond the Europeans’ ability to manage it, American involvement at some level became nearly unavoidable.

All of these issues and problems before and during the Bosnia crisis provide the first case study in this dissertation. The case illustrates that involvement in any conflict wherein there is no major direct or immediate traditional security threat to a country (and/or its allies) considering military intervention is likely to provoke contradictory pressures within the transatlantic security regime that can combine to produce unsatisfactory results for everyone. The case also provides the first test of whether and how these pressures may be overcome.

5.2 PRELUDE TO DISASTER: SLOVENIA, CROATIA, AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

5.2.1 Initial Responses

To the extent that the West had a collective policy toward the Yugoslav crisis before the outbreak of fighting, that policy was generally aimed at discouraging the use of violence (by all

sides) to achieve political goals and peaceful resolution of the conflict.⁹⁹ By the spring of 1991, however, growing popular support for independence in Slovenia and Croatia set the stage for violent confrontation in Yugoslavia. The Serb-dominated federal Yugoslav government made it clear that it would not voluntarily allow the country to dissolve into its component parts.¹⁰⁰

As the two republics began to move toward independence, both individual Western countries and international institutions appealed for a peaceful settlement, hoping to maintain (at least in some form) Yugoslavia's unity. The European Community sent Commission President Jacques Delors to Belgrade but also gave its first indication of the difficulty in adopting a common EC position. Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos (whose country held the rotating EC presidency at the time) stated that the EC would not recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by Slovenia or Croatia; but Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek (whose country would succeed Luxembourg to the EC presidency) also warned that the EC would not support the Yugoslav federation "at any price."¹⁰¹ U.S. Secretary of State James Baker also visited Yugoslavia, returning to have the State Department issue a statement emphasizing the U.S. goal of preserving the unity of Yugoslavia and opposing any changes in internal borders.¹⁰² But these preliminary efforts to prevent the crisis were primarily rhetorical and ultimately unsuccessful.

The Yugoslav crisis exploded when the governments of Slovenia and Croatia decided to declare independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991. The initial confrontation centered on Slovenia, which sought to assert independent control over its international border crossings, and

⁹⁹ Stuart Kaufman, "The Irresistible Force and the Imperceptible Object: The Yugoslav Breakup and Western Policy," *Security Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 1994-1995, pp. 306-307.

¹⁰⁰ Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), p. 37.

¹⁰¹ Saadia Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years, 1990-1995* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 32-33.

¹⁰² Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans* (London: Mandarin, 1994), p. 40.

this led to clashes with the Yugoslav Federal Army.¹⁰³ These actions raised alarm throughout the West and set into motion a series of efforts by various actors to diffuse the crisis.

European leaders reacted to the outbreak of violence by initially pursuing diplomatic efforts through two parallel institutional tracks: the CSCE and the EC. As the crisis began to unfold, Austria (which was not yet a member of the EC) notified Belgrade of its concern over “unusual military activity” in Yugoslavia, and this formal diplomatic action triggered a requirement that Yugoslavia clarify its intentions through the CSCE’s Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, the European Council (EC heads of state and government) agreed on June 29 to send the “troika” (Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands)¹⁰⁵ on a mediating mission to Yugoslavia. Germany and Italy took the lead in pushing for EC action. On the night before the EC summit, Germany proposed that the EC hold “urgent consultations” on the Yugoslav crisis, and Germany and Italy together asked the Council to authorize a high-level EC mission to Yugoslavia; Germany also raised the issue of suspending EC aid to Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁶ The Council also decided to support Austria’s request to convene the CSCE emergency mechanism and to freeze aid to Yugoslavia unless there was an immediate cessation of violence.¹⁰⁷ As the troika departed for Belgrade, the EC called on Slovenia to

¹⁰³ As was expected, the declarations of independence by the two northwestern republics were followed by an emergency session on the same day of the federal parliament in Belgrade, during which it called on the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to intervene to prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia. On June 27, the Federal Secretariat for National Defense mobilized 1,990 members of the JNA and charged them with the task of taking over all border crossings in Slovenia. Any resistance was to “be crushed.” During the next four days, fighting and air attacks intensified, resulting in the deaths of over 100 people.

¹⁰⁴ Michael Libal, *Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), pp. 14 and 16-19. (Libal was head of the Southeast Europe Department of the German Foreign Ministry from 1991-1995.) This requirement was established by the Stockholm Confidence and Security Building Measures Agreement as further amended in the Paris CSCE Charter, Article 17.

¹⁰⁵ The EC’s troika consisted of the foreign minister of the country holding the EC presidency as well as the ministers from the immediate past and succeeding presidency countries (with the presidency rotating every six months in alphabetical order). The troika changed to Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal on July 1, when the Netherlands assumed the presidency.

¹⁰⁶ Libal, *op. cit.* in note 104, pp.13-15.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

suspend its declaration of independence, asked Serbian leaders to support installing Stipe Mesic as head of the collective presidency,¹⁰⁸ and proposed a cease-fire with forces returning to their barracks.¹⁰⁹

The overnight mission to Belgrade and Zabreb seemed to produce the EC's first diplomatic success: an agreement to suspend hostilities and a three-month moratorium on Slovenia's and Croatia's move toward independence. It was hailed by several senior European officials as a sign of the EC's political maturity, expertise, and independence from the U.S. In addition to Jacques Poos' bold quote about the "hour of Europe," Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis also remarked: "From our point of view, it is a good sign for the future of (European) political union. When a situation becomes delicate, the Community is able to act as a political entity."¹¹⁰ De Michelis even went so far as to publicly point out that Washington and Moscow had been "informed," not consulted, about the EC diplomatic mission to Yugoslavia.¹¹¹

However, the fragility of the agreement was apparent from the beginning. Slovenes were not entirely prepared to back away from a struggle for independence that had already cost them blood, and the various parties in Yugoslavia disputed among themselves just what they had agreed upon with the troika. As the violence continued, Poos, on behalf of the EC, threatened to freeze all aid unless the agreement was implemented immediately. In an effort to salvage its earlier agreement, the troika returned to Yugoslavia on June 30 to nail down in concrete terms each side's responsibilities.¹¹² Some, especially the British, believed that the troika should have

¹⁰⁸ Mesic, a Croat, was scheduled to become head as a result of the normal rotation of the presidency, but his appointment was blocked by Serbia and its supporters.

¹⁰⁹ Libal, *op. cit.* in note 104, p. 14.

¹¹⁰ *The Guardian*, June 29, 1991, www.guardian.co.uk.

¹¹¹ *International Herald Tribune*, July 1, 1991, www.iht.com.

¹¹² *The Guardian*, July 1, 1991, www.guardian.co.uk.

remained in Yugoslavia on its first visit until the cease-fire was assured.¹¹³ On July 1, Mesic was confirmed as the head of the federal presidency. In response to the troika's initial mission, Slovenia called on the EC to send observers to monitor the terms of the agreement, and this was immediately supported by Germany.¹¹⁴

Meanwhile, the CSCE began to consider what actions it might take, and representatives to the CPC met in Vienna on July 1. They (including Yugoslavia) agreed to an immediate cease-fire and return of troops to barracks but reached no agreement on Austria's proposal that the CSCE send observers.¹¹⁵ Two days later, representatives of 35 CSCE countries met in Prague (the seat of the CSCE secretariat). At the Prague meeting, CSCE officials reached an agreement on two diplomatic missions. The first sought to promote a dialogue among the parties "in consultation and agreement with the Yugoslav authorities"; and the second was an approval for the idea of sending observers to monitor the cease-fire, with the logistical arrangements and details to be carried out by the EC.¹¹⁶

In response to the CSCE's endorsement of an EC-led observer mission, a group of senior EC officials was sent to lay the groundwork for a group of civilian observers to monitor the cease-fire. The EC also agreed to send the troika to Yugoslavia on a third diplomatic mission, place an embargo against arms shipments to Yugoslavia, and suspend EC aid.¹¹⁷ Prior to the July 5, 1991, EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Van den Broek and EC External Relations Commissioner Frans Andriessen met with Secretary of State Baker in Washington, where Baker gave his support to the EC's efforts and indicated that the United States would join in suspending

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, July 3, 1991.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*; and Libal, *op. cit.* in note 104, p. 16.

¹¹⁵ Touval, *op. cit.* in note 101, pp. 42-44.

¹¹⁶ *The Guardian*, July 4, 1991, www.guardian.co.uk.

¹¹⁷ Libal, *op. cit.* in note 104, p. 19.

aid and imposing an arms embargo.¹¹⁸ The EC ministers also held out the prospect of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia if violence from the federal government continued.

On July 7-8, the troika met with representatives of the Yugoslav government, Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia on the Adriatic island of Brioni and hammered out a “Common Declaration on the Peaceful Resolution of the Yugoslav Crisis.” The Brioni Declaration (“accepted” but never actually signed by the various parties) contained four points: 1) the Yugoslav parties alone should decide their future; 2) negotiations on Yugoslavia’s future should begin no later than August 1; 3) the Yugoslav presidency would assert authority over the federal army; and 4) all parties would refrain from unilateral acts, especially the use of violence.¹¹⁹

Throughout the crisis thus far, NATO had maintained a low profile. On June 27, a NATO spokesman stated that NATO was “greatly concerned about the deterioration of the situation” and indicated that NATO was “following the situation closely.”¹²⁰ NATO’s Political Committee held an emergency session in order to discuss the crisis.¹²¹ The Alliance’s reluctance to get involved was attributable in large part to the United States’ inclination to allow Europeans to take the lead. The *Financial Times* quoted one U.S. official: “After all, it’s not our problem; it’s a European problem.”¹²² Throughout July, NATO’s Political Committee continued to meet, primarily as a forum for exchanging views and as a channel between the U.S. and the NATO members that were also members of the EC. The U.S. did not waver from its determination to leave the initiative to the EC and CSCE, and there is no indication that NATO discussed playing any sort of military role or initiating any sort of contingency planning at that time.

¹¹⁸ *Washington Post*, July 5, 1991, pp. A3-4.

¹¹⁹ James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 52.

¹²⁰ *Financial Times*, June 27, 1991, p. 1.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, June 29/30, 1991, p. 2.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

In the first months of the conflict, the UN also maintained a low profile. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar stressed that the crisis was an internal matter that the Yugoslavs should resolve on their own.¹²³ He specifically rejected the idea of sending UN observers in response to any Slovene request on the grounds that Slovenia was not an independent member of the UN, and that view was echoed by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, who stated, “The UN has no role in Yugoslavia” unless the EC and CSCE efforts fail.¹²⁴

5.2.2 Divergent Actor Preferences

Almost from the beginning, the EC’s efforts to resolve the Yugoslav crisis were hindered by divergent views among key member states on the appropriate course of action. Initially, the EC focused on trying to find a solution that would maintain some form of federal state, and this led the EC to avoid supporting Slovenian or Croatian independence. The first step toward a more sympathetic attitude toward independence came from growing pressure against what was perceived as the EC’s undue support for the federal government.

The reaction was strongest in Germany, where a number of Bundestag members called for a policy more supportive of Slovenia and Croatia. In a strongly worded statement, the Chair of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) stated:

We won our unity through the right to self-determination. If we Germans think everything else in Europe can just stay as it was, if we follow a status quo policy and do not recognize the right to self-determination in Slovenia and Croatia, then we have no moral or political credibility. We should start a movement in the EC to lead to such recognition.¹²⁵

¹²³ *Washington Post*, July 4, 1991, p. A19.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *The Guardian*, July 2, 1991, www.guardian.co.uk.

These criticisms were echoed by senior Social Democrat (SPD) officials after a trip to Yugoslavia. This emphasis on self-determination in both the German government and in German public opinion was reinforced by strong historical and cultural ties with the Croats (including the presence of 500,000 Croats living in Germany).¹²⁶ Similar concerns were also voiced in Italy, especially among political leaders in the region near the border with Slovenia, as well as by the leader of the Italian Republican Party.¹²⁷

By contrast, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Greece appeared most determined to hold Yugoslavia together. There were a number of reasons for this reluctance to support Croatian and Slovenian independence: fears that it would inflame separatist movements in their own countries; concern that dissolving Yugoslavia would set a dangerous precedent throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and, in the case of France, its historical ties to Serbia.¹²⁸ Greece was the strongest supporter of maintaining the federal state, driven by its fear of a potential conflict with an independent Macedonia, as well as its increasingly strong political ties with and support of Serbia.¹²⁹ Although EC leaders strove to maintain the appearance of unity, the strains increasingly showed through. Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl noted that some (unnamed) EC countries had "considerable problems in separatist ideas in their own countries" and thus were "more interested in projecting any decisions in Yugoslavia to their situations at home."¹³⁰

In response to these internal pressures (as well as continued Serbian intransigence in diplomatic negotiations) Germany and Italy, along with Belgium and Denmark, moved toward supporting recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. France, Spain, Greece, and the Netherlands (in

¹²⁶ *Time*, December 30, 1991, pp. 13-14.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, June 29, 1991, p. 8.

¹²⁸ Almond, *op. cit.* in note 102, pp. 236-237.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *The Guardian*, July 2, 1991, www.guardian.co.uk.

its role as EC president) remained the most resolute in favor of preserving Yugoslavia's unity (although criticism in the French press grew as the crisis dragged on), while the United Kingdom's position seemed to float somewhere in the middle.¹³¹ In a strongly worded statement clearly aimed at Germany, Van den Broek said, "It is easy from behind a desk to recognize Slovenia and Croatia and leave the rest of the work aside."¹³²

5.2.3 The Spread of War

The EC's efforts to implement the Brioni accord initially focused on bringing an end to the fighting in Slovenia and a withdrawal of federal Yugoslav troops from that republic. On July 10, the EC foreign ministers met and endorsed a decision to send 30-50 observers to Yugoslavia in order to monitor the proposed cease-fire; the ministers also rejected Germany's suggestion to include observers from other CSCE countries.¹³³ Initially, the observers were sent to Slovenia. But with the Yugoslav government's decision to withdraw all federal forces from Slovenia (a *de facto* acceptance of Slovenia's independence), attention shifted to Croatia. There was confusion over what role the observers should or could play in Croatia, and federal Yugoslav authorities resisted any effort to extend their mandate.

As fighting in Croatia escalated, the EC foreign ministers met again on July 29 in Brussels, joined (at the EC's invitation) by representatives from the Yugoslav federal presidency and the Yugoslav prime minister and foreign minister. France suggested a European peacekeeping force for Yugoslavia, perhaps under WEU auspices, but this was rejected by Van den Broek and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd; the ministers instead decided to extend

¹³¹ *Washington Post*, July 5, 1991, p. A15 and *New York Times*, July 7, 1991, p. A4.

¹³² *Time*, September 30, 1991, p. 16.

¹³³ Touval, *op. cit.* in note 101, p. 54.

the observer mission to Croatia and to increase its number to 300 observers and 300 support personnel (and to permit participation by other CSCE countries).¹³⁴

This was met with resistance from Serbia, however, and from pro-Serb forces in Croatia, who refused to allow EC observers to enter contested areas. On August 4, the troika left Yugoslavia, announcing, “There is nothing more we can do here.”¹³⁵ The EC foreign ministers met again on August 6 and debated further economic sanctions (such as a trade embargo) against any Yugoslav republic that opposed EC peace efforts; they also discussed the French peacekeeping proposal and asked the CSCE to support the EC’s efforts.¹³⁶

On August 6, the Yugoslav federal presidency announced a cease-fire agreement by the warring parties. While the troika’s withdrawal and the threat of economic sanctions may have contributed to that decision, it is more probable that the heavy losses suffered by Croatian forces coupled with a threat of unilateral recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence by Germany and Austria were the main factors. On August 8, the CSCE met again in Prague and decided (with Yugoslavia’s agreement) to send 200 to 500 additional observers to help monitor the cease-fire in Croatia.¹³⁷ Yugoslavia vetoed a British proposal to convene a peace conference.¹³⁸ As the conflict in Croatia escalated, France once again called for a WEU peacekeeping mission (supported by Italy and Belgium), and the WEU ministers discussed the idea in a meeting on August 7 in London.¹³⁹ The WEU decided that it would not act unless the EC concluded that its diplomatic efforts had been exhausted, with the UK, Germany, Denmark,

¹³⁴ Libal, *op. cit.* in note 104, pp. 27-29.

¹³⁵ *Washington Post*, August 5, 1991, p. A1.

¹³⁶ *New York Times*, August 7, 1991, p. A3.

¹³⁷ *New York Times*, August 8, 1991, p. A6 and August 9, 1991, p. A5.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Time*, August 19, 1991, p. 91.

and Portugal voicing strong reservations about such a force.¹⁴⁰ The British view was best expressed by former British Ambassador to West Germany Sir Oliver Wright: “It would be madness to send unwelcome troops into a dreadful quagmire.”¹⁴¹ Yet, ironically, this is exactly what the British and others would later decide to do as part of the UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia.

With any further CSCE involvement effectively blocked by a Yugoslav veto, the EC attempted to organize its own peace conference. This was endorsed by the foreign ministers on August 27. When fighting broke out again in mid-August, the EC also threatened to impose economic sanctions against Serbia if it rejected the peace conference.¹⁴² This action marked the first time that Serbia was clearly singled out as the main cause of the continued violence in Yugoslavia. Both Germany and Italy threatened to recognize Slovenia and Croatia if Serbia did not agree to a cease-fire and to the peace conference. Although Serbia initially opposed the proposal, the peace conference finally convened on September 7, even though fighting continued in Croatia.

As the fighting continued, the Dutch foreign minister proposed that the EC send a “lightly armed” contingent of up to 30,000 peacekeepers to Yugoslavia under the aegis of the WEU.¹⁴³ The Dutch proposal was supported by France, Germany, and Italy, although many in the French government were skeptical.¹⁴⁴ The UK agreed to support a proposal for the WEU to develop contingency plans for deploying peacekeeping forces in the event that a lasting cease-fire could be arranged, but it opposed armed intervention.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Financial Times*, September 4, 1991, p. 1-2.

¹⁴³ *Wall Street Journal*, September 17, 1991, p. 13.

¹⁴⁴ *The Guardian*, September 18, 1991, www.guardian.co.uk.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, September 16, 1991.

5.2.4 Enter the UN

With the EC's failure to find a means to stop the fighting, efforts turned to the UN. Even before the EC decision of September 19, Austria formally called on the UN Security Council to take the lead in organizing a peacekeeping effort—an idea with backing from France and Germany.¹⁴⁶ France, in its capacity as chair of the Security Council for September, proposed that the UN establish an emergency force under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and impose an arms embargo.¹⁴⁷ The Security Council agreed to an arms embargo on September 25 but did not include any provisions to enforce it.¹⁴⁸

The EC-sponsored peace conference reconvened on October 18, while fierce fighting continued around Dubrovnik and Vukovar in Croatia. The EC proposed a new constitutional plan (the Carrington Plan) for Yugoslavia, with much more autonomy for the republics but still maintaining Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, and the U.S. and Soviet Union issued a joint communiqué in support of the EC's efforts.¹⁴⁹ All of the Yugoslav republics accepted the plan except for Serbia, which rejected it on numerous grounds. In response, the EC agreed to impose sanctions against Yugoslavia and to ask the UN Security Council to impose an oil embargo; a NATO summit in Rome (held at the same time) also endorsed the EC efforts.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, September 19, 1991, p. 8.

¹⁴⁷ *Financial Times*, September 27, 1991, p. 6.

¹⁴⁸ Higham, Matthew T., Michael N. Mercurio, and Steven W. Ghezzi (eds.), *The ACCESS Issue Packet on Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Washington: ACCESS, 1996), p. 47.

¹⁴⁹ Gow, *op. cit.* in note 119, pp. 53-60.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

However, the collapse of the EC peace plan and the need for UN support to impose effective trade sanctions against Serbia¹⁵¹ refocused attention on the UN. In October, four Security Council members (the UK, France, Belgium, and Austria) renewed their appeal for UN intervention, and on October 8, UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar appointed former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as his personal envoy to Yugoslavia.¹⁵² After Vance's return, the Secretary General presented a report to the Security Council, calling the fighting in Yugoslavia a threat to international peace and stability.¹⁵³

Both Croatia and the Serbian-dominated rump Yugoslav presidency appealed to the UN to send in peacekeeping forces. The UK introduced a draft resolution in the Security Council calling for an oil embargo against any of the Yugoslav parties that refused to halt the fighting, while Lord Carrington, Vance, and Marrack Goulding (the UN official in charge of peacekeeping) traveled to Belgrade to make another attempt at negotiating a cease-fire.

On November 23, Vance negotiated a new cease-fire (the first with direct UN involvement) and offered a compromise plan on deploying UN peacekeepers.¹⁵⁴ On November 27, the Security Council adopted Resolution 721, urging the Secretary General to present "an early recommendation" for a peacekeeping force if the conflicting parties observed the truce.¹⁵⁵ Although the UN sent a small observer group to Yugoslavia to determine whether conditions for sending in a full peacekeeping contingent were being met, continued fighting blocked any further moves toward establishing a peacekeeping force.

¹⁵¹ Especially due to continued Soviet/Russian and Chinese trade with the Serbs.

¹⁵² *The Guardian*, October 11, 1991, www.guardian.co.uk.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, October 29, 1991.

¹⁵⁴ Glenny, *op. cit.* in note 100, p. 112. This marked the first time that "peacekeepers" rather than "observers" were considered for deployment into the region.

¹⁵⁵ *The Guardian*, November 28, 1991, www.guardian.co.uk.

At the same time, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher repeated warnings that Germany would unilaterally recognize Slovenian and Croatian independence by December 25 if an agreement was not reached by the EC-imposed December 10 deadline.¹⁵⁶ Italy's prime minister stated that his country would act "in close solidarity and at the same time" as Germany.¹⁵⁷ Pérez de Cuéllar and Carrington, supported by the United States, strongly opposed the German proposal on the grounds that it would exacerbate the conflict.¹⁵⁸ Several EC leaders, including French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, argued that unilateral German action was inconsistent with the recently concluded Maastricht agreement meant to strengthen the EC's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).¹⁵⁹ But Germany remained insistent, and on December 17, the EC foreign ministers reluctantly agreed to recognize Croatia and Slovenia—as well as any of the other four republics that sought recognition by December 23—on January 15, 1992, on the condition that the republics provide adequate assurances on human rights and democracy, as well as a commitment to not alter borders by force.¹⁶⁰ Germany announced its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on December 19. Chancellor Kohl called the decision "a great triumph for German foreign policy."¹⁶¹

For months, EC policy had been that Yugoslavia should remain intact as a sovereign entity. Germany forced the issue by its unilateral statements and actions, and other EC members had reluctantly felt compelled to follow suit. EC recognition had also been opposed by the Bush administration, which feared that fighting in Croatia would spread to multi-ethnic Bosnia.¹⁶²

The recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence may well have sealed the fate of

¹⁵⁶ Libal, *op. cit.* in note 104, p. 81.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *New York Times*, December 14, 1991, p. A3.

¹⁵⁹ *Le Monde*, December 6, 1991, p. 18.

¹⁶⁰ *Washington Post*, December 17, 1991, p. A15.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, December 18, 1991, p. A25.

¹⁶² Edgar O'Ballance, *Civil War in Bosnia, 1992-94* (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 8.

Bosnia. The decision almost guaranteed continued violence and may have possibly violated international law.¹⁶³ The EC expected to play a special role in the recognition of Bosnia, yet it had no intention of playing a role in protecting it as an independent entity.¹⁶⁴ The Pandora's Box of self-determination had been opened; out would come the Bosnia war.

5.3 DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: THE CRISIS IN BOSNIA

5.3.1 Self-determination and Diplomatic Failure

Despite its eventual (if reluctant) support of self-determination in the former Yugoslavia, the EC continued to promote talks between the rival factions. At a conference held in Lisbon on February 22-23, 1992, a compromise seemed to be within reach. The Serbs agreed to respect the existing borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Muslim Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic, promised to establish national territorial units within Bosnia—in effect, a sort of Balkan version of Switzerland.¹⁶⁵ But the details of the plan (in particular, the degree of autonomy such units would possess) were left unresolved, and no final agreement was reached.

A referendum held in Bosnia between February 29 and March 1, 1992, produced no surprises. Of the 63 percent of Bosnians who voted, 99 percent opted for full independence; as expected, the overwhelming majority of Serbs boycotted the referendum.¹⁶⁶ Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Serb Democratic Party in Bosnia and a close ally of Serbian President Slobodan

¹⁶³ For commentary on the legality of the EC's decision, see Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia," *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3, 1993, p. 468. Higgins argued, "Contrary to popular belief, international law does not permit self-determination, by way of national secession, to national minorities. But, that apart, the use of force, with significant loss of life, to prevent secession is not acceptable either."

¹⁶⁴ Jonathan Eyal, *Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from a Failure* (RUSI, 1993), pp. 63-64 and pp. 76-77.

¹⁶⁵ O'Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 9.

¹⁶⁶ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 1994), p. 6.

Milosevic, warned: “We are not going to accept an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.”¹⁶⁷

Izetbegovic ignored the warning and declared Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence from Yugoslavia on March 3, 1992. In the meantime, violence between Serbs and Muslims began to escalate in Sarajevo, while clashes in other parts of the republic between Croats and Serbs also occurred.

The Bosnian Muslim leadership believed that the outcome of the referendum would lead to international recognition.¹⁶⁸ However, the both the UN and the EC were hesitant and now worked desperately to delay the inevitable. On March 18, UN envoy Cyrus Vance and José Cutileiro, a Portuguese diplomat who chaired the EC Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, brokered an agreement in Sarajevo that provided for three autonomous ethnic provinces, similar to those discussed in Lisbon.¹⁶⁹ But the details were, once again, left vague. Both the Muslims and Serbs had serious reservations about the plan—the former because it might lead to the disintegration of the republic, and the latter because there was no attempt to link the proposed national units to a confederation arrangement within Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁰ Despite EC pressure to sign the agreement as a condition for recognition, Izetbegovic publicly renounced the deal a short time later. On March 27, 1992, Karadzic announced the creation of a separate Bosnian Serb republic (*Srpska Demokratske Bosnei-Hercegovine*), and the violence continued to spread.

The crisis came to a head with EC and American recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 7, 1992. Both the U.S. and EC (despite all evidence to the contrary) continued to believe

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ See especially Izetbegovic’s Sarajevo Radio address on November 29, 1991, in Steven L. Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 127.

¹⁶⁹ O’Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 13.

¹⁷⁰ Rigby, *op. cit.* in note 166, p. 7.

that recognition would stop the fighting and preserve a unified Bosnia.¹⁷¹ There was also an implicit warning to the Serbs that they would not be allowed to pursue an aggressive course in Bosnia. Without a believable threat of force to back them up, however, such warnings were completely ignored by the Serb leadership.

As the fighting spread, the EC desperately tried to bring the main factions back to the negotiating table. However, a truce brokered by Cutileiro on April 12 was effectively ignored; likewise, a cease-fire negotiated by Lord Carrington two weeks later was broken within hours of its signing. Thus began a pattern that was to be repeated over and over for the next twenty months. The war was soon raging out of control.

5.3.2 Enter UNPROFOR

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council had been reluctant to become directly involved in the spiraling violence in Bosnia and remained content to let the EC take the lead in peace efforts. But as EC mediation efforts continued to fail, and the international media increased coverage of the Serb siege of Sarajevo and the plight of Muslim refugees, the pressure to act (especially in the U.S.) increased.

From the outset of the crisis, even before large-scale fighting had broken out, Bosnian officials had encouraged the UN to intervene in some way. When Cyrus Vance traveled to Sarajevo on January 2, 1992, the Bosnian President requested the “preventive deployment” of

¹⁷¹ There was still significant division and reluctance within the EC, however; and it seems that the path towards recognition of Bosnia was driven mainly by the U.S., Germany, Turkey, and Muslim countries. See Touval, *op. cit.* in note 101, pp. 110-111.

2,000-3,000 UN peacekeepers to act as a deterrent to war.¹⁷² New UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali refused, stating that the UN's peacekeeping mandate was limited to Croatia and that the EC should play a larger role in Bosnia.¹⁷³ However, soon after, on February 21, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 743, adopting and establishing the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as an interim arrangement for a twelve-month period in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to "create the conditions of peace and security necessary to reach an overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis."¹⁷⁴ The original UNPROFOR had been stationed only in Croatia (where a peace agreement had been signed *before* the forces were deployed), and by the spring of 1992, there were 14,000 UN troops deployed in four areas (UNPAs—UN Protected Areas) in the parts of Croatia occupied by Serbian forces.¹⁷⁵

As the EC struggled on the diplomatic front and the UN debated a possible "peacekeeping" role in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs quickly gained the upper hand on the ground, making huge advances in eastern Bosnia and laying siege to Sarajevo. Serb "ethnic cleansing"¹⁷⁶ was now attracting major international media attention, as was the indiscriminate shelling of Sarajevo by the besieging Serb forces. And with each new Serb military success, the flood of Muslim refugees increased. As the death and refugee toll steadily increased, the Serbs came to be seen by most in the West as the aggressors, even though their original *causus belli* (preservation of Yugoslavian territorial integrity and sovereignty) may have been valid.

Of particular concern in the West was the emerging role of Serbia in supporting the Bosnian Serbs. Both the UN and EC agreed that one possible way to sever the link between

¹⁷² Rigby, *op. cit.* in note 166, p. 9.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ Higham, Mercurio, and Ghezzi (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 148.

¹⁷⁵ Primarily East Slavonia and the Krajina region.

¹⁷⁶ *Čišćenje terena*: the self-described Serb practice of creating ethnically homogeneous villages, towns, and cities by killing and/or forcefully expelling non-Serb populations.

Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs was through the imposition of targeted economic sanctions. Thus, on May 27, 1992, the EC imposed a small package of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, froze all export-credit guarantees, and suspended scientific and technical cooperation.¹⁷⁷ On May 30, the UN Security Council followed the EC lead and condemned Belgrade authorities for failing to fulfill the requirements of Resolution 752 (passed on May 15), imposing an economic embargo against Serbian and Montenegrin products as well as demanded the establishment of a “security zone” around Sarajevo and its airport to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid through Resolution 757 (May 30, 1992).¹⁷⁸ Humanitarian goods (food, medical supplies, etc.) were exempt from the embargo.

The UNPROFOR mission was thus expanded in the summer of 1992. The first step came in June 1992 with a UN effort to secure a cease-fire between Serb and Muslim forces in Sarajevo in order to open the airport there to humanitarian aid.¹⁷⁹ Under the proposal agreed to by both sides, UNPROFOR would secure and operate the airport while unloading humanitarian aid and ensuring its safe delivery to Sarajevo’s inhabitants. UNPROFOR would also be responsible for overseeing the removal of anti-aircraft weapons from within range of the airport and monitoring the concentration of artillery, mortars, and surface-to-surface missiles. On June 8, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 758, which enlarged the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR so that it could perform these functions.¹⁸⁰ Canadian Brigadier General Lewis MacKenzie was promoted to Major General and appointed to command UNPROFOR’s new Sarajevo sector.

¹⁷⁷Glenny, *op. cit.* in note 100, p. 210.

¹⁷⁸ Burg and Shoup, *op. cit.* in note 168, p. 132.

¹⁷⁹ O’Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, pp. 53-54.

¹⁸⁰ Higham, Mercurio, and Ghezzi (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 148.

The agreement broke down almost immediately, however. In a dramatic and flamboyant gesture, French President François Mitterand paid an unexpected six-hour visit to Sarajevo on June 28, and this finally convinced the two sides to honor the agreement. Despite the agreement, there was still near continuous fighting around the airport in the next couple of days. But this died down by June 30, and UNPROFOR was able to gradually build up its presence over the next week. By July 3, the airport was fully reopened for humanitarian relief supplies. And by the end of the month, a land corridor was also opened to the city from Croatia.

UN peacekeepers were now on the ground, but their exact role still remained unclear. The Security Council passed Resolution 764 on July 13, 1992, defining the humanitarian nature of their mandate.¹⁸¹ But despite the presence of UNPROFOR, UN aid convoys continued to be attacked and looted by local warlords who showed little respect for the UN presence in Bosnia, and the UNPROFOR soldiers were powerless to respond. As a result, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 770, on August 13, 1992, which authorized “all measures necessary” to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief, including military force.¹⁸² Discussion of the use of force made UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali very nervous, however. He expressed such fears in a letter to the Security Council, arguing that the use of force resolution could endanger UN peacekeepers already operating in Bosnia (or even in Croatia) and demanded “adequate” advance warning of military intervention so that any threat to UN peacekeepers could be minimized.¹⁸³

On September 14, the UN went one step further when the Security Council adopted Resolution 776, which increased the number of UN troops in Bosnia by up to 6,000—in addition

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁸² James Gow, “Nervous Bunnies: The International Community and the Yugoslav War of Dissolution, The Politics of Military Intervention in a Time of Change” in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 18.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

to the 1,700 peacekeepers already deployed—and all drawn solely from NATO countries; the UK, Canada, France, and Spain provided combat troops, and the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Denmark, Belgium, and the U.S. provided support personnel.¹⁸⁴ The total UN force in the former Yugoslavia at this point stood at 21,000—its largest peacekeeping operation ever. UNPROFOR’s Sarajevo mission was to escort humanitarian aid convoys, only using its weapons in self-defense if fired upon first. This limited authorization, however, led to obvious difficulties ensuring the passage of aid where the way was blocked by combatants. While the Serbs were the most frequent offenders in this respect, all sides frustrated the work of aid delivery to some degree or another. Although there was growing impatience with the situation, there was also a lack of will among those countries with troops on the ground to accept a shift towards peace “enforcement.”¹⁸⁵

At the same time, UNPROFOR’s mission was also expanded into Macedonia, where the UN deployed a preventative peacekeeping force, driven by the twin threat to Macedonia of war spilling over the border and/or of an internal disintegration of the republic along ethnic Macedonian/Albanian/Serb lines. In this UN operation, the U.S. committed combat forces to the Balkans for the first time, deploying 300 Marines in support of a 700-strong multinational Scandinavian battalion.

While the UN began to pursue a more proactive policy of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, the general fighting worsened and led to increasing brutality on both sides of the conflict—but especially from the Bosnian Serbs. “Ethnic cleansing” of Muslims by Serb forces soon became widespread and well known. And discovery of mass Muslim civilian graves and alleged Serb concentration camps drew comparisons with Nazi Germany in the international

¹⁸⁴ O’Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, pp. 99-100.

¹⁸⁵ Gow, *op. cit.* in note 182.

media.¹⁸⁶ It became a human catastrophe of incredible proportions. The death toll steadily mounted into the tens of thousands, and by the end of July 1992, more than one million Bosnian civilians were homeless; the total for all the former Yugoslavia was close to two million refugees, and nearly 500,000 had fled the region completely, seeking refuge in other countries.¹⁸⁷ On August 13, 1992, the UNSC adopted Resolution 771 (and the first of many) condemning the detention camps and reminding all parties of their obligations under the Geneva Conventions.¹⁸⁸ On August 13-14, the UN Human Rights Convention (UNHRC) strongly condemned the policy of ethnic cleansing and began investigating human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁹

There was obviously a much more direct way in which the suffering taking place in Bosnia could be reduced or even eliminated: direct military intervention. But at this point (mid-1992), both the U.S. and Europeans agreed that they were not even contemplating using military force to halt the conflict. However, as the various EC and UN diplomatic efforts and sanctions failed to reduce (much less halt) the fighting or the practice of “ethnic cleansing,” increasing numbers of Americans and Europeans began to argue that the use of military force was the only answer to resolving the crisis. Many began to view the conflict in very simple (but accurate) terms: heavily armed Serbs waging an unjust war of aggression against not only Bosnian Muslim combatants, but against civilian populations as well.

There were a number of military options available, but nearly all of them possessed their own unique problems. NATO, with enough ground troops, could have undoubtedly defeated the Serbs, but that would require tens of thousands of troops, and there was no guarantee of a quick

¹⁸⁶ These atrocities have been extensively documented. For example, see Ivo Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); and Gale Stokes, *Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

¹⁸⁷ Smith, *op. cit.* in note 95.

¹⁸⁸ Higham, Mercurio, and Ghezzi (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 148, p. 48.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

or easy victory. Bosnia, with its mountainous terrain, was tailor-made for an entrenched defender and/or for insurgent warfare, and the Serbs were quite skilled at both traditional and guerrilla warfare. Thus, for the Americans (who would most likely have to contribute the largest share of ground troops), the specter of “another Vietnam” loomed quite large.

Air strikes against Serb positions were also suggested. While this might avoid the deployment of ground troops, it was questionable how useful it would prove, as most of the fighting was being done by light infantry forces in mountainous, woodland, or urban terrain and not more easily targeted mechanized troops in open desert, as in the Gulf War. There was also a fear among the Europeans and Canadians that air strikes might provoke reprisals against UN troops already on the ground. Another option was stepping in solely to protect civilians; but again, this would require large numbers of ground troops. Finally, numerous Muslim countries were urging the UNSC to lift its arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia so that Bosnian Muslims could import the weapons they needed to fight the better-armed Serbs on more equal terms.

In summary, then, at the outset of the Bosnian civil war, there were eight levels of potential/discussed military intervention policy (from lowest to highest) in the transatlantic security regime: 1) non-intervention; 2) delivery and escort of humanitarian aid; 3) peacekeeping (ground troops prohibited from offensive engagement); 4) surface interdiction (naval enforcement of sanctions; 5) air interdiction (enforcement of a “no-fly zone” and/or air support of peacekeepers); 6) punitive attacks (limited air strikes); 7) indirect use of force (providing arms and/or military training); and 8) peace-making (offensive ground troops with limited rules of engagement). Note that “war fighting” (i.e. mostly unrestricted air strikes and/or ground troops with aggressive/offensive rules of engagement) was never an option considered by any major

member of the regime during the Bosnia crisis. Changes over time in the transatlantic security regime's cohesion regarding military intervention in Bosnia may be measured according to this ordinal scale. As the historical analysis shows, from the beginning of the crisis and through 1992, the regime's collective policy was very limited. However, this changed over time to surface interdiction in 1993, air interdiction in 1994, and finally to punitive attacks by 1995.

5.3.3 NATO Joins the Fray

By mid-1992, differences over how to handle the Bosnia problem were emerging in Washington. There was increasing anxiety and disappointment in the Bush administration about how the Europeans were handling the Bosnia crisis, even though President Bush seemed to have no personal views on how to solve the problem and had thus far preferred to allow the Europeans to play the major role. 1992 was a presidential election year in the U.S., and Bush initially did not want to play a high profile role in the crisis that might result in the largest share of the blame should events turn out disastrously (as it seemed they already were).

Nevertheless, the continued Serb shelling of Sarajevo throughout the summer of 1992 contributed to mounting tensions and created a crisis atmosphere in both Washington. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 23, Secretary of State James Baker called the shelling of Sarajevo an "absolute outrage" and refused to rule out the use of force—but only taken multilaterally; he also confirmed that U.S. military planners were consulting their allies and the UN to see how humanitarian aid could be delivered into Sarajevo.¹⁹⁰ But when President Bush, Baker, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney met in the White House on June 26 to discuss possible military options, they were told by the Pentagon that it would require

¹⁹⁰ *New York Times*, June 24, 1992, p. A9.

35,000-50,000 troops to reopen Sarajevo airport by force and establish a security zone around it.¹⁹¹

The Pentagon was extremely reluctant to support any direct U.S. military involvement, as it feared that any intervention would not only possibly drag the U.S. into a costly war of attrition against the Serbs but that it might also spread the war into other Balkan countries and destabilize the entire Balkan Peninsula.¹⁹² The U.S. policy that emerged from this debate was named “Prudent Planning.”¹⁹³ The agreed upon compromise was that while the U.S. was prepared to involve its air force and navy, it would continue to refuse to provide ground troops and hope its European allies could be pressured into doing so. Thus, on June 29, a flotilla of five U.S. Navy ships (from the Sixth Fleet) sailed into the Adriatic Sea. Bush declared that this was merely a “show of force” that he hoped would persuade the factions involved to allow Sarajevo airport to be reopened for humanitarian aid; however, Bush also stated that he had no immediate plans for military action in Bosnia.¹⁹⁴

Since President Bush had ordered the warships of the Sixth Fleet to be under NATO command, the U.S. administration was not amused when French President Mitterand unilaterally (without consulting the NATO allies) dispatched nine armed helicopters to Sarajevo. Since the British were holding the EC presidency at the time, Prime Minister John Major wanted to exert some level of his own influence over events, but all he could come up with was to send a British destroyer to the Adriatic to join the U.S. flotilla.

Perhaps seeing a new post-Cold War role for the alliance or perhaps under pressure from public opinion (and following a formal request made by the U.S.), NATO ministers voted to

¹⁹¹ *Washington Post*, June 27, 1992, p. A1; and *New York Times*, June 29, 1992, p. A1.

¹⁹² *Washington Post*, June 13, 1991, p. A16.

¹⁹³ The unofficial name was derived from a previous quote from President Bush concerning the U.S.’s Bosnia policy: “Prudence and caution prevents (sic) military action.” *Washington Post*, June 5, 1992, p. A44.

¹⁹⁴ *New York Times*, June 30, p. A1.

authorize the naval flotilla in the Adriatic in July 1992—thus suddenly changing what started as a U.S. unilateral military operation into a multilateral NATO one. The formal mission of the flotilla was to monitor the UN-imposed arms embargo against all of the former Yugoslavia (Resolution 713) and economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (Resolution 757).¹⁹⁵ Dubbed “Operation Maritime Monitor,” this was NATO’s first formal involvement in the crises in the former Yugoslavia and the first ever out-of-area NATO military operation. The mission was expanded and renamed “Operation Maritime Guard” in November after the NAC authorized NATO to use force to enforce UNSC resolutions for the first time.

Meanwhile, Germany began to criticize both British and French policy in Bosnia. New German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel also complained about aircraft returning empty from Sarajevo, suggesting that at least sick and injured children should be flown out.¹⁹⁶ At the London conference on Yugoslavia, held in August, Kinkel also strongly insisted that tribunals be established to gather evidence and try war criminals; he left no illusions about Germany’s position regarding whom the primary aggressors were, referring to the government in Belgrade as “the main source of evil.”¹⁹⁷

Several months went by, with various conferences held and peace initiatives proposed, and all the results were pretty much the same: continuation of the status quo. As a result, on December 11, NATO defense ministers met in Brussels and debated an increased role for NATO in the Bosnia crisis. Shortly thereafter (on December 14), the new U.S. Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, suddenly called for a military option to be taken against the Bosnian

¹⁹⁵ Joyce P. Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 81.

¹⁹⁶ O’Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 86.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

Serbs.¹⁹⁸ This was a complete U-turn for Bush administration, which so far had been against such a course of action. Eagleburger formally called for strict implementation of the no-fly zone over Bosnia and proposed that an international war crimes tribunal be established—two policy changes the Bush administration had been publicly advocating only in the months immediately prior to the November elections.¹⁹⁹

5.3.4 Shift Change at the White House

In contrast, to President Bush's initially passive attitude towards the crisis, Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton's pre-election speeches and promises regarding Bosnia and the Balkans gave one the impression that (if elected) he would step in and settle the matter with quick action and resolve.²⁰⁰ On July 26, 1992, Clinton's campaign office in Little Rock, Arkansas had issued a policy statement on the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying: "The United States should take the lead in seeking United Nations Security Council authorization for air strikes against those who are attacking the relief effort. The United States should be prepared to lend appropriate military support to that operation."²⁰¹ Yet, many accounts of the Clinton administration suggest that the newly elected president was focused mostly on domestic political issues and not entirely prepared to back its foreign policy campaign rhetoric with concrete action.²⁰²

¹⁹⁸ *New York Times*, October 2, 1992, p. A1.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ See especially *Washington Post*, July 29, 1992, p. A1; and *New York Times*, August 12, 1992, p. A24.

²⁰¹ David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), p. 13.

²⁰² See Douglas C. Foyle, "Public Opinion and Bosnia: Anticipating a Disaster" in Ralph G. Carter (ed.), *Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2002), pp. 32-58; and Halberstam, *op. cit.* in note 80.

Clinton (and Vice President Al Gore) took office on January 20, 1993. He appointed Warren Christopher as Secretary of State, Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense, Anthony Lake as National Security Advisor, and Madeleine Albright as Ambassador to the UN. Unlike Bush, Clinton was almost completely without experience in foreign affairs. Despite their different backgrounds, all the members of Clinton's National Security Council shared the general conviction that the Europeans had failed to successfully tackle the Yugoslav problem, and thus they saw a certain scope for American action in Bosnia.²⁰³

The Pentagon, however, advocated continuation of the initial (i.e. pre-election campaign) policy of the Bush administration, which was essentially non-intervention or very limited intervention, leaving the issue primarily to the Europeans to solve. The Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was an especially strong and vocal advocate of non-intervention.²⁰⁴ Lake, Albright,²⁰⁵ and Gore were the strongest proponents of military action in Bosnia, while Aspin urged caution, and Christopher seemed to initially have no clear opinion one way or the other.²⁰⁶

The new administration took its first diplomatic action regarding the crisis in February, when it persuaded the Geneva Conference peace negotiations to be moved to New York. It also expressed serious reservations about the most recent peace plan, the Vance-Owen Plan, which it

²⁰³ Ivo H. Daalder, *Anthony Lake and the War in Bosnia* (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1995), p. 1.

²⁰⁴ See *New York Times*, September 28, 1992, p. A1; and October 8, 1992, p. A35.

²⁰⁵ In one of the more colorful quotes from the period, at one point Ambassador Albright went so far as ask General Powell, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" Colin Powell, *A Soldier's Way* (London: Hutchinson, 1995), p. 576.

²⁰⁶ Daalder, *op. cit.* in note 203; and Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 138-146.

argued rewarded ethnic cleansing.²⁰⁷ Reginald Bartholemew, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, was appointed U.S. special envoy to these international peace talks.

The UK was eager to cooperate with the new U.S. administration in diplomatic or military efforts, but it disliked the increasing signs of a potentially aggressive attitude, as expressed by candidate Clinton during the American election campaign.²⁰⁸ The British government believed that the military option (i.e. bombing Serb artillery positions and airfields and shooting down Serb aircraft) would only worsen the situation on the ground by inflaming the Serbs.²⁰⁹ This could, in turn, mean British casualties, which would be unacceptable to the Parliament. France was also opposed to any stronger military action for the same reason.²¹⁰

On coming to office, however, Clinton was appalled to find that the EC (now EU) had no plan of its own and seemed to have little intention of doing anything (other than continue negotiations) to settle the crisis.²¹¹ Differences, however, existed within his own administration, with Anthony Lake and Les Aspin, especially, differing strongly over any military option.²¹² When Christopher was questioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the differences of opinion between the U.S. and its European allies, Democratic Senator Joe Biden told him: “What you’ve encountered, it seems to me, was a discouraging mosaic of indifference, timidity, self-delusion, and hypocrisy....I can’t even begin to express my anger for a European policy that’s now asking us to participate in what amounts to a codification of a Serbian victory.”²¹³ With many in his own political party so strongly opposed to it, President Clinton

²⁰⁷ For an explanation and details of the intricate Vance-Owen Plan, see Owen, *op. cit.* in note 203, pp. 89-93.

²⁰⁸ O’Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 144.

²⁰⁹ Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 82.

²¹⁰ Ivo H. Daalder, *op. cit.* in note 203, p. 7.

²¹¹ O’Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 144.

²¹² Daalder, *op. cit.* in note 203, p. 2.

²¹³ Owen, *op. cit.* in note 201, p. 164.

said that the Vance-Owen Plan was “flawed” and rejected it. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, however, insisted that it was the “only plan available” and should be accepted.²¹⁴

On February 10, 1993, the U.S. administration announced that it was going to become more “actively and directly engaged” in peace efforts in Bosnia, and its policy was put forward by Christopher, in what became known as the “Six Point Program.”²¹⁵ These points were even more idealistic and vague, however, than the other peace plans that had already been proposed. After Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic walked out of the New York peace talks on February 12, Clinton scrapped any ideas about military intervention and sought Russian support in the peace process. It was hoped that Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who needed considerable economic aid from the U.S. and Europe, might use Russia’s traditional influence to curb the Serbs.²¹⁶ Clinton also reasoned that it would be better to involve the Russians in the negotiations than to exclude them in case they were provoked or convinced into openly siding with Serbia.²¹⁷

By this time, Clinton was growing increasingly troubled by the Bosnian crisis and irritated by the lack of support from the European allies for his more aggressive ideas regarding the use of force. The UNSC had authorized a no-fly zone (Resolution 781) over Bosnia, but as of yet, no subsequent resolution had been passed giving authorization to actually enforce it. NATO ambassadors, meeting on February 17 to discuss the issue, still could not agree among themselves on what further role NATO should or could play. Stymied by the lack of progress in NATO, Clinton then turned his attention to airdropping humanitarian supplies to besieged Muslim towns. The UK and Boutros-Ghali were both against this idea due to the fear that low

²¹⁴ O’Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 145.

²¹⁵ Daalder, *op. cit.* in note 203, pp. 9-10.

²¹⁶ Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 93.

²¹⁷ *New York Times*, May 21, 1993, p. A1.

flying planes might be shot down by Serb anti-aircraft weapons.²¹⁸ Since the Bosnian Serbs were using starvation as a weapon of war, airdropping supplies might be seen by them as the West or the UN openly siding with the Muslims; and this might provoke hostile reactions against the UN troops and personnel on the ground.

Under orders from Clinton, however, the Pentagon immediately began drawing up plans for such an operation, including combat aircraft escorts and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft to shoot down any Serb violators of the no-fly zone. Clinton wanted (and asked for) allied participation, but most European countries refused; only Turkey and non-NATO, non-European Pakistan offered direct assistance.²¹⁹ Clinton was thus forced to tone down the operation, but it was named Operation Provide Promise and launched on February 25—with no combat (only transport) aircraft involved. The initially (like the Adriatic NATO mission) solely American operation was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers the next day, but none offered any specific help. Aspin had never been in favor of Provide Promise, but he had been overruled by Clinton, who was supported more strongly by Christopher and Albright.²²⁰ After the operation continued a while with no serious threat to American aircraft or peacekeepers on the ground, the UK and France became involved on a much smaller scale; however, the operation was suspended by the end of the month.²²¹

Meanwhile, NATO's military command and planning staff were preparing for a possible "peace enforcement" role if the Vance-Owen Plan were accepted and implemented, even though

²¹⁸ O'Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 148.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150.

²²¹ In another indicator of the confusion surrounding Bosnia policy, Elizabeth Drew notes that there were conflicting reasons given as to why the airdrops were suspended and that there was "open confusion about the policy." While Secretary of Defense Aspin indicated that the airdrops were suspended, his statement was later publicly contradicted by both President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, who both said that they would continue. See Elizabeth Drew, *op. cit.* in note 206, pp. 146-147.

no one had formally asked (or tasked) it to do so.²²² Boutros-Ghali, especially, was strongly against any role for NATO in what he believed should be a UN operation.²²³ NATO command of such a postwar military force would take away his power and authority over the troops on the ground. The European allies also showed great reluctance to commit troops for such a purpose or to have their soldiers removed from national control.

UNSC Resolution 816, introduced by France and strongly backed by the U.S., authorizing the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia, was approved on March 31, 1993. It did not pass without some difficulty, however, as several countries (especially Russia, China, and even the UK) were initially reluctant to accept it.²²⁴ But it did pass, and the UN formally asked NATO to coordinate its enforcement, which the NAC agreed to on April 1. However, the UN laid down very restrictive rules of engagement, and NATO aircraft were not to attack any Serb aircraft on the ground. These restrictions were due to Russia's insistence, as part of a bargain to get its approval for the resolution. Thus, on April 12, NATO combat aircraft from the U.S. (24), the Netherlands (18—later 24), France (14), and the UK (12—later 20) began NATO's first out-of-area combat mission in its history, dubbed Operation Deny Flight.²²⁵ Turkey also later participated in the effort with 18 aircraft. Although no German combat aircraft participated, the German Constitutional Court ruled on April 8 that they could do so, and several Germans served in the crews aboard five NATO AWACS and supply aircraft.

On April 17, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 819 to impose stronger economic sanctions against rump Yugoslavia if the Serb leadership failed to endorse the Vance-Owen peace plan by April 26. The embargo would ban trans-shipments of any goods through

²²² O'Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 152.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

²²⁴ Owen, *op. cit.* in note 201, p. 98.

²²⁵ *New York Times*, April 12, 1993, p. A8.

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); impose stricter controls on barges along the Danube River; ban all ships entering Yugoslavian territorial waters and create a twelve-mile exclusion zone; impound all trucks, ships, aircraft, or rolling stock in other countries; and freeze all Yugoslav financial assets in foreign countries.²²⁶ The day after the resolution was passed, Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic publicly rejected the Vance-Owen plan, and the UN sanctions took effect soon after.²²⁷

On May 6, 1993, the UNSC approved Resolution 824, declaring six locations in Bosnia to be “safe areas” and ordered all parties to ensure that they were free from “armed attack or other hostile act” and UN military observers be allowed access to monitor the sites; these were Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa.²²⁸ Again, however, nothing was mentioned in the resolution about how the UN intended to enforce the safe areas.²²⁹ Clinton still strongly backed some sort of direct military action against the Serbs, if necessary, but the Europeans were still equally opposed to this idea.²³⁰

Clinton and Boutros-Ghali also continued to argue over who should command any peacekeeping mission sent to Bosnia. Boutros-Ghali sent an open letter to all members of the Security Council, insisting that ultimate command must remain with the UN, and that the UN must be actively involved in monitoring day-to-day operations.²³¹ He suggested that the commander of a NATO (or any other force) must report daily to the UN senior representative in

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, April 18, 1993, p. A16.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, April 19, 1993, p. A14; and April 28, 1993, p. A11.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, May 7, 1993, p. A11.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, May 9, 1993, p. A1.

²³¹ See Yasushi Akashi, “Managing United Nations Peacekeeping: The Role of the Security Council vs. the Role of the Secretary General” in Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset (eds.), *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia* (Aldershot, United Kingdom: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 125-136.

Yugoslavia, who ultimately reported to the Secretary General and UNSC.²³² Clinton did not like the idea at all; the President (and the Pentagon) just wanted UN authority to act—not to be subjected to UN interference, which could restrict American/NATO freedom of operational movement or run contrary to American national interests.²³³

The U.S. administration by this time was pushing for the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and for NATO to conduct air strikes against Serb artillery and other heavy weapons, as long as these were used to continue the war. However, this “lift and strike” proposal met with vigorous opposition from Europe—particularly from the UK and France, which had the largest number of peacekeepers on the ground in Bosnia. They were adamantly opposed to lifting the arms embargo, fearing that this would only intensify the war and thus increase the already significant risk to their peacekeeping troops.²³⁴

Having failed to convince the Europeans to adopt “lift and strike,” the U.S. subsequently concentrated its efforts on securing an allied agreement to use air power for a variety of limited tasks. These included the enforcement of the UN-imposed no-fly zone over Bosnia, protection of UN peacekeepers from attack, and the defense of the six UN-designated “safe areas” (including Sarajevo) from Serb shelling or attack.²³⁵ Again, the Europeans were reluctant to consent to the American request, fearing that the use of air power would increase the risk to their forces—a risk that the United States (which had refused to deploy American troops on the ground) did not share. Nevertheless, the allies eventually did concede a role for NATO air

²³² See Allin, *op. cit.* in note 96, p. 26; Gow, *op. cit.* in note 119, pp. 136-137; and Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 104.

²³³ O’Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 166.

²³⁴ Lester H. Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, 1992-1998* (Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1998), p. 99; and Mark Peceny and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, “Liberal Interventionism in Bosnia,” *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Spring 1998, p. 12.

²³⁵ Alastair Finlan, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 1991-1999* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2004), pp. 46-49; and Gow, *op. cit.* in note 119, pp. 135-136.

power for these limited purposes—provided, however, that the ultimate decision to resort to air strikes reside with the UN rather than NATO (the so-called “dual-key” command structure).²³⁶

The gap between the U.S. and Europeans was thus widening, not converging at this time, and this hampered NATO efforts to openly commit to respond to Serb acts of aggression and to demonstrate resolve. Although Karadzic had promised to respect UN “safe areas,” the lack of a serious and credible UN/NATO threat to retaliate essentially presented him with a free pass. Thus, in early May, Bosnian Serb forces broke through the defensive lines that surrounded Zepa, killing more than 500 people in the offensive.²³⁷

Finally, after this act of blatant defiance, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 836 on June 4, 1993, authorizing UNPROFOR to use force—including air power—in response to future attacks against the six “safe areas” or in response to any obstruction of humanitarian convoys.²³⁸ At a NATO ministerial meeting in Athens on June 10, the Alliance offered aircraft to defend UNPROFOR, if necessary; and throughout the summer, the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs was frequently threatened.²³⁹ However, it became apparent that Boutros-Ghali was not going to give his permission or cooperation in such an effort.²⁴⁰ The primary disagreement was that the U.S. (which would carry out the majority of air operations) wanted to use “decisive force,” while Boutros Ghali insisted that if force were to be used at all, it must only be a “proportional response.”²⁴¹

Warren Christopher wrote to Boutros-Ghali indicating that the U.S. only wanted the UN to select the timing and targets of any air strikes in Bosnia and then let NATO carry out the

²³⁶ Gow, *op. cit.* in note 119, pp. 136-137; and Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 104.

²³⁷ *New York Times*, May 8, 1993, p. A4.

²³⁸ Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), p. 501.

²³⁹ Owen, *op. cit.* in note 201, pp. 144-149 and pp. 152-153.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ O’Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 199.

missions without any further UN interference; Boutros-Ghali replied sharply, telling Christopher that it was essential that the UN (i.e. Boutros-Ghali himself) should remain in full control of all military operations related to UNPROFOR.²⁴² In response, the Clinton administration declared on August 1 that it was prepared to use air power unilaterally if necessary.²⁴³

At a meeting on August 2-3, however, NATO agreed to act but only under direct UN authority (i.e. command).²⁴⁴ This pleased not only Boutros-Ghali but the UK and France, as well. The UK's Ministry of Defense had expressed anxiety over possible "friendly fire" from U.S. air strikes; and France (which disliked NATO anyway and had always favored a WEU operation instead) retained its powerful veto as a permanent member of the Security Council. Also, the NATO members had to be unanimous in their agreement to take any military action, thus allowing any single member to veto a proposed mission. Both Denmark and Greece spoke out against military action; and Germany was prepared to be included in any post-conflict peacekeeping missions, but its government firmly insisted that it would not be drawn into any combat role.²⁴⁵ This marked the beginning of a new, more assertive U.S. strategy to mount a more credible threat by attempting to *create consensus* within the transatlantic security regime and not simply *wait* for it. In essence, this meant that the Clinton administration had shifted its policy approach from one of broad multilateralism to renewing the traditional leadership role played by the U.S. in transatlantic security affairs.

On August 5, both the UN and NATO announced that they had agreed on a "dual-key" command arrangement for air strikes. Basically, any combat operation would require dual approval from both institutions at all levels of the operation. A request would first have to come

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ *New York Times*, August 2, 1993, p. A3.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, August 3, 1993, p. A1.

²⁴⁵ O'Ballance, *op. cit.* in note 162, p. 200.

from a UN commander on the ground, then approved by the regional UN commander, the approved by either Boutros-Ghali or the UNSC (or both), and then approved and executed by NATO forces. Despite all of the bluster and planning, however, the rest of the year passed with no air strikes being launched. The following summary illustrates American frustration with the European allies:

Clinton did periodically call for air strikes between mid-1993 and mid-1994, usually in response to visible, televised attacks on Bosnian civilians, which generated outrage in the U.S. Each time Clinton pushed for air strikes, however, America's allies demurred and worked out diplomatic solutions with Bosnian Serb forces. In August 1993, when Bosnian Serb forces captured the strategically crucial Mt. Igman protecting the Bosnian capital, Clinton called for air strikes. Before the threat was carried out, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to a partial withdrawal and a replacement of Bosnian government troops on the mountain with French peacekeepers. In February 1994, when a Serb mortar attack killed 61 at Sarajevo's central market, Clinton called again for air strikes. Before air strikes could commence, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw their heavy artillery from a twenty-kilometer radius surrounding Sarajevo. Only in April 19, when the Bosnian Serbs had launched an offensive against the safe haven Gorazde, did NATO warplanes launch an air strike, but then only against a few tanks and artillery pieces. Serb forces accepted a twenty-kilometer heavy weapons exclusion zone around Gorazde, but only after they had defeated the local Bosnian government forces.²⁴⁶

In February 1994, NATO aircraft did shoot down four Serb aircraft that had violated the no-fly zone. This was the first time in its history that NATO had ever "fired shots in anger."

Following a Serb offensive against the Bihac "safe area," in October 1993 (and which threatened to drag Croatia and Serbia into the war), President Clinton announced that the U.S. would unilaterally stop participating in the enforcement of the arms embargo against Bosnia on November 10.²⁴⁷ This came as a complete surprise to many in Europe, and allied reaction was swift and angry. A French foreign ministry spokesman said that "This action by the Americans could ruin chances of maintaining a common approach and lead to a lot of nasty finger-pointing

²⁴⁶ Peceny and Sanchez-Terry, *op. cit.* in note 234, pp. 12-13.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

across the Atlantic.”²⁴⁸ The British also expressed concern, but additional motives behind France’s heated opposition were revealed when Foreign Minister Alain Juppé announced in late November that “The conflict in Bosnia has shown the necessity of moving beyond NATO and American guarantees to build a credible European defense that could back up our common foreign policy interests....This crisis has revealed the doubts we had all along that Europe’s interests are not necessarily those of America.”²⁴⁹

As fighting continued to escalate, and Serb aircraft repeatedly violated the no-fly zone, NATO was obliged to act more aggressively or face losing all credibility. On November 21, NATO aircraft targeted a Serb airfield in Croatia. On orders of the UN commander (General Michael Rose), however, the attack was limited to destroying the airport’s runway, leaving the aircraft themselves unscathed.²⁵⁰ Another attack against Serb anti-aircraft missile sites was launched on November 23. Even the French were becoming more belligerent. A spokesman for the French foreign ministry warned that the “offensive against Bihac must stop” and added that France would back any UN call for military action.²⁵¹

The air strikes, however, provoked the Bosnian Serbs into a series of countermeasures. They blockaded 200 UN peacekeepers at nine sites around Sarajevo, detained 50 Canadian troops north of Sarajevo, and stopped the movement of all other UN military observers throughout Bosnia. At a meeting of NATO ambassadors in Brussels on November 24, the U.S. tried to persuade its allies to take additional military action against the Bosnian Serbs—who by now were in open and direct violation of numerous UN Security Council resolutions, but again the U.S. failed to persuade the Europeans.

²⁴⁸ *Washington Post*, November 12, 1994, p. A21.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, November 27, 1994, p. A44.

²⁵⁰ *New York Times*, November 22, 1994, p. A1

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, November 24, 1994, p. A9.

Following the shelling of Sarajevo's main market on February 5, 1994, however, the EU's foreign ministers adopted a statement that supported "a very early meeting of the North Atlantic Council," with the aim of achieving "the immediate lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, using *all means necessary*, including the use of air power" (italics added by author).²⁵² Despite such strong rhetoric from the EU, further NATO action remained problematic due to continued internal European disagreements. France, Belgium, and the Netherlands now strongly advocated military action to lift the siege of Sarajevo; but others in the EU (notably Greece and Lord Owen) opposed the use of force against the Bosnian Serbs. The British remained cautious, while the Germans agreed that something had to be done—just not with the use of any German troops.

The issue of some form of response to the massacre of civilians in Sarajevo was raised by the U.S. and France in NATO. The alliance, through passing a joint French-American communiqué on February 10, gave its full support to Boutros-Ghali's request to implement any future air strikes and also issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs stating that if heavy weapons (i.e. artillery pieces and rocket launchers) in a thirteen-mile "exclusion zone" around Sarajevo had not been withdrawn or submitted to UN control by midnight February 20, then NATO would launch air strikes against any remaining heavy weapons.²⁵³ The ultimatum was opposed by the UK and Greece for different reasons. Greece was concerned about the domestic political ramifications of supporting air strikes against the Serbs (who were traditional Greek allies); while the UK continued to favor negotiations.²⁵⁴ The vote in the North Atlantic Council was fifteen in favor with one abstention (Greece).²⁵⁵ The British, despite being reluctant to support

²⁵² *EU Bulletin*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1994, p. 65.

²⁵³ Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 109.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ *New York Times*, February 11, 1994, p. A6 and February 13, 1994, p. A12.

NATO air strikes, consented to such a move in order to prevent confrontation with the French and to preserve the credibility and solidarity of NATO.²⁵⁶

On March 1, the Clinton administration, acting on its own and outside of international institutions, finalized an alliance between the Bosnian government, Bosnian Croats, and the Croatian government.²⁵⁷ The Washington agreement provided for a Muslim-Croat Federation, with a powerful central government, to comprise slightly more than half of Bosnia-Herzegovina's prewar territory; the federation was also to merge in a loose economic union with Croatia.²⁵⁸ Three weeks later, on March 18, at a ceremony in Washington, President Clinton and representatives from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia signed an accord on the creation of a Federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats, as well as a further "preliminary agreement on the establishment of a confederation" linking this new federation to Croatia in a loose confederation.²⁵⁹

In response to a call on April 19 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin for an international summit on the Bosnia crisis between the U.S., EU, and Russia, the "Contact Group" was formed in London on April 26, comprising senior American, British, French, German, and Russian officials, with the aim of working "as a matter of urgency towards full cessation of hostilities for four months."²⁶⁰ As Lawrence Freedman suggested however: "The need for a common policy often overruled the requirements of an effective policy in terms of the proclaimed objectives....At times, the Contact Group seemed to be sustained only by the shared reluctance to admit total failure."²⁶¹

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁷ *New York Times*, March 2, 1994, p. A1.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ *Washington Post*, March 19, 1994, P. A13.

²⁶⁰ Lawrence Freedman, "Why the West Failed," *Foreign Policy*, No. 97, Winter 1994-1995, p. 54.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

President Clinton warned on August 11 that if the Bosnian Serbs had not accepted the Contact Group's plan by October 15, the U.S. would urge the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.²⁶² The Bosnian Serbs refused to accept the plan. In response, the U.S. announced on November 11 that it would no longer enforce the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, but (once the midterm election was over) he also publicly rejected the congressional insistence that the U.S. unilaterally lift the arms embargo.²⁶³ However, not willing to see a total military collapse of Bosnian government forces (which appeared fairly imminent if nothing further was done to help), the Clinton administration secretly supported efforts by Muslim countries (especially Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran) to violate the arms embargo and provide badly needed weapons and munitions to the Bosnian Muslims through Croatia and through direct flights into Bosnia.²⁶⁴ In addition, U.S. active and former military personnel had covertly began advising and training the Bosnian Muslim-Croat army.²⁶⁵ This infusion of arms probably prevented an all-out Serb victory in late 1994/early 1995.

By early 1995, the military balance was beginning to swing in favor of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, even as extensive fighting took place around the "safe area" of Bihac. A successful Muslim-Croat counteroffensive in late 1994 took back nearly sixty square miles of land from the Serbs; but in early 1995, the Bosnian Serbs, with help from Croatian Serbs, attacked and regained most of this land.²⁶⁶ With continued NATO resistance to the use of air

²⁶² Clinton was under intense domestic pressure to lift the arms embargo, as both the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate had passed independent resolutions calling on him to do just that, and the topic had become a major issue in the midterm election debates. See Peceny and Sanchez-Terry, *op. cit.* in note 234, pp. 14-15.

²⁶³ Daalder, *op. cit.* in note 203, p. 31; and Owen, *op. cit.* in note 201, p. 304.

²⁶⁴ *New York Times*, November 5, 1994, p. A1; April 14, 1995, p. A3; and April 17, 1995, p. A1; and *Washington Post*, February 21, 1995, p. A8; March 1, 1995, p. A5; April 14, 1995; and July 28, 1995, p. A1.

²⁶⁵ A little known and not often reported but major part of the history of the crisis, especially of U.S. involvement. See *New York Times*, July 28, 1995, p. A1; October 28, 1995, p. A1; and *Washington Post*, August 11, 1995, p. A1.

²⁶⁶ Finlan, *op. cit.* in note 235, pp. 50-51.

strikes (due mainly to opposition from the UK and France),²⁶⁷ the U.S. was faced with a dilemma. As Joyce Kaufman writes:

It could defy its allies and authorize air strikes (unilaterally) in support of the Bosnian Muslim forces and, in doing so, risk precipitating the withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia; it could choose to abandon the idea of air strikes and risk losing the enclave of Bihac but also probably save the Alliance; or it could deploy the ground forces necessary to ensure that the UN could effectively protect the safe areas. None of these options was desirable politically, but, forced to choose, the United States opted to ensure the continuation of the Alliance and abandoned the push for air strikes, at least for the present.²⁶⁸

During this time, the UN and NATO eventually (and reluctantly) permitted limited air strikes against an airfield from which Croatian Serb aircraft were flying over Bihac's no-fly zone and a few Bosnian Serb surface-to-air missile sites that threatened NATO aircraft.²⁶⁹

In March and April, Bosnian Serb forces launched a spring offensive, which included massive bombardments of the Tuzla and Sarajevo "safe areas." The NATO SACEUR (who was urged by President Clinton) requested permission to launch air strikes, but this was denied by the UN.²⁷⁰ When the Serbs ignored a NATO ultimatum, the UN finally approved limited punitive air strikes in late May.²⁷¹ The first of these were flown on May 25 and 26, consisted mostly of American aircraft, and attacked Serb ammunition dumps and military installations near Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale.²⁷² In retaliation for the air strikes, however, the Serbs began detaining UNPROFOR personnel and using them as human shields. NATO stopped its combat air strikes entirely after Serbs captured approximately 400 UN soldiers and used them as human shields at their military installations.²⁷³ Taking advantage of the absence of NATO air cover, the Bosnian

²⁶⁷ *New York Times*, November 25, 1994, p. A1.

²⁶⁸ Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 115.

²⁶⁹ Daalder, *op. cit.* in note 203, p. 32.

²⁷⁰ Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 118.

²⁷¹ Finlan, *op. cit.* in note 235, pp. 52-53.

²⁷² *New York Times*, May 25, 1995, p. A14 and May 26, 1995, p. A1; and *Washington Post*, May 26, 1995, p. A1.

²⁷³ *New York Times*, May 27, 1995, p. A1.

Serbs launched an all-out offensive against the “safe area” of Srebrenica. Despite pleading by the commander of Dutch UNPROFOR troops (Lieutenant Colonel Thom Karremans) at Srebrenica for direct air support to save his command, NATO refused to resume air strikes.²⁷⁴ What eventually followed was the overrunning of Srebrenica and the massacre of an estimated 7,000-8,000 Muslim males of various ages in July.²⁷⁵

In the meantime, a major political change occurred in France, where Jacques Chirac replaced François Mitterand as President on May 17. (He was elected in April.) Chirac was much more critical of the problems with previous EU/UN policies in Bosnia than his predecessor was, and he persuaded UNPROFOR to revise its operational tactics to include a more aggressive set of rules of engagement.²⁷⁶ Chirac was also much less opposed to using air strikes against the Serbs than Mitterand²⁷⁷ and even went so far as to suggest that the UNSC approve the recapture of Srebrenica by force.²⁷⁸ This is no doubt a direct reason why there was a significant change in French (and thus UN, NATO, and EU) policy in May 1995. Following the capture of UNPROFOR troops, Chirac felt that the crisis had reached an impasse and that the regime principals needed to decide whether to strengthen their forces and take more assertive action or to withdraw completely.²⁷⁹ Favoring the former, Chirac proposed the creation of a new force specifically designed to protect UNPROFOR forces by being capable of taking offensive action.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁴ Finlan, *op. cit.* in note 235, pp. 53-54.

²⁷⁵ A well documented incident. See Allin, *op. cit.* in note 96, p. 26; and Carole Rogel, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and Its Aftermath* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2004), p. 63.

²⁷⁶ Brune, *op. cit.* in note 234, p. 104.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ Burg and Shoup, *op. cit.* in note 168, p. 326.

²⁷⁹ Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 118.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 119; also *New York Times*, May 29, 1995, p. A5.

Thus, from late May through mid-June, the Contact Group (May 30), NATO (June 3), and the UNSC (June 16) jointly agreed on the creation of a 10,000-strong rapid reaction force (RRF), to consist of French, British, and Dutch troops and be under the command of UNPROFOR.²⁸¹ The tasks of the RRF were set out in the Paris meeting as follows: 1) to retaliate in the event of an attack on UN forces; 2) to assist isolated units to regroup; 3) to support the besieged enclaves of eastern Bosnia; 4) to resupply besieged peacekeepers; and 5) to police UN-declared weapons-free zones, notably that around Sarajevo.²⁸² Oddly enough, at about the same time, the UN indicated (on June 9) that UNPROFOR would return to “traditional peacekeeping principles” and would not interfere with Serb efforts to end the war by finishing off the eastern enclaves.²⁸³

In July, following the UN declaration, the situation on the ground (not surprisingly) grew worse, as the Bosnian Serbs overran the “safe areas” of Zepa and Srebrenica. The fall of Srebrenica and subsequent massacre prompted an urgent appeal from French President Jacques Chirac to use the RRF to retake the Muslim enclave.²⁸⁴ However, his request received little support from anyone else. As Malcolm Rifkin, the British Foreign Secretary put it: “The RRF (had) neither the size nor the capacity to be a war-fighting machine. We would be responsible for a cruel deception if we implied otherwise.”²⁸⁵

On July 21, foreign and defense ministers of the Contact Group and the eleven other main contributors to UNPROFOR met in London for a one-day “crisis meeting.” The conference

²⁸¹ *New York Times*, May 30, 1995, p. A1 and June 4, 1995, p. A14; and *Washington Post*, May 30, 1995, p. A1 and June 4, 1995, p. A1.

²⁸² *Ibid.*

²⁸³ The statement was issued by UN Special Representative to the former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi, following a meeting with UNPROFOR commanders in Croatia, and supported by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. See Daalder, *op. cit.* in note 203, p. 67.

²⁸⁴ See note 270.

²⁸⁵ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 71.

produced two major decisions. First, NATO would “draw a line in the sand”²⁸⁶ around the enclave of Gorazde and respond to any Serb attack against it with a significant and sustained air campaign, which could include targets throughout Bosnia; and second, the decision to use air power and, if so, how much, would be made by NATO only, thereby removing the UN from direct decision-making authority and ending the inept “dual-key” command structure.²⁸⁷ This agreement was also formally approved by NATO at a meeting of the NAC on July 25.

NATO faced increased pressure to take action following a Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo’s Markale Market on August 28, 1995, which killed 37 civilians and wounded 88.²⁸⁸ The deliberate attack against civilians became the focus of a great deal of media attention in the U.S. and Western Europe, and it increased the already widespread public outrage over human rights abuses inflicted by the Bosnian Serbs during the war. This proved to be the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back” for NATO, and it responded to the attack by initiating its first ever sustained bombing campaign, called Operation Deliberate Force, which lasted for three weeks against Bosnian Serb military targets throughout the country. These strikes were also followed by a Croatian offensive against the Krajina Serbs, which succeeded in retaking that territory that Croatia lost in the previous conflict.

Following Croatia’s successful Krajina offensive and the NATO air campaign, the U.S. called for a meeting of the Contact Group and the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia, held in Geneva on September 8. At the end of the talks, the parties signed an agreement covering the basic principles of a peace accord, including the continued existence of

²⁸⁶ A quote attributed to U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke; *ibid.*

²⁸⁷ *New York Times*, July 22, 1995, p. A1; and *Washington Post*, July 22, 1995, p. A1. Note that these decisions were made by the principals at the meeting, which was held outside of formal international institutions, although representatives from the UN and EU were invited and attended the conference. Authority for air strikes now rested jointly with the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia (British General Rupert Smith) and the NATO AFSOUTH (Allied Forces South) commander (American Admiral Leighton Smith).

²⁸⁸ *New York Times*, August 29, 1995, p. A1.

Bosnia-Herzegovina within its prewar borders consisting, however, of two entities: the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) and the (Muslim-Croat) Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On October 5, a sixty-day ceasefire was announced by President Clinton. This was followed a month later by three weeks of intense negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, at the end of which, the Dayton Peace Accord was signed by the participants. (See Appendix Three for the major points of the agreement.) The peace agreement was negotiated mainly by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, with the UN, EU, and Russia permitted observer status but allowed no direct role in the negotiations.²⁸⁹ As part of the agreement, NATO deployed a 50,000-strong peacekeeping force (IFOR—later SFOR) to Bosnia. The Bosnia war was over, but many of the policy-making, policy coordination, and implementation challenges it posed for the transatlantic security regime would be revisited only four years later during the Kosovo crisis.

5.4 ANALYSIS OF THE VARIABLES

5.4.1 Dependent Variable: Measuring Regime Policy Preferences in Bosnia

Interestingly, the regime in this case viewed the indirect use of force as a higher level of escalation than punitive attacks. Collective regime policy shifted over time. Those shifts were as follows. (Note that a given level of escalation also includes acceptance of all lower levels of intervention.)

1992: Humanitarian Aid (1) + Peacekeeping (2) = 1.5

1993: Surface Interdiction (3) + Defensive Air Interdiction (4) = 3.5

²⁸⁹ For detailed coverage of the Dayton negotiations and agreement, see Richard Holbrooke, *op. cit.* in note 285.

1994: Offensive Air Interdiction (5) = 5.0

1995: Punitive Attacks (6) = 6.0

USA/President George H.W. Bush

Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention = Non-intervention (0)/Humanitarian Aid (1)

- Maximum Acceptable Level = Offensive Air Interdiction (5)
- Average Preferred Intervention Rating = **0.5**

USA/President Bill Clinton

Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention = Offensive Air Interdiction (5)/Punitive Attacks (6)/Indirect Use of Force (7)

- Maximum Acceptable Level = Indirect Use of Force (7)
- Average Preferred Intervention Rating = **6.0**

France/President François Mitterand

Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention = Humanitarian Aid (1)/ Peacekeeping (2)

- Maximum Acceptable Level = Defensive Air Interdiction (4)
- Average Intervention Rating = **1.5**

France/President Jacques Chirac

Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention=Defensive Air Interdiction (4)/Offensive Air Interdiction (5)

- Maximum Acceptable Rating = Punitive Attacks (6)
- Average Intervention Rating = **4.5**

United Kingdom/Prime Minister John Major

Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention=Humanitarian Aid (1)/ Peacekeeping (2)

- Maximum Acceptable Level = Punitive Attacks (6)
- Average Preferred Intervention Rating = **1.5**

Germany/Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention=Humanitarian Aid (1)/ Peacekeeping (2)/Surface Interdiction (3)/Defensive Air Interdiction (4)

- Maximum Acceptable Level = Punitive Attacks (6)
- Average Intervention Rating = **2.5**

5.4.2 Independent Variable 1: Power as Influence in Regime Policy Congruence

The first hypothesis stated that collective regime policy would *increasingly become easier* to form as relative power within of the regime became *increasingly concentrated with the hegemon* (i.e. the U.S.). Likewise, collective regime policy would *increasingly become more difficult* to form as relative power inside of the regime *became more diffuse*. Unlike the Kosovo case, the Bosnia case study covers an extended period of time (approximately four years of European and transatlantic diplomacy). As such, possible changes in the regime's distribution of power can be analyzed within this particular case, as well as across the cases. See Appendix Four for the complete breakdown of distribution of power within the regime across time.

At first glance, it does not seem that the distribution of power had any direct influence in formation of a collective policy regarding use of force in Bosnia. First, the share of relative power among the major regime members remained relatively static over time, never fluctuating more than seventeen percent (in the case of France between 1994 and 1995). And the American share of relative power never fluctuated more than 2.8 percent (a drop between 1994 and 1995). The lack of any significant change in relative power during the time period suggests one of two possibilities; either the first independent variable has no effect on the dependent variable, or the measurement of power being used is inappropriate (i.e. there is a measurement error). To deal with the possibility of the second, I analyzed the power relationships a second time over the

same period, but this time using only MS (military spending) as the measurement criterion. This was done to test the possibility that measurement of relative power as influence within a security regime—and especially with regard to issues concerning the collective use of force and military intervention—may be better measured in purely military power, rather than a combination of military and economic power. (Again, see Appendix Four.)

Using only military spending as a measurement of intra-regime relative power does make for a more interesting analysis, as a change of as high as 29.8 percent took place (in France, from 1994-1995). However, overall, this measurement is still inconclusive. Despite one or two fairly large changes in military power distribution, no country showed a *constant* increase or decrease across the time period. Each of the four countries showed one or two years of increase in relative power and one or two years of decrease. And the United States, as hegemon, demonstrated very little remarkable change one way or the other over the time period.

In this case, the United States was clearly dominant in the most relevant power resource—military capability—but that seems to have had little relevance. The transatlantic balance of power seems to have had little impact on this particular regime policy change. Instead, power resources seem to have been important only to the extent that the regime (collectively or individual members) was willing to use them, not to influence each other, but to address the fighting in Bosnia.

Thus, in conclusion, both realist, material-oriented measures of relative power as influence failed to demonstrate any correlation with the steady, measurable change in regime intervention policy over the time period of the Bosnia crisis. Of particular interest is the fact that the U.S., despite having an *overwhelming* relative share of power (measured in either manner) among the major regime members was *not able* to translate that power into influence under the

Clinton administration. This may indicate one of two things. First, that realist assumptions about the distribution/concentration of power in the international system is not translatable into influence between or among regime members (and thus the first independent variable fails). Or, it may indicate that the materialistic measurement of power is simply not an adequate one, and a more intricate and less materialistic measurement is necessary for further study (something, in fact covered by Volgy and Bailin²⁹⁰ as well as in the literature more generally). However, the second possibility is beyond the limited scope of this dissertation. *For purposes of the first case study, the distribution/concentration of power in the transatlantic security regime has no correlation with regime policy congruence or changes over time therein, and the H1 hypothesis may be rejected.*

5.4.3 Independent Variable 2: Threat Perception and Regime Policy Congruence

In realist theory, one of the strongest assumptions is that the presence of an external threat will cause greater cohesion among allies. Indeed, the Soviet threat has often been credited with providing the glue that kept NATO together during the Cold War. But there was no similar threat to enforce transatlantic cohesion on the issue of Bosnia. Of course, both the United States and Western Europe were concerned about instability on the continent in the aftermath of the Cold War. And both ultimately identified the Bosnian Serbs as the aggressors in the Bosnia war. But the truth was that as long as the conflict was contained within the former Yugoslavia, there was little direct threat to the interests of most regime members. As David Gompert noted: “Neither the United States nor any other power saw its vital interests imperiled by the conflict.

²⁹⁰ *Op. cit.* in note 79.

The West had a political and moral interest in humanitarian relief and a strategic interest in containment—and in fact, the United States and EC have been successful in protecting those two interests.”²⁹¹

The major members of the transatlantic security regime maintained that three critical issues justified their involvement in Bosnia: massive movement of refugees, the humanitarian crisis brought on by the war, and the Bosnian Serbs’ human rights violations.²⁹² Moreover, the major regime members were concerned that the spillover of fighting and mass refugee movements would continue to spread to Kosovo and/or Macedonia and draw in more parties to the conflict.²⁹³ This would seem to indicate that the major regime members saw at least two direct security threats from the war in Bosnia: refugee flows and possible spillover of the conflict. However, the regime initially decided not to use military force in Bosnia, based, in large part, on the belief that Yugoslavia was no longer strategically important and that the conflict was not worth risking lives. Instead, non-aggressive intervention was undertaken earlier in the conflict, including economic sanctions and humanitarian relief. From a threat assessment perspective, the question then is how similar was individual regime members’ threat assessment, and did the regime’s collective perception of the threat arising from conflict in Bosnia change over time?

In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to a continuum of threat level intensity, regime participation in military intervention responding to the Bosnia conflict represented a low level of threat to regime members (as defined in Chapter Four). Table One

²⁹¹ David C. Gompert, “How to Defeat Serbia,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, July/August 1994, p. 42.

²⁹² James B. Steinberg, “International Involvement in the Yugoslav Conflict” in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 53.

²⁹³ Susan L. Woodward, “Upside-Down Policy: The U.S. Debate on the Use of Force and the Case of Bosnia” in H.W. Brands, Darren J. Pierson, and Reynolds S. Kiefer (eds.), *The Use of Force after the Cold War* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University, 2000), p. 118.

(see below) demonstrates a rather interesting observation, in that out of the four states, Germany had the highest level of threat perception. While Germany was the most *politically active* of the three states at the outset of the crisis, it was *always the most reluctant to commit its own military forces*. This has no direct bearing on my dependent variable, but it does lead to interesting intellectual questions regarding *national* (as opposed to international or regional) security, threat perception, and the use of military force.

Additionally (and more specifically relevant to this dissertation), while one could argue based on this threat assessment that Germany had the most at stake in the crisis in terms of national interest, one could also argue that (out of the four) *Germany was the least cooperative in terms of facilitating the advancement of a collective regime policy*. Finally, given the nearly complete lack of debate among the major regime members about a specific security threat (or its absence) during the time period of the case study, this variable may also be classified as irrelevant (or at least non-causal). *Thus, for purposes of the first case study, perceived external threat to the transatlantic security regime has no correlation with regime policy congruence or changes over time therein, and the H2 hypothesis may be rejected.*

Table One: Threat Matrix for Bosnia Case Study²⁹⁴

	<u>Imminence</u> ²⁹⁵	<u>Probability</u> ²⁹⁶	<u>Proximity</u> ²⁹⁷	<u>Severity</u> ²⁹⁸
<u>France</u>	Low to Medium	Low	Low	Very Low
<u>Germany</u>	Low to Medium	Medium	Medium	Very Low
<u>United Kingdom</u>	Low to Medium	Low	Low	Very Low
<u>United States</u>	Low to Medium	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low

5.4.4 Independent Variable 3: International Institutions and Regime Policy Congruence

One of the major differences between realism and neoliberal institutionalism is the emphasis placed by the latter on international institutions. The main argument (as outlined in Chapter Four) is that the creation and maintenance of such institutions can affect the interests of states and may come to be more important to a national government than achieving immediate, short-term interests that may run counter to the interests of the institution or its collective

²⁹⁴ In this case, specifically the dual threats of conflict spillover and/or refugee exodus that would directly threaten that country. Note that there are, in effect, no real security “threats” to individual states in the traditional military-based view of security. Rather, the threats being analyzed are to *regional stability as it would impact the state* and *domestic economic stability*.

²⁹⁵ Imminence is the amount of warning time available for the country to prepare for or respond to a security threat. Very High=Warning/reaction time measured in seconds or minutes; High=Warning/reaction time greater than one hour but less than one day; Medium=Warning/reaction time measured in more than one day but less than one week; Low=Warning/reaction time measured in more than one week but less than one month; and Very Low=Warning/reaction time measured in more than one month.

²⁹⁶ This is easily the most difficult type of threat to estimate. The estimates are based on the historical evidence as provided in this chapter. Probability indicates likelihood of occurrence without any outside intervention. Very High=Greater than 80%; High=60-80%; Medium=40-60%; Low=20-40%; Very Low=Less than 20%.

²⁹⁷ Geographic proximity of potential threat. Very High=Bordering country; High=Nearby country separated only by major geographic impasse; Medium=Nearby country separated by a single interposed country; Low=Country is in same continent; Very Low=Countries are in different continents.

²⁹⁸ Likely number of short-term (i.e. within hours, days, or weeks) human casualties or economic costs suffered if threat is actuated. Very High=Tens of thousands of deaths (or more) and/or tens of billions of dollars in economic costs; High=Thousands of deaths and/or billions of dollars in economic costs; Medium=Hundreds of deaths and/or hundreds of thousands of dollars in economic costs; Low=Scores or dozens of deaths and/or tens of thousands of dollars in economic costs; Very Low=Few or no deaths and/or thousands of dollars or less in economic costs.

membership as a whole. In the case of Bosnia, there were three main international institutions involved: the UN, NATO, and the EC/EU.

The first important finding regarding this variable is that some of the major political decisions of the four major individual states within the regime came unilaterally and despite protests by representatives of international institutions such as the UN, as well as individual governments.²⁹⁹ This is interesting, because the literature on international institutions would suggest that institutional participation creates norms that constrain the actions of member states. While each of the four major powers did consult individual NATO allies and EC/EU member states, as well as the organizations themselves about the details of various diplomatic and military proposals (especially regarding *implementation* of any specific decisions), the overall *policy making* process was primarily national and/or bilateral. The EC/EU played no role whatsoever in the debates surrounding and decisions leading up to use of force. And once NATO actually became involved in the crisis, its primary role was to *accommodate and manage policy decisions rather than initiate them*. In contrast to the international institutions literature, *the major regime member states acted within some institutional constraints, but those constraints were frequently overshadowed by perceived national interest*.

The second important finding is that while the United States (which was the only regime member truly capable of unilateral military action) might have been tempted to unilaterally use military force (to unilaterally initiate “lift and strike,” for example), this was never a serious consideration. Throughout the entire crisis (including the administrations of both U.S.

²⁹⁹ Specifically the following actions: Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia; France’s unilateral deployment of attack helicopters to Sarajevo; and the U.S.’s unilateral decision to cease enforcement of the arms embargo against rump Yugoslavia.

presidents), American policy makers consistently and repeatedly emphasized that the U.S. would not act unilaterally with regard to the use of force.

In early April 1993, for example, President Clinton acknowledged differences with the NATO allies but reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to work through the UN:

“(The United States has) in many cases been more aggressive in what we were willing to than the European neighbors of the former Yugoslavia....The United States is not capable of solving the problem alone....If you believe that we should engage this problem in a multilateral way...then the reverse has to be true too....The United States has got to work through the United Nations, and all our views may not always prevail.”³⁰⁰

In short (and more specifically regarding use of military force rather than purely political or economic issues), although some aspects of this case appear inconsistent with this hypothesis, there was no attempt to appeal to the UN as an external (i.e. outside of the transatlantic security regime) institution in order to facilitate collective policy formation and implementation, nor was there a threat to the formal rules and operating procedures of either of the two international institutions within the regime (NATO and the EC/EU) that any regime members felt the need to resist.

Such an institutional threat (albeit a modest one) did surface during this period as the regime principals discussed the options of air strikes. The U.S. State Department sent a letter to Senator Joe Biden, an outspoken supporter of stronger military action in Bosnia, saying that because UNSC Resolution 770 permitted members to use “all necessary means” to deliver humanitarian supplies, no further authorization was needed for air strikes.³⁰¹ This was not the view of most European regime member governments, which believed that a new UNSC resolution would be required. Thus, it is possible that the Europeans resisted the idea of air strikes because they believed such action would damage NATO credibility without a specific

³⁰⁰ *Washington Post*, April 7, 1993, p. A1.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, April 22, 1993, p. A1.

UNSC resolution. It is more likely, however, that the Europeans were simply skeptical about the utility of air strikes and concerned about the safety of their own ground forces.

It is also possible that various policy advocates and advisors may have appealed to institutional solidarity—and thus to the relevance and cohesion of both NATO and the EU—as part of the attempt to form a cohesive collective policy. There is evidence that at least two such appeals affected the position of at least some European governments. The first, as discussed previously in this chapter, was the political pressure leveraged by Germany in *leading* the EC to recognizing Croatian and Slovenian independence *before* a common EC position could be debated and adopted. The argument was that the EC *had* to follow Germany's lead or risk jeopardizing its newly agreed upon CFSP.

Additionally, one can see similar logic within NATO specifically regarding decisions to use military force. Just before Warren Christopher's May 1993 trip to Europe, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd told the House of Commons: "We have to stick together as we consider these options. We are not going to allow the Atlantic alliance to fracture on this issue."³⁰² In theory, this provided an opening for the United States to make just such an appeal—i.e. to emulate Germany in militarily *leading* NATO into using stronger military force, just as Germany had politically led the EC/EU into recognizing Croatian and Slovenian sovereignty. It appeared that, just as with the debate over recognition, some of the Europeans (most notably the UK) were willing to change their policy preferences and position rather than endanger NATO or EC/EU cohesion.

However, while Europeans (on both sides of the debate) used the institutional cohesion argument, the Americans were apparently not ready to use this as a bargaining mechanism. Both

³⁰² *New York Times*, April 30, 1993, p. A1.

before and after Christopher's trip, it appears that the Clinton administration explicitly rejected putting NATO cohesion in jeopardy in order to gain regime support for U.S. policies. As one U.S. official put it: "If we'd bet the ranch, said to the French and the English (sic), 'This threatens a fundamental breach in our relationships,' we could perhaps have got (sic) the Europeans—kicking and screaming—involved. But this would have made it an American problem."³⁰³ If anything, the unwillingness of the Clinton administration to make such an appeal may have *delayed the ability of the regime to formulate a collective policy regarding the use of force*.

Thus, different aspects of this case appear to be both *consistent and inconsistent* with the hypothesis; but those aspects of the case do *support* the hypothesis do so in a *corollary* rather than a *causal* manner. There is enough cursory and counterfactual evidence that merits further investigation. *Thus, for purposes of the first case study, the presence of an "enforcing" regime institution has a strong correlation with regime policy congruence or changes over time therein, but it does not conclusively prove to be a causal factor. The H3 hypothesis should not be rejected.*

Additional research and analysis is necessary to make any further assessments, in particular, the differing roles played by simple institutional membership versus actual institutional participation. Specifically, further research should examine a larger selection of regime member states in order to evaluate if this type of institutional constraint is more applicable (or applicable at all) to smaller regime member states, which the institutionalist literature argues are more susceptible to such constraint and have less freedom of action. The argument developed here would expect to see that many of the smaller regime member states

³⁰³ Elizabeth Drew, *op. cit.* in note 206, p. 156.

would be unable or unwilling to make the kinds of unilateral decisions that the larger regime members made during the crisis.

5.4.5 Independent Variable 4: Risk Assessment and Regime Policy Congruence

As discussed earlier, the member states of the transatlantic security regime were extremely reluctant to contribute direct military assistance to Bosnia. This reluctance was in part due to the risks and/or costs that might accompany multilateral military intervention, and these risks/costs were very evident before and during the civil war. Both the demography and geography of Yugoslavia presented enormous challenges to any military operation. Thomas Mockaitis points out that, “The unique political/military geography of Yugoslavia guaranteed that the conflict would be bloody even by the standards of a civil war.”³⁰⁴ Moreover, animosities between the three ethnic groups can be traced back for centuries. Thus it was fairly evident to most Western powers that any deployment of ground combat troops in support of a multilateral intervention would require a long-term (and therefore costly) commitment.

Costs of potential military intervention may be measured in terms of expected economic, human, and political costs/risks. The long-term military commitment (through NATO’s IFOR and SFOR missions and now through the EU peacekeeping mission—EUFOR) did result in a number of costs. The U.S. contribution alone to the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia (1996-2003) cost approximately \$12.5 billion.³⁰⁵ On the other hand, the human costs of peacekeeping in Bosnia have been extremely light, although there were fears and predictions of

³⁰⁴ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch?* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1999), pp. 82.

³⁰⁵ *Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2003).

NATO forces suffering heavy casualties. In contrast, domestic political costs had the potential for being high.

Participation in multilateral military intervention in Bosnia constituted a significant risk to the members of the transatlantic security regime—economic, military, and political. High-level risks/costs were present as a result of the conflict being a civil war, the level of long-term involvement expected (time of operation), the fact that intervention would have to take place during an active conflict, the nature of the physical environment, the potential for negative consequences to the regime's relationship with Russia, the *perceived* (if not actual) human costs, uncertain public support in case of failure or serious setbacks, and the extent (size) of the operation. The perceived benefits of increased military intervention were the obvious humanitarian crisis, the need to maintain the credibility of the regime (as well as the UN), and the need to address/alleviate widespread Western public concern/opinion.

The case of Bosnia seems to support the hypothesis regarding the cost-benefit conditions under which the transatlantic security regime will adopt a cohesive, collective policy regarding military intervention. When UNPROFOR deployed to Bosnia in 1992, neither the United Nations nor the countries contributing troops believed that the force's protection of aid convoys would provoke armed, organized resistance from the warring factions. Thus, the perceived military and human costs were initially low, and there was little disagreement among the major regime members. As the Bosnian Serbs began an increasingly systematic campaign of interference with UN relief operations, the Europeans began planning for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. However, once it became clear that retreating was likely to provoke even more opposition and human rights abuses (which translated into greater human and political costs) than remaining in Bosnia under the current conditions, the regime members began to disagree

about options for military escalation or intervention. Faced with the variety of possible military options mentioned earlier, the regime members chose to adopt the use of NATO air strikes to pressure the Bosnian Serbs—a very rational option that reflected a balance between the increasing political and human costs of continuing the status quo and the higher military and economic costs of more large-scale intervention. *But it was changes in the perceived cost-benefit analysis that (in part) pushed the regime members to move from agreement to disagreement and back to agreement. When European costs of escalation were higher than American costs, there was disagreement; but when the costs were more equally shared, there was stronger agreement.*

The Bosnia case thus seems to provide (qualified) support for this hypothesis. In this instance, the major regime members were in agreement on the need to avoid armed, organized resistance in order to lower the costs of intervention (although Americans and Europeans had different types of costs). For example, by waiting until a peace agreement was in place before deploying IFOR, the regime members undoubtedly sought to avert a significant number of casualties (i.e. reduce the military and human costs of intervention).

In the final analysis, it is obvious that once the Europeans committed ground troops to the UNPROFOR mission, they faced a completely different risk and associated costs than the U.S. did with regard to escalating the use of military force. The Europeans, by the very act of committing ground forces, expressed a higher degree of perception of utility gained by military involvement in Bosnia. However, through its equally obvious reluctance to commit its own ground troops to any intervention in Bosnia (initially even to a post-conflict peacekeeping role), the U.S. demonstrated a perception of higher costs associated with ground intervention—but lesser costs associated with the use of air power and the “lift and strike” proposal. In other

words, the U.S. and Europeans had *diametrically opposite* views of perceived costs and benefits associated with increasing military intervention and the nature of such intervention. This clearly led to complete intransigence in forming a common intervention policy until the Europeans changed their position and agreed to NATO air strikes, and the U.S. changed its position and agreed to commit ground troops to peacekeeping operations.

The greater the perceived costs of intervention in Bosnia compared to the benefits, the more unlikely any individual regime member was to support increased intervention. It was differences among major regime members in this cost-benefit analysis that caused (to some degree) the lack of a congruent policy. When those perceptual differences changed, so too did the ease of policy congruence. What this variable cannot seem to explain, however, is *what caused the changes in utility perception among various members?* For an answer to that question, other variables must be examined. *Thus, for purposes of the first case study, the perceived risk analysis or cost-benefit ratio of the policy also has a strong correlation with regime policy congruence (and, in fact, seems to play a relatively strong causal role)—but not necessarily with changes over time therein. The H4 hypothesis should not be rejected.*

5.4.6 Independent Variable 5: Perceptual Lenses and Regime Policy Congruence

When the Clinton administration sought European agreement on its more aggressive policy of “lift and strike,” it had little in terms of shared political ideology or personal relationships with European leaders to fall back on. The Clinton administration was a center-left Democratic one, and the major leaders of Europe were either from center-right political parties (Major in the United Kingdom and Kohl in Germany) or even farther left than Clinton and his advisors (Mitterand’s socialist government in France). Furthermore, the policy was largely

devised and decided upon at the highest levels of U.S. government, and no major administration officials (Lake, Christopher, Albright, Aspin, Powell, Gore, and Clinton) were “Europeanists.”³⁰⁶ As members of a new (and very domestically-oriented) administration, they had not yet had time to develop firm relationships with their European colleagues. Table Two outlines the various beliefs of the three typologies.


³⁰⁶ John Peterson, “Europe and America in the Clinton Era,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 416-417. See also “Cool Winds from the White House,” *Economist*, March 27, 1993, in which Lake admitted that he had never heard of the Transatlantic Declaration.

Table Two: Transatlantic Belief Structures in Bosnia Intervention Policy

<u>Belief Category</u>	<u>Non-intervention Typology</u>	<u>Limited Intervention Typology</u>	<u>Active Intervention Typology</u>
1. Normative Core Beliefs			
Analytical Anchor	Isolationism/ Pacifism	Realism	Idealism/Liberalism
Priority of Values	National/Domestic Interests	Balance of Power	Peace & Human Welfare
Primary Goal of Foreign Relations	Maintain National Security/Prosperity	Avoid great power war/Maintain balance(s) of power	Maintain peace/ Uphold human rights
2. Policy Core Beliefs			
Major Challenge Posed by Bosnia War	Avoid becoming involved	Maintaining peace among the great powers/Avoiding “spillover” of conflict into neighboring states	Establishing a lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia
Preferred Political Order in Bosnia	Irrelevant	Establish balance of power between Croats, Muslims, & Serbs	Establish interdependence among Croats, Muslims, & Serbs
Conception of Security Interests	Strictly National or Non-existent	Regional	Global
Political Priorities	National/Domestic	Formal Alliances/Treaties	Western Norms & Values
3. Instrumental Policy Beliefs			
Perception of Cause of Bosnia War	Historical Ethnic Animosities	Serb Attempt to Maintain Integrity of Yugoslavia	Serbian Aggression against Bosnia
Role of United Nations	Irrelevant/Useless	Policy Legitimization	Policy Legalization
Role of NATO	Territorial Defense/ Military Alliance (i.e. no role)	Political-military Alliance; “In Area” Collective Security/ Policy Implementation	Socio-political Regime; “Out of Area” Collective Security/ Policy Making
View on Military Intervention in Bosnia	Abstain Completely	Contain Conflict/ Discriminate Intervention	End Conflict/ Indiscriminate Intervention
Implementation Preference in Balkans	Zero intervention preferable; humanitarian intervention at most	Diplomatic solution first; NATO Peacekeeping	Use force to reach diplomatic solution; NATO Peacemaking

Each of the leaders of the four major regime members had strong political/ideological core values that appear to translate into their varying positions on military intervention during the crisis in Bosnia. The key members of each typology are as follows. The non-intervention typology included American Republican President George H.W. Bush, British Conservative Prime Minister John Major, and French Socialist President François Mitterand. The limited intervention typology included French President Jacques Chirac, German Christian Democrat Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and American Democrat President Bill Clinton.

Using the measurements discussed previously, the political/ideological typologies may be placed within the parameters of the dependent variable in a ratio manner: 0-2=non-intervention typology; 2.1-5=limited intervention typology; and 5.1-8=active intervention typology. Thus, President Bush, President Mitterand, and Prime Minister John Major all fall ideologically within the non-intervention typology; President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl fall within the limited intervention typology; and President Clinton falls within the active intervention typology. Ideologically, then, during the Bosnia crisis, one can see a sort of horseshoe-shaped ideological graph in which political leaders may be placed based upon the joining of their political beliefs and policy preferences about military intervention and use of force during the crisis.



The question still remains, however, of what impact (if any) these ideological typologies/belief structures had on regime policy congruence. Policy core beliefs clearly came into conflict during the crisis in Bosnia. In competition were the non-interventionists' core beliefs of the national interest and staying out of "peripheral" wars versus (both groups of) the interventionists' core belief in maintaining regional balances of power and/or upholding human rights. All three groups protected their normative core beliefs by making adjustments in secondary (policy core) aspects of their belief systems, and this may be why a sort of "middle ground" of limited intervention evolved as regime policy—especially after the change of governmental leadership in both the U.S. and France, from non-interventionists to active (former) and limited (latter) interventionists. It required the least amount of change (in terms of secondary beliefs) on behalf of the non-interventionists and active interventionists. It is clear, based on this analysis, that not only did each major political leader possess his own set of belief structures regarding the issue-area but that the change in leadership (and therefore belief structures) in two of the major leadership positions coincided with changes in regime policy.

Thus, for purposes of the first case study, the degree of congruence in the ideological beliefs/structures of the leaders of the major regime member states also has a strong correlation with regime policy congruence and, in fact, also seems to play a relatively strong causal role—including influencing changes in regime policy over time. The H5 hypothesis should not be rejected.

5.4.7 Independent Variable 6: Domestic Political Pressures and Regime Policy Congruence

Although much of international relations theory treats states as unified actors, this is not often the case in reality. State governments (particularly democratic ones) are often divided. Additionally, public opinion can play a strong role in influencing national decision-makers regarding national foreign policies. It is therefore only logical to assume that such pressures may also influence regime-level policy formation and cohesion. Thus, an important variable to examine regarding regime policy congruence (or lack thereof) regarding use of force in Bosnia is the domestic political considerations of the four major members.

The United States

In the United States, the first public response to the civil war in Yugoslavia was that the U.S. had no stake or responsibility in the conflict. This was followed by sustained indifference to the extraordinary amounts of coverage given the war by the US media. As the brutality intensified, the longer-term reaction was a growing feeling among many (but not most) Americans that the U.S. was avoiding a broader moral responsibility in the Balkans. However, this was not accompanied by a consensus on what exactly the U.S. should do.

At the outset of the civil wars in Yugoslavia, in a December 1991 Times Mirror survey, fewer than ten percent of Americans said they were paying “very close” attention to news of the conflict.³⁰⁷ The indifference remained high throughout the spring of 1992, even as the war in

³⁰⁷ Data from Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “The People, the Press, and the Use of Force” in The Aspen Strategy Group, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era* (Queenstown, Maryland: The Aspen Institute, 1995), p. 149.

Bosnia was given extensive television coverage, including reports of ethnic cleansing, rapes, and other atrocities.

Most polls taken in 1993 suggested that, while relatively ambivalent about the issue generally, the public would strongly oppose unilateral intervention and/or use of ground troops but would moderately support some form of multilateral action to alleviate the growing humanitarian crisis. A January 1993 CBS/*New York Times* poll, taken as U.S. air drops of food had begun, found that 67 percent said that the United States *does not* have “a responsibility to do something about the fighting between Serbs and Bosnians,” while 24 percent said it did.³⁰⁸ A similar result was found at the same time by a Times Mirror survey, when the public was asked if U.S. forces should be used “in Bosnia to help end the fighting there”; 55 percent said no, and 32 percent said yes.³⁰⁹ In the same poll, only slightly more support came when the element of fighting aggression was introduced; 47 percent opposed using U.S. forces “to prevent Bosnia from being taken over by the Serbs,” while 36 percent favored it.³¹⁰

An early May poll found twelve percent of the public favored and 86 percent opposed the United States taking “military action alone to try to stop the fighting in Bosnia.”³¹¹ Another poll found that 65 percent favored and 32 percent opposed “carrying out air strikes” along with the NATO allies against the Bosnian Serbs.³¹² After President Clinton announced in February his pledge to send U.S. troops to enforce a peace agreement, 41 percent favored the decision and 51 percent opposed it; but support rose to 58 percent favoring and 32 percent opposed if the troops were part of an “international peacekeeping force.”³¹³ Little support existed for unilateral action

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

³¹¹ Foyle, *op. cit.* in note 202, p. 39.

³¹² *Ibid.*

³¹³ *Ibid.*

by the United States to end the war. In an April 1993 poll, only 35 percent favored, while 52 percent opposed the U.S. “sending troops to Yugoslavia to try to help stop the civil war there.”³¹⁴ But the public that was giving pollsters its opinions was still an uninformed one, as only around fifteen percent of the public said that they were tracking the news from Bosnia “very closely” in 1993, and this figure did not change much in 1994 or 1995, despite the intense media coverage of the war.³¹⁵ Indeed, the level of public interest in Bosnia over the course of the conflict demonstrates little correlation to the nature and extent of media coverage. Only once (prior to the Dayton Accords) did the proportion of the public who followed news of the Bosnia conflict “very closely” climb above twenty percent, and that was in May 1993, when U.S. military action appeared likely.³¹⁶ Mostly, it hovered at the fifteen percent level throughout 1993, dipping to twelve percent in 1994.³¹⁷

Over the course of 1993, a majority of Americans continued to believe that the United States *did not* have a responsibility to do something about the fighting in Bosnia in the polls. By 1994, with the prospects of U.S. air strikes and the slaughter of 68 civilians in an outdoor market in Sarajevo, there was a steady rise in the view that the United States did have a responsibility to do “something”—although this was still a minority. Despite many hours of television coverage, as well as commentary in the print media, the *prevailing* attitude in 1994 still remained that this was not an American problem. Specific questions about the use of force in Bosnia in 1994 revealed responses along the following lines.³¹⁸ Questions that asked if U.S. forces should be employed to *make* peace were rejected. Questions that tested participation in multilateral *peacekeeping* generally drew more support unless the wording suggested that U.S. forces might

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

³¹⁶ Kohut and Toth, *op. cit.* in note 314, p. 149.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

become involved in a shooting war. Questions that tested whether U.S. forces should be used to protect UN peacekeepers received strong support.

Even limited U.S. air strikes for humanitarian purposes had drawn little support initially. A Gallup poll in August 1992 found only 35 percent agreeing that the United States should “take the lead” in seeking UN-backed air strikes to unblock relief efforts to Sarajevo; (45 percent said it should not).³¹⁹ Similarly, a CBS/*New York Times* poll found that the use of U.S. planes to bomb targets to get food and medicine to civilians was favored by only 39 percent and opposed by 43 percent.³²⁰ Using non-combat aircraft to distribute humanitarian aid was favored by 67 percent in a *Los Angeles Times* poll in the same mid-1992 period.

Throughout much of 1993, Gallup found U.S. air strikes against Bosnian Serb military forces opposed by majorities—62 percent in April and 56 percent in May—who said the United States should not get militarily involved.³²¹ With rising Bosnian Serb attacks and heightened Bosnian Serb intransigence toward peace efforts, however, support increased for air strikes more broadly. Once actual U.S. air strikes were carried out through NATO against Bosnian Serbs attacking Sarajevo, they drew 51 percent and sixty percent support in August 1993 polls by Gallup/CNN/*USA Today* and ABC/*Washington Post*, respectively.³²² A June 1993 CBS/*New York Times* survey found that using U.S. planes to bomb targets that were attacking UN peacekeepers was favored by 61 percent of the public.³²³ But these narrow majorities of support only came *after* the decision was made by the Clinton administration and the actual air strikes had begun.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

³²¹ *Ibid.*

³²² *Ibid.*, p. 152.

³²³ *Ibid.*

Although public attitudes towards U.S. air strikes were somewhat ambivalent, use of air power was still clearly favored over using U.S. ground troops (except as part of a post-conflict peacekeeping force). In early 1993, Times Mirror found that by a 55 percent to 32 percent margin, the public opposed the use of force to help end the fighting in Bosnia or to prevent Bosnia from being taken over by the Serbs (47 percent to 36 percent).³²⁴ Support for deploying U.S. “armed forces” as part of a UN operation to deliver relief supplies was 57 percent in a December 1992 Gallup poll.³²⁵ But when the possible risk of U.S. forces being subject to hostile fire was introduced into the question, a September 1993 NBC/*Wall Street Journal* poll found opposition to deployment of U.S. forces—even as peacekeepers—rose to 59 percent.³²⁶

When a mortar shell struck the marketplace in Sarajevo on February 5, 1994, the grizzly scenes of civilian deaths and injuries were displayed on television screens around the world. The gruesome coverage of the shelling of Sarajevo seemed to shift public support in favor of air strikes. Although a January 1994 poll about U.S. participation in multilateral air strikes found only 35 percent of Americans favoring such action and 56 percent opposing it, polls shortly after the shelling found the public virtually deadlocked on support for multilateral air strikes (48 percent in favor to 45 percent opposed).³²⁷

By early June 1995, the public still overwhelmingly opposed sending U.S. troops to Bosnia to “try and end the fighting,” with 21 percent in favor and 73 percent opposed.³²⁸ At the same time, however, the public rallied around the policies the administration had selected. The public supported sending American troops to “maintain peace and protect relief operations” (61 percent to 32 percent), favored “the use of U.S. military forces to help UN peacekeepers move to

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

³²⁵ *Ibid.*

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ Foyle, *op. cit.* in note 202, p. 43.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

safer places in Bosnia” (65 percent to 29 percent), approved of sending ground troops to “help UN forces to withdraw safely” (68 percent to 27 percent), and, regarding more aggressive action, favored multilateral air strikes if the Serbs continued “to attack Bosnian cities or UN peacekeeping troops” (56 percent to 33 percent).³²⁹

There were distinct differences in attitudes among Americans, however, depending on the type of proposed intervention in Bosnia. Support was strongest for sending U.N. peacekeepers (eighty percent in July 1992), airdrops of humanitarian relief (67 percent in February 1993), air cover for U.N. peacekeeping troops (61 percent in August 1993), and shooting down Serbian planes violating the October 1992 no-fly zone (61 percent in April 1993).³³⁰ Support for lifting the September 1991 arms embargo (57 percent in June 1994), bombing by NATO to protect safe havens (54 percent in April 1994), and U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping after a peace settlement (54 percent in June 1993) has at times ranged above 50 percent.³³¹

Although support for allied air strikes against Serbian military forces in Bosnia was initially low (30 percent in April 1993), approval rates grew over time.³³² During the summer of 1993, a majority approved of retaliatory strikes in response either to Serbian attacks (54 percent in August 1993) or to threats against UN peacekeepers (85 percent in August 1993), and to protect humanitarian shipments (69 percent in August 1993).³³³ Ironically, there was at that time less sentiment for strikes to protect the Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo (50 percent in August 1993) or to force the Bosnian Serbs out of territory occupied during the war (40 percent in

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

³³⁰ See Richard Sobel, “U.S. and European Attitudes Toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia: *Mourir pour la Bosnie?*” in Richard H. Ullman (ed.), *The World and Yugoslavia's Wars* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996).

³³¹ *Ibid.*

³³² *Ibid.*

³³³ *Ibid.*

August 1993).³³⁴ Thus, Americans were more willing to use air power to protect UN soldiers providing aid than to save Bosnian civilians or punish the Serbian military.

In sum, between 1992 and 1995, there was generally majority support for U.S. assistance in providing humanitarian aid and protecting peacekeepers. Most Americans also were willing to use U.S. air power to protect UN troops and Bosnian Muslims in safe havens. Support did grow for more active U.S. involvement (and specifically for the use of U.S. combat troops), but this always remained in the minority. There was somewhat more support for allied military actions in which the United States might participate and considerable approval for U.S. soldiers protecting U.N. forces. Yet as the risks grew, support generally dropped.

American attitudes toward Bosnia and the issue of intervention were clearly influenced by events and changes in U.S. policy, rather than the other way around. Contradictory pronouncements from the White House, inconsistent UN policies, and the multiple peace proposals, threats, and cease-fires all contributed to the inconsistency of American public opinion. When the Clinton administration took a clear position against Serbian aggression in May and August 1993, in February 1994, and in August 1995, the public moved in the direction of supporting military action.³³⁵ For instance, during the spring of 1993, when the Clinton administration began talking about possible American intervention, support for military action rose from 23 to 40 percent.³³⁶

Wariness of ground force engagement aside, measures of support for multilateral participation increased despite the clear consensus that Bosnia was not an American problem.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

³³⁵ See Richard Brody, *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991); and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Security in the New Order: President, Polls, and the Use of Force," in Daniel Yankelovich and I. M. Destler, (eds.), *Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Norton, 1994).

³³⁶ Sobel, *op. cit.* in note 330.

While the war in Bosnia, and especially the subsequent atrocities, created a huge surge in media coverage in the United States, that media coverage *did not* seem to initially affect American public opinion to any great extent. Increased television and other media coverage of Bosnia only seemed to increase Americans' willingness to become more involved after years of bloodshed and only *after* changes in official U.S. policy occurred. As noted by the polls, the vast majority of Americans had virtually no interest and/or knowledge of the events in Bosnia throughout the time period. Thus, public opinion polling about specific *policy preferences* tended to fall into three categories: 1) a strong desire to avoid getting too involved (and risking loss of American lives); 2) a moderate desire to do something to help; and 3) a simple rallying effect of supporting the administration's policies as long as they met conditions one and two.

Throughout the Bosnia crisis, the Clinton administration focused heavily on domestic considerations during deliberations over policy goals and means, and these debates, public opinion was an important constraining influence. Public opinion affected choices concerning foreign policy priorities, goals, and means regarding intervention in Bosnia.

Thus, while President Clinton favored "doing something" about the Bosnian conflict, the core problem remained what to do. For Clinton, public opinion was the concern that provided context for any action. He therefore ruled out two options. First, because he feared any unilateral action would erode domestic support, he rejected acting without allied support. Second, other than to enforce a peace agreement, he also removed U.S. ground troops from the table because of the lack of public support coupled with fears of a possible quagmire. This narrowed the U.S. policy options regarding use of force. While public opinion did not *determine* U.S. policy goals and decisions, it did *constrain* them.

Europe

Meanwhile, in Europe, the German government had strong domestic support for supporting more aggressive military action—but only if that action was taken by someone else; Germans were staunchly opposed to any direct *German* military involvement in the crisis. Despite strong domestic support for intervention, French President Mitterand worried about his slippage in public opinion polls with upcoming elections, and his Socialist government was wary of any action that might impose serious domestic political costs if it went badly—such as adopting a more aggressive military option. The French and British alike also had to concern themselves over the effect that casualties among their UNPROFOR troops (possibly arising as retaliation for NATO air strikes) would have on public opinion.

European governments, however, generally had a stronger base of support for potential use of force in Bosnia. Since at least late 1992, the publics of France, the United Kingdom, and (usually) Germany supported military intervention in Bosnia. For the most part, European publics were thus more willing than their governments to take military action against the Bosnian Serbs. In January 1993, a significant number (47 percent) across Western Europe held very negative images of the Serbs, and a majority supported the use of force against them.³³⁷ European publics, like the American public, also preferred multilateral action and leadership. Majorities in each European country in January 1993 thought “the United Nations should authorize a multinational force to intervene militarily in the former Yugoslavia.”³³⁸

European citizens also were more supportive of direct military intervention than the American public or European leaders. In particular, there was strong support among the citizens of Western Europe for the use of force. In late 1992 and early 1993, pluralities to majorities in

³³⁷ Eurobarometer, May 1993.

³³⁸ Sobel, *op. cit.* in note 330.

France, Britain, and Germany supported the authorization of multilateral U.N. intervention in the crisis (44 to seventy percent).³³⁹ Large majorities supported humanitarian intervention, particularly by a multilateral force (64 to 92 percent), but majorities also supported even *unilateral* humanitarian intervention by their own governments (64 to 79 percent).³⁴⁰ Majorities supported multilateral intervention to enforce a cease-fire (51 to 87 percent), and the French and British publics supported cease-fire enforcement by their own troops alone (63 to 77 percent), though initially only a minority of Germans concurred (42 to 52 percent).³⁴¹ Similar majorities supported using force to separate the warring parties multilaterally (52 to 78 percent) or unilaterally (53 to sixty percent) except in Germany (forty percent).³⁴²

There was substantial support for imposing a military solution on Bosnia multilaterally (52 to 79 percent).³⁴³ Moreover, near majorities in Britain and France supported imposing a military solution unilaterally (48 to 56 percent); however, only a minority in Germany (40 percent) favored imposing a unilateral solution.³⁴⁴ Overall, in January 1993, roughly half of the French (54 percent), British (47 percent), and German (45 percent) publics supported the use of multinational forces for *all* proposed actions, from protecting aid shipments to imposing a peace settlement by force.³⁴⁵

At the end of 1993, public support remained high for intervention, even unilaterally. In November 1993, a majority of citizens in each of the three major regime members approved of NATO's enforcing a cease-fire (68 to 77 percent), and a majority in each approved of their own

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

³⁴² *Ibid.*

³⁴³ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

troops' participating (52 to 77 percent).³⁴⁶ Majorities in Britain and France also approved sending NATO troops to help establish peace (59 to 64 percent), while only a minority in Germany approved of doing so (44 percent in western Germany and 28 percent in eastern Germany).³⁴⁷

Interestingly, despite expressing overall support for stronger military action, in late 1994, when Bosnian Serbs set up antiaircraft guns around Bihac, the majority of the German public (54 percent) *opposed* the sending of *Luftwaffe* Tornado aircraft with the capacity to evade Serbian defenses; at the same time, 75 percent of Germans thought the international community should *not* remove its troops.³⁴⁸ Between January and June 1995, support for UN "reinforcement of military intervention" grew from 47 percent to 51 percent, but it dropped to 43 percent in July.³⁴⁹ By October 1994, still only 55 percent felt German participation in NATO military action was "right."³⁵⁰ Thus, German public opinion was the most erratic and least willing of the "big three" West European states to actually commit to military intervention—despite expressing a desire for others to do so.

British public support for intervention in Bosnia actually grew over time. From June 1993 to February 1994, approval of British troops' providing humanitarian aid grew from 67 to 74 percent, although it then dropped to 62 percent in June 1995.³⁵¹ From April 1993 to February 1994, support for sending British troops as a part of an international contingent force to enforce a peace settlement grew from 67 to 75 percent, then dropping to 62 percent in June 1995.³⁵²

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁰ Eurobarometer October 1994.

³⁵¹ Sobel, *op. cit.* in note 330.

³⁵² *Ibid.*

Nearly half (47 percent) of those surveyed in February 1994 thought that the UK should help to impose a peace settlement if an agreement were not reached.³⁵³

In fact, support for joint European military intervention to establish peace grew from 1993 into 1994 in all three nations (sixty to 65 percent in Britain, 59 to 75 percent in France, and 43 to 57 percent in Germany).³⁵⁴ There remained majority opposition to withdrawing troops (52 to 72 percent) and majority support for fighting to assure that aid convoys get through (58 to 90 percent).³⁵⁵ Small majorities in Britain, France, and western Germany supported air strikes (51 to 57 percent), but only a minority in the eastern Germany (34 to 49 percent) did.³⁵⁶ However, opposition to lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims ranged from 44 to 67 percent; it remained a plurality in Britain in July 1995 (36-47 percent).³⁵⁷

In sum, majorities of the French, British, and German publics generally supported the use of multinational forces for actions ranging from protecting aid shipments to forcefully imposing a solution on the parties to the conflict. However, German support, especially in the east, was consistently lower than British or French support. This surprisingly strong approval of European publics for the use of force contrasts sharply with the reluctance of their governments to intervene forcefully.

Analysis

As James Gow points out:

³⁵³ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

“The political worries of Western politicians concerned popular opinion and the need to win votes at the next election. The prospect that the mission might go wrong, given the complexity of the problem and its apparently intractable nature, made these political leaders reluctant to contemplate intervention seriously enough.”³⁵⁸

While European regime members deployed ground forces to act as “peacekeepers,” opposition mounted in the U.S. Congress regarding sending U.S. troops to Bosnia. A bipartisan majority in Congress strongly favored lifting the military embargo against Bosnia unilaterally and opposed any direct U.S. involvement on the ground. Even after the Dayton agreement, many members of Congress still favored lifting the military embargo as a “cost-free” solution, because it would not involve U.S. ground troops. While conflict intensified between the President and Congress over U.S. policy in Bosnia, ultimately, Congress “left full responsibility for the success or failure of U.S. involvement in the hands of the President.”³⁵⁹

It is clear from the survey data given above and gathered throughout the period of the Bosnia crisis that there were two distinct gaps within the transatlantic security regime regarding public opinion and the issue of using military force in the conflict. The first gap was between public opinion in the U.S. and public opinion in Europe. Public opinion in the U.S., while increasing in support for military action over time, was generally detached and rather isolationist, viewing the whole crisis as not really America’s problem and certainly not one into which America should commit its “blood and treasure.” American public opinion *only shifted in response to stronger presidential leadership*. Conversely, with the war taking place in their “back yard” and with the EC/EU initially taking on a very large and very public (but ultimately failing) diplomatic role in the conflict, Europeans seem to have been much more engaged in

³⁵⁸ Gow, *op. cit.* in note 119, p. 376.

³⁵⁹ Lee Hamilton, “Congress and Foreign Policy: The Case of Bosnia,” *World Affairs*, Winter/Spring 1996, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 303.

following the events of the crisis and much more willing to see their countries become more involved in it.

The second gap is thus one between the *publics* and the *governments* of the major regime member states. In the U.S., President Clinton and (most, if not all) of his administration wanted to see the U.S. play a larger role politically and militarily in resolving the crisis, but he was constantly held back by other forces, including allied governments, some members of the U.S. Congress, and an American public that showed varying signs of apathy, isolationism, and risk aversion. Conversely, in Europe, it was *national leaders* who (for the most part) displayed apathy and/or risk aversion—especially in the earlier stages of the conflict. In Europe, it was public opinion that created moderate pressure for increasing military involvement and government leaders who resisted such pressure. But even with such moderate domestic pressure, European governmental policy *only showed major changes when the French government changed hands*. One must ask the question if European public opinion helped to push national governments into adopting a more aggressive (more “American”) policy stance, then why did it take so long? The European polls did not show much divergence in opinion regarding use of force over the four-year period. Clearly, other factors were at play.

In terms of the variable being tested, this sort of four-way dichotomy helps to dispel some common myths about Western responses to the crisis, but it only moderately helps to explain regime policy congruence and changes over time. While there was strong domestic pressure in Europe, it was not constant, and (in the case of Germany) was often hesitant and/or conditional. In the U.S., there simply *was no* strong domestic pressure for increased action throughout most of the conflict (and until its later stages). The polls in the U.S. clearly show that the public *rallied behind presidential decisions to use force rather than drove those decisions*. While an

important factor (especially in terms of constraining policy options), public opinion simply did not drive or change regime policy congruence in a clear, causal manner.

Thus, for purposes of the first case study, the degree of domestic political and public support congruence across the four major regime members has a moderate correlation with regime policy congruence but seems to play no strong causal role—including influencing changes in regime policy over time. The H6 hypothesis should not be rejected but also cannot wholly be accepted as a causal factor by itself.

6.0 CHAPTER SIX: KOSOVO

*How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches...because of a quarrel
in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.*

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, 1938

6.1 INTRODUCTION

On March 24, 1999, NATO went to war for the first time in its half-century history. NATO was originally designed as a military alliance whose primary purpose was to defend Western Europe against the communist threat from the Soviet Union. (See chapter two.) However, its first (and to this date only) real “shooting” war was not a war against the Soviet Union or its Warsaw Pact satellite states; in fact, it occurred almost a decade after the collapse of communism in Europe. Nor was it a war of collective self-defense. No NATO members were attacked or even threatened. Instead, NATO’s first war was fought for “humanitarian” purposes. It was a war ostensibly aimed at preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in the southern Balkans. Through NATO, the transatlantic security regime intervened in order to save a whole ethnic group of people (Kosovar Albanians) from repression by another ethnic group of people (the Serbs). The latter, for the second time in the decade, initiated policy of massive “ethnic cleansing” and indiscriminate killing of civilians. Once NATO failed to prevent that catastrophe, it chose instead to try to reverse its consequences and was ultimately successful in doing so.

However, beyond this “popular” dimension of the war, it has also been alleged by many scholars and policy analysts that there were other, more complex strategic reasons for the decision made to go to war. It has been argued that NATO’s military intervention was dictated predominantly by the need to establish a new role for itself in the post-Cold War world. Events in Kosovo, it is alleged, provided the ideal opportunity to do so. Conversely, others argue that NATO, in responding to the obvious humanitarian crisis and in the absence of decisive UN action, moved preemptively in order to fill a dangerous vacuum and prevent the spread of further destabilizing events of a potentially more serious and wider nature. In other words, the alliance “learned the lessons” of Bosnia and reacted accordingly.

This chapter examines how NATO came to launch its first war and attempts to understand the complex international diplomacy that took place within the transatlantic security regime that led to the decision to go to war in 1999. In doing so, it attempts to examine these views of motivations behind going to war over Kosovo in addition to pursuing the research question outlined at the beginning of this dissertation. The Kosovo crisis not only provoked some serious questions for the individual member states of NATO but also (like Bosnia) raised important issues for the members of the EU as a political actor on the world stage. As such, the Kosovo crisis is an excellent case study for the questions being explored in this dissertation.

6.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS

The origins of the crisis have to be understood in historical context and in terms of a wave of nationalism that erupted in the 1970s and 1980s among both Serbs and Albanians in Yugoslavia. Kosovo was an autonomous region within the Serbian republic in Yugoslavia—and

not a separate republic as were Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Kosovo province has historically been very important to the Serbs, although they made up only ten percent of the population. In 1389, Christian forces under Serbian Prince Lazar were defeated by the army of Turkish Sultan Murad I in the Battle of Kosovo. Although they suffered a military defeat in the battle, Serbs historically came to regard Kosovo as the cradle of Serbian civilization, and Kosovo eventually became the core of Serbia's medieval kingdom. It is also still the location of many historic Serbian Orthodox churches. It was Serbian nationalism that led to the rise of Slobodan Milosevic and the official adoption of an extreme Serbian nationalist agenda. Once the Serb nationalist agenda had become official government policy, civil war became a real possibility.

The conflict in Kosovo also has to be understood in the context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia discussed in the previous chapter. Kosovo was one of the eight constituent units of Yugoslavia; there were six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces in Serbia (ethnic Hungarian dominated Vojvodina and ethnic Albanian dominated Kosovo). The stripping of Kosovo's and Vojvodina's autonomous status by Milosevic in 1989 was a key moment in a series of events leading to war.

After the Second World War, the new communist leadership of Yugoslavia declared Kosovo to be an autonomous "constituent part" of Serbia. Before Tito's rule, Kosovar Albanians experienced harsh persecution by the Serbs. The effects of thirty years of prewar government-sponsored colonization by Serbs of almost half of Kosovo's arable land were mitigated when Tito returned a third of the land to its Albanian owners after 1945. Also, some of the prewar measures employed to stifle the Albanian language were lifted. This immediate postwar period was short-lived, however, as after Tito broke ties with the USSR in 1948, Albanians experienced

a new round of particularly harsh repressive measures, since they were suspected of sympathizing with Albanian President Enver Hoxha, who was a loyal Stalinist.

The situation began to change in the 1960s, when the “Serbianization” policy was no longer officially endorsed by the Communist Party’s Central Committee in Belgrade. There were student demonstrations in 1968, as there were throughout Eastern Europe. Although the demonstrations were dealt with harshly, a series of measures were taken during this period that greatly improved the situation of the Kosovar Albanians. The culmination of these improvements was the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, under which Kosovo and Vojvodina were declared autonomous provinces of Serbia. As an autonomous province, Kosovo was entitled to select its own administration, assembly, and judiciary, and it had a right of veto in the federal Yugoslav parliament.

However, instead of cooling the desire of Kosovar Albanians for greater independence, these actions only seemed to further encourage a budding Albanian nationalism. There were demonstrations calling for full republic status in the provincial capital of Pristina in 1976 and a number of riots, including some of the worst in 1981. Among the demonstrators were a small number of radicals who favored unification with Albania.

The 1981 demonstrations were brutally crushed. Police and military units and the newly created territorial defense units were brought into Kosovo from all over Yugoslavia, and a state of emergency was declared in the province. Hundreds of people were arrested, tried, and imprisoned. A Communist Party purge was undertaken, and thousands of university professors and schoolteachers were fired. Albanian professors and textbooks were removed from the classrooms. The consequence was a growing polarization between the Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo during the 1980s. During this time, the proportion of Albanians in the

population of Kosovo increased from 67 percent in the 1960s to nearly eighty percent in the 1980s, due to a combination of a very high birth rate of Albanians and fleeing of some 100,000 Serbs, who were being harassed and discriminated against by the Albanians.³⁶⁰

From the mid-1980s, Serb nationalists began to openly term the exodus of Serbs from Kosovo a “genocide.” Public Serb and Montenegrin protests also erupted. The federal Yugoslav government resisted calls for “reigning in” Albanian nationalism and power in Kosovo. However, a turning point came with the visit of Slobodan Milosevic, then Deputy President of the Serbian Party, to Kosovo on April 24, 1987. Milosevic arrived in the middle of a clash between Serbs and the police. He then uttered the now famous words: “No one should dare beat you” and proceeded to give a speech about the sacred rights of Serbs.³⁶¹ The speech was later dubbed the “Field of Blackbirds” speech, based on the historic location where it was delivered, and Milosevic became a national Serb hero virtually overnight. He was soon able to mobilize popular support and take control of the Communist Party leadership. In addition to a majority of Serbs, Milosevic was also supported by the national media and the JNA (Yugoslav army). After consolidating power, Milosevic instituted a series of measures, including pushing the Serbian assembly to take more direct control over Kosovo’s security, judiciary, finance, and social planning in 1989; this finally led to completely revoking Kosovo’s autonomy in 1990. In July, the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved, in violation of the 1974 constitution.

The revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy spawned an increase in human rights abuses and discriminatory government policies designed to “Serbianize” the province, including imposing anti-Albanian language policies and instituting pro-Serb education curricula in schools.

³⁶⁰ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 38.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

Thousands of Albanians were dismissed from public and private employment, and special privileges were granted to Serbs who resettled in or returned to Kosovo. Above all, there were widespread human rights abuses—arbitrary unrest, torture, and detention without trial.³⁶²

At the time, many observers expected a war in Yugoslavia to begin in Kosovo. There were already acts of apparent random provocation, including random shootings of villagers in central Kosovo. One reason that war probably did not break out in Kosovo at the time is simply because conflict broke out elsewhere in Yugoslavia and continued through 1995, distracting Milosevic and the Serbs. Another reason was the adoption of a strategy of non-violent resistance by mainstream Kosovar Albanian resistance leaders, such as Ibrahim Rugova. According to Rugova, the dominant figure in the Albanian resistance movement: “The Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than be massacred.”³⁶³

In 1990, the various strands of Albanian political movements in Kosovo came together to form a mass movement, which was to operate a self-organized parallel political system in Kosovo. On July 2, 1990, three days before the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved, 114 of the 123 Albanian delegates met on the steps of the Assembly building, which had been locked. They collectively issued a declaration giving the Albanians the status of a “nation,” entitled to their own republic within Yugoslavia. On September 7, they met again at Kacanik and agreed on the proclamation of a constitutional law for a “Republic of Kosovo,” including provisions for a new assembly and elected presidency (but still within the state of Yugoslavia). After the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence in June 1991, the demand for a republic within

³⁶² These abuses have been widely documented by several organizations, including Amnesty International, the Council for Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, the Humanitarian Law Center, Human Rights Watch, the International Helsinki Federation, and the United Nations.

³⁶³ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *op. cit.* in note 360, p. 43.

Yugoslavia was changed to a demand for full independence. In September 1991, a referendum on independence was held. 87 percent of the Kosovo population participated, and the vote was 99 percent in favor.³⁶⁴ And in May 1992, Kosovo-wide elections were held, using private homes as polling stations, for a new republican government and assembly.

The dominant political organization was the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK). It spread rapidly in 1990 and 1991 and claimed 700,000 members by the spring of 1991. The LDK drew on village organizations and the traditional clan structure of Albanian society for support. In the May elections, the LDK won 96 of the 100 single constituency seats in the assembly. Of the other four seats, two were won by members of the LDK who ran as independents, one by the Socialist Alliance (SDA), one by the Bosniak Party, and one by the Turkish Peoples Party.³⁶⁵ A further 42 seats were distributed by proportional representation, giving the Turkish Party twelve seats, the Christian Democrats seven seats, the Social Democrats one seat, and the SDA three seats; thirteen seats reserved for Serbs and Montenegrans were left empty.³⁶⁶ The LDK, under the leadership of Rugova, set about developing a unique parallel state apparatus—a sort of “shadow government.” A government was established on October 19, 1991; initially it was based in Ljubljana, but it moved to Bonn in 1992. “Voluntary” taxes were levied on all Kosovar Albanians, and a parallel education system was established. During this period, some 400,000 Albanians are estimated to have immigrated from Kosovo to Western Europe—many to avoid conscription into the Yugoslav army and others due to the widespread poverty in Kosovo; many also immigrated to the United States.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

The main goal of the LDK was always full independence for Kosovo. The strategy for achieving this goal was to influence the international community and to deny the legitimacy of Belgrade institutions, both through the parallel government and through boycotting Yugoslav elections. Rugova pressed for the establishment of a temporary protectorate, under UN auspices, which could oversee the transition to independence.

6.3 THE PATH TO WAR

From the mid-1990s, the situation began to deteriorate. At about the same time that many Kosovar Albanians were losing patience with Rugova's strategy of passive resistance and many of their leaders were becoming frustrated with maintaining the parallel government, the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia was signed—in which no mention was made of the status of Kosovo. This was a profound disappointment to virtually all Kosovar Albanians. For many of them, it seemed as though the strategy had failed. It had been evident to many analysts throughout the Bosnia war that a lasting peace for the region would require a comprehensive approach to the issue of national minorities—one that took account of the problems of minorities across all of former Yugoslavia.³⁶⁸ The conclusions drawn by Kosovar Albanians from Dayton, however, were that ethnic territories in the former Yugoslavia can achieve international legitimacy and that international attention could only be obtained by war. Several leading Kosovar Albanian figures began to openly criticize Rugova for excessive passivity and began

³⁶⁸ Richard Caplan, "International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo," *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4, 1998, p. 750.

recommending a change in policy ranging from active civil disobedience to outright armed revolt.

It was during this period that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or known by its Albanian name, UCK—*Ushtria Çlirimatare e Kosovës*) first made its appearance. The KLA grew out of a Marxist-Leninist political party formed in the early 1980s called the LPK (*Levizja Popullare e Kosoves*). In 1992 and 1993, the LPK played a leading role in setting up a guerrilla group in secret meetings in Pristina and Macedonia. The first planned, deliberate violent action committed by Kosovar Albanians was the killing of a Serb policeman in 1995. But it was not until 1996 that an organization based in Switzerland and calling itself the KLA claimed responsibility for these acts. At the time, most Albanians (much less the rest of the world) had not even heard of the KLA. Its strategy, like Rugova's, seems to have been directed at the international community. But woefully prepared for a true guerrilla warfare campaign, the KLA seems instead to have adopted the deliberate strategy of provoking near-term international intervention rather than fight a protracted, long-term guerrilla war.

Indeed, until late 1997, active armed resistance groups in Kosovo were very small and without any permanent bases in the province. They had few arms and do not seem to have had any clear leadership structure—a key component in organized versus random armed conflict. Individual operations consisted of hit-and-run terrorist attacks on Serbian police outposts and supposed Albanian “collaborators.” These operations were planned and commanded by KLA members coming from abroad with only a few days of preparation with local fighters.

The collapse of the Albanian state system in 1997, however, changed the situation dramatically. Albanian Army and Interior Ministry warehouses and depots were looted, and arms and munitions were made available to the KLA by sympathizers or agents in Albania.

Because of the collapse of the security structure and ensuing lawlessness in Albania, it was possible (for the first time) to organize training facilities in northern Albania, near the border with Kosovo. This proved to be the most important precondition for creating permanent recruitment and training facilities, organizing supply routes into Kosovo, and coordinate different regional and local resistance cells. Organized crime also played an important role in organizing and financing the conflict, with much of the revenue coming from the sale and transport of illicit drugs.

6.4 INITIAL INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

Kosovo was simply not a priority for the international community before 1998. The province's troubles almost appear to have been an inconvenience, adding further complications to negotiations about the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Kosovo seems to have been regarded as secondary to these conflicts in terms of both urgency and status. The one strong statement that was made during this period was President George H.W. Bush's "Christmas warning." On December 24, 1992, the American ambassador to Yugoslavia read the following message to Milosevic: "In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serb action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper."³⁶⁹ The message was subsequently reiterated by Madeline Albright in the UN Security Council in August 1993.³⁷⁰

The comparatively low level of violence in Kosovo during the early 1990s was misinterpreted by the international community. None of the main international actors, including

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 753.

³⁷⁰ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *op. cit.* in note 360, p. 56.

the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), EC/EU, CSCE/OSCE (the renamed CSCE—now Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), UN, or NATO paid much attention to Kosovo. The little attention that was directed toward Kosovo by international organizations was in 1992-1993, when it was feared that the war in Bosnia might spillover into Kosovo.

As with Bosnia, the initial tone of the European response was set by the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, chaired by Lord Carrington, which took place at The Hague in 1991. In contrast to the stern warning from the U.S., the EC conference defined Kosovo as an “internal” problem for Yugoslavia, thus discouraging any further European interest or involvement. Meanwhile, Rugova and other LDK leaders were managing to get increased attention from the international media and NGOs, from whom he received praise for his self-determination movement—especially for its non-violent character. But this public praise never translated into any real political or material support.

When the joint UN-EC International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) convened under Cyrus Vance and David Owen in 1992, a special working group was tasked with the Kosovo situation. The group tried to mediate between the Serbs and Albanians, but the talks collapsed in late 1992. The Helsinki summit of the OSCE called for “immediate and preventive action” and urged “the authorities in Belgrade to refrain from further repression and to engage in serious dialogue with representatives from Kosovo in the presence of a third party.”³⁷¹ But like the Bosnia crisis, the Serbs simply ignored the OSCE, and its proclamations proved futile. Clearly, the intransigence of the Belgrade government hampered any non-coercive international attempts to deal with Kosovo, and little was done until late 1997. In the desperation to halt the

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

bloodshed in Bosnia, Kosovo was deliberately sidelined. Kosovo was not considered in the Dayton negotiations because Tudjman and Izetbegovic were not interested in it, and Milosevic would have refused to consider it.

The result of this omission, however, was to indirectly legitimize Milosevic's role in Kosovo and to send a clear signal to both Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians that Kosovo was off the current international agenda. This message had three serious effects. First, it gave Serbia a free hand in Kosovo. Second, it demoralized and weakened the non-violent resistance movement in Kosovo, which felt betrayed by the international community and began to doubt the effectiveness of its own tactics. And third, it led directly to a decisive surge of support among ordinary Kosovars for the path of violent resistance as the only politically realistic path to full independence.

6.5 CIVIL WAR

By the beginning of 1998, Kosovo was on the brink of open war. Student demonstrations in August 1997 had made it clear that the LDK was no longer in control of Kosovar Albanian political activity. In September, student protesters took further steps away from LDK control, refusing Rugova's call to stop street protests and seeking contact with the KLA. On October 1, 1997, Serbian police assaulted a peaceful protest of 20,000 students in Pristina and started to detain known opponents of Belgrade rule throughout Kosovo. In October and November, the KLA began, for the first time, to make public appearances at funerals of its fighters and sympathizers. These events began to draw tens of thousands of people. Also during this time period, the KLA began to openly confront Serbian police control in the areas of Drenica and Pec,

declaring them the first “liberated areas” in Kosovo. In response to these actions, the number of armed skirmishes in Kosovo increased dramatically.

Despite numerous international calls for restraint and dialogue, Serb forces accelerated their repressive and counterinsurgency actions, including arming Kosovar Serb civilians and bringing in paramilitary groups from Serbia. With the rise of the KLA, the already pervasive Serb police harassment increased. The Serbian government proclaimed the KLA a terrorist organization, thereby leading to intensified searches, detentions, political trials, and torture. This Serb police behavior was targeted not only at known or suspected members of the KLA but also at members of the LDK political party, peaceful activists, and other civilians. The Clinton administration sent envoy Robert Gelbard to the region to meet with both sides. In a meeting in Belgrade, Gelbard warned Milosevic that he faced a “downward spiral of darkness” if he pursued further violence.³⁷²

Ignoring Gelbard’s warning, on February 28, 1998, the Serbs decided to arrest Adem Jashari, a local strongman in Kosovo who had joined the KLA. Heavily armed Yugoslav forces attacked Jashari’s village of Likosane, in Drenica, using armored units and helicopter gunships, and the fighting continued in the area for several days. Within a week, his entire extended family (58 people) was killed by the Serbs. At this point, village militias all over Kosovo sprang up to defend their villages. Many of them were linked to Rugova’s “shadow government,” but they called themselves the KLA, even though a number of them were not formal members. This was the beginning of the war. In response to the attack, a street protest was organized in Pristina on March 2. Yugoslav forces violently broke up the protest with water cannons, tear gas, and

³⁷² *New York Times*, March 8, 1998, p. A5.

batons. Human rights abuses committed by both sides began to be reported. Within a week, 85 people had been killed by Serb security forces, including dozens of women and children.³⁷³

At this point in the conflict, the major regime member states completely ruled out threatening or using military force, with the notable exception of the United Kingdom. However, unlike Bosnia, this time NATO decided to involve itself early in the crisis (politically if not militarily). The North Atlantic Council issued the first of many statements on the crisis on March 5, 1998—four days before the Contact Group convened for the first time to discuss Kosovo. However, aside from the usual expressions of “concern” and condemnations of violence, the alliance at this point offered no concrete proposals for action—diplomatic, military, or otherwise.

The Yugoslav government (to some degree rightfully) characterized the situation as an internal conflict that was under control and labeled the KLA a terrorist group.³⁷⁴ Yet, the crisis was increasingly drawing international attention and condemnation. The United States withdrew certain diplomatic concessions made to Yugoslavia following Dayton.³⁷⁵ On March 9, 1998, the Contact Group (now including Italy) condemned the crackdown, demanded that Serbs cease all actions against the civilian population, and withdrawal of Serb forces within ten days; failure to meet these demands would lead to the imposition of an arms embargo and other measures against Yugoslavia.³⁷⁶ On March 31, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1160 (with China abstaining) imposing an arms embargo against Yugoslavia and calling for autonomy and “meaningful self-administration” for Kosovo; the UNSC also warned that

³⁷³ *New York Times*, March 10, 1998, p. A1; and *Washington Post*, March 10, 1998, p. A1.

³⁷⁴ *New York Times*, March 8, 1998, p. A6.

³⁷⁵ *Washington Post*, April 18, 1998, p. A30.

³⁷⁶ Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo* (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2000), p. 24.

“additional measures” were possible if no progress was made toward a peaceful solution.³⁷⁷

Conspicuously missing from the resolution, however, was any mention or threat of using military force.

Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon argue that the quick reaction from the Contact Group was derived from four “lessons learned” from Bosnia by its Western members (i.e. excluding Russia).³⁷⁸ First, the five NATO Contact Group members agreed that they had to act rapidly in order to avoid a repeat of the Bosnian horrors. Second was that successful intervention required unity of effort as well as American (rather than European) leadership. Third was that only concerted pressure on Milosevic would prove effective in convincing him to end the violence and commence a dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians. And fourth was to rule out independence for Kosovo.

As Daalder and O’Hanlon also point out, however, inherent in these agreements/assumptions were three contradictions that hindered the transatlantic security regime’s policy cohesion.³⁷⁹ First, there was a conflict between the desire to act quickly and decisively and the perceived need to forge a consensus on policy not only with key NATO allies but also with Russia. Second was the belief that a solution to the Kosovo crisis lay in pressing Milosevic to end the violent crackdown in Kosovo—while at the same time, NATO relied on him to negotiate a final settlement with the Kosovar Albanians. And third was the contradiction of pressuring Milosevic to end the violence while hoping not to encourage the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to push their claims for independence.

³⁷⁷ *Washington Post*, April 1, 1998, p. A24.

³⁷⁸ Daalder O’Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, pp. 24-25.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

The KLA at this point had no political program, no accepted national representation in the shadow assembly, no international recognition, and no control over any military forces of any significance. But reports of Serb atrocities suddenly made the KLA the driving force of national liberation in the eyes of a growing number of Kosovar Albanians, and, for the first time, the KLA could claim some level of significant political power due to its increasing support among the population. To many Kosovar Albanians, Dayton had already demonstrated the limits of international support for their cause—and by extension, of Rugova's own effectiveness. Rugova's non-violent approach seemed to be producing no tangible results and did not even earn him a "seat at the table" in international diplomatic circles. Many Kosovo Albanians simply concluded that their "reward" for using non-violent resistance was international neglect.³⁸⁰ Thus, as the number of Kosovar Albanians who looked to the KLA for liberation and affiliated themselves with it increased, support for the LDK party's non-violent strategy declined.

In the aftermath of the Serb Drenica offensive, both sides increased the depth and scope of their operations. Hundreds or even thousands of volunteers were crossing into Kosovo from Albania to join the KLA, and supply routes were organized to bring arms and munitions into the province. Spring 1998 saw a widespread wave of small attacks on Serbian police stations, as well as direct fighting between armed Serb and Albanian villagers in some areas. The KLA gradually gained control over the countryside, while Serbian forces maintained control of the towns and main roads. Yugoslav forces also expanded their campaign of repression against the civilian population. Facing a rapidly expanding KLA presence, the Yugoslav army sent massive reinforcements to Kosovo and began a large-scale operation coordinated with police and

³⁸⁰ James Hooper, "Kosovo: America's Balkan Problem," *Current History*, April 1999, p. 160.

paramilitary units. This campaign was aimed not only at stopping the spread of KLA activities but intended to achieve this by directly targeting the Albanian civilian population in rural areas.

These increases in military activity and violence directed specifically against civilians led to the first public consideration by NATO of possible military involvement in late May and early June of 1998. Meeting in Luxembourg in late May, NATO foreign ministers announced, “In order to have options available for possible later decisions and to confirm our willingness to take further steps if necessary, we have commissioned military advice on support for Un and ASCE monitoring activity, as well as on NATO preventive deployments in Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”³⁸¹ Striking a more aggressive posture, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana further stated that NATO “will consider further deterrent measures, if the violence continues. Let me stress, nothing is excluded.”³⁸²

On June 10, 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair (who had replaced John Major) stated support for military action if diplomacy were unable to end the crisis. At this time, however, three obstacles to developing a regime policy consensus on the issue of using military force emerged.³⁸³ First, some NATO allies feared that military intervention against Serb forces would unfairly favor the KLA. Essentially, intervention would mean choosing sides in the conflict. Second, even among those who supported intervention in principle, there was disagreement on how to do so most effectively and with the least amount of risk. And third, with Russia threatening to veto any UNSC resolution authorizing use of force, there was considerable disagreement on what (if anything) would constitute a legal basis for intervention.

³⁸¹ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 32.

³⁸² *Ibid.*

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-37.

Meanwhile, the tragedy on the ground began to unfold as the Serbs launched a major offensive in late July 1998. The offensive was designed to deliver a punishing blow against the KLA, which had exploited the previous period of relative Serb restraint by succeeding in taking control of a substantial part of Kosovo. While precise details were unavailable, various reports estimated that 460,000 Kosovar Albanians had been displaced from their homes by August 1998 (260,000 internally and 200,000 externally) as a result of the Serb offensive, which included shelling of cities and villages.³⁸⁴ The international community was now faced with potentially a vast humanitarian crisis.

It took more than a month, however (until September 23, 1998), for the UNSC to pass Resolution 1199, which demanded an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Yugoslav forces “used for civilian repression.”³⁸⁵ (China again abstained.) The main problem with getting the resolution passed was Russian opposition to any implied threat to use force to enforce resolution. Thus, no mention was made of consequences of not abiding by the resolution, and it was, of course, ignored by Milosevic.

The Yugoslav military campaign of the summer of 1998 in Kosovo was, in many ways, a success. The KLA had been effectively uprooted as a military force and proven unable to protect civilians in contested areas. The international response (in military terms) had been limited to a few NATO air maneuvers over Albania and Macedonia.³⁸⁶ Despite debating the subject for many months, by early October 1998, the NATO allies were no closer to agreeing on using military force than they had been at the start of the crisis. The problem for many of the NATO members was simply that Russia and China had made it very publicly clear that they would veto

³⁸⁴ Hooper, *op. cit.* in note 380, p. 74.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

³⁸⁶ Operation Determined Falcon, see *New York Times*, June 16, 1998, p. A1.

any UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force against a sovereign country for what they regarded as an issue that was purely the internal affair of Yugoslavia.³⁸⁷

The lack of UN authorization was especially a problem for many European countries, which had long argued that NATO could not use force for anything other than self-defense purposes unless the UN Security Council first approved an explicit mandate for such an operation. With UNSC action effectively blocked by the threat of a Russian or Chinese veto, achieving agreement as to what the legal justification for threatening or using force would be was no easy matter. Of the four major regime members, France and Germany³⁸⁸ were initially most concerned about acting without a UN resolution. The U.S. and UK, however, argued that the urgency of the humanitarian crisis, coupled with the Security Council's inability to act, created a situation in which an exception to the agreed upon regime norm could be justified.³⁸⁹ Unlike his Socialist predecessor, however, French President Jacques Chirac seemed more open to the latter position. He stated on October 6:

“Any military action must be requested...by the Security Council. In this particular case, we have a resolution that does open the way to the possibility of military action. I would add, and repeat, that the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, however strong and firm it is. And if it appeared that the situation required it, then France would not hesitate to join those who would like to intervene in order to assist those that are in danger.”³⁹⁰

On October 13, 1998, however, the NAC finally voted to authorize air strikes if Serb military and security forces were not withdrawn from Kosovo within 96 hours.³⁹¹ After a period of intense negotiations, U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke (representing the Contact Group and backed by the implied but still unofficial threat of NATO air strikes), concluded a cease-fire

³⁸⁷ *New York Times*, October 7, 1998, p. A8.

³⁸⁸ At this time, Germany was going through a change of government, with Kohl's party being replaced by a coalition of Christian Socialists and the Green Party. The incoming Chancellor was Gerhard Schröder.

³⁸⁹ See *Financial Times*, October 9, 1998, p. 2; and *New York Times*, October 18, 1998, p. A3.

³⁹⁰ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, pp. 44-45.

³⁹¹ *Washington Post*, October 15, 1998, p. A32.

deal with Milosevic.³⁹² The agreement directly brought NATO into the crisis for the first time. Under its terms, the alliance would be responsible for enforcing the agreement through the continued threat of air strikes and by verifying its provisions through reconnaissance over-flights by unarmed aircraft; the OSCE also agreed to deploy 2,000 unarmed monitors to verify the agreement on the ground.³⁹³ The agreement was then submitted to the UN Security Council for approval.

On October 24, 1998, the UNSC passed Resolution 1203, which affirmed the agreement between Holbrooke and Milosevic. By the end of October, large numbers of Yugoslav forces had been withdrawn, and OSCE monitors were deployed. Holbrooke boldly announced: “Anyone who’s alive is not, in my view, in danger anymore, and that couldn’t have been said a few weeks ago.”³⁹⁴ The Yugoslav troop strength was set to be reduced from 18,000 to 12,500 and special police limited to 6,500; also, a series of steps toward autonomy were to be initiated, including elections within nine months and the development of Kosovar Albanian police forces.³⁹⁵

Serbia initially implemented the agreement and withdrew its forces accordingly. The KLA, by contrast, took advantage of the new situation and renewed military action. In fact, KLA forces moved in to take up positions vacated by the redeployed Serbian forces.³⁹⁶ The UN, NATO, and OSCE were alarmed by the KLA’s actions. According to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (who had replaced Boutros Boutros-Ghali):

“Recent attacks by Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have indicated their readiness, capability, and intention to actively pursue the advantage gained by the partial

³⁹² See *New York Times*, October 5, 1998, p. A1; October 9, 1998, p. A6; October 19, 1998, p. A6. Also *Washington Post*, October 10, 1998, p. A18, October 11, 1998, p. A39; and October 12, 1998, p. A14.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁴ *Washington Post*, October 25, 1998, p. A38.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, November 18, 1998, p. A3.

withdrawal of the police and military formations....Reports of new weapons, ammunition, and equipment indicate that the capacity of those units to crisply defend themselves is still fairly good. This development is disturbing.”³⁹⁷

NATO noted in a statement on December 8 that:

“both Belgrade authorities and the armed Kosovar elements have failed to comply fully with the requirements set out in SCR 1160, 1199, and 1203. We call upon the armed Kosovar elements to cease and desist from provocative actions, and we call upon the FRY and Serbian authorities to reduce the number and visibility of MUP special police in Kosovo and abstain from intimidating behavior.”³⁹⁸

At the same time, the KLA was trying to strengthen its political influence by threatening LDK political representation in rural areas. The organization kidnapped and, in some cases, executed both Serbs and Kosovar Albanian civilians.³⁹⁹

The situation got worse in December, as OSCE monitors began to report attacks made by both sides, increased tensions on the border with Serbia, and frequent border incursions from both Serbia and Albania. According to UN Secretary General Annan’s December 24 report:

“Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have taken advantage of the lull in the fighting to reestablish their control over many villages in Kosovo, as well as over some areas near urban centers and highways. These actions...have only served to provoke the Serbian authorities, leading to statements that if the (NATO and OSCE) Kosovo verification mission cannot control these units, the Serb) government would....There is now a new cycle of violence, and there are reports that suggest that the number of Yugoslav forces deployed in Kosovo may exceed agreed figures.”⁴⁰⁰

The UN also reported that between 1,500 and 2,000 Kosovar Albanians had been detained by Serb authorities since the October agreement, and that an estimated 150 civilians had been kidnapped by the KLA.⁴⁰¹ In clear violation of the October agreement, the Yugoslav army

³⁹⁷ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *op. cit.* in note 360, p. 78.

³⁹⁸ Marc Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo, 1989-1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to the Rambouillet Conference and the Outbreak of Hostilities* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 286.

³⁹⁹ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 61.

⁴⁰⁰ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *op. cit.* in note 360, p. 79.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

positioned more than 12,000 men around the Kosovo borders. At the end of the month, the army then moved them inside the province, once again firing on villages with heavy weapons.

It was becoming clear that, despite the apparent initial success of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was no longer in a position to address necessary peacekeeping issues. American Ambassador William Walker, head of KVM, declared, “Both sides have been looking for trouble, and they have found it. If the two sides are unwilling to live up to their agreements, 2,000, 3,000, or 4,000 unarmed verifiers cannot frustrate their attempts to go after each other.”⁴⁰² From aerial monitoring over the region, NATO was aware of violations of the cease-fire agreement made by both sides during this period.⁴⁰³

As the new year started, clashes intensified between the two sides, and Serb forces moved back into the province in force. Serb military, paramilitary, and police units created three sealed areas inside Kosovo, using artillery and tank shelling to push ethnic Albanian civilian residents to leave their villages inside the three zones. However, after being pushed out of their homes, the civilians were not allowed to leave the sealed areas. By late January 1999, Serb forces with armor, artillery, and mechanized and light infantry established permanent positions along the Macedonian and Albanian borders with Kosovo. Their main strategic goals were to block the borders with Macedonia and Albania, so as to deter any possible NATO ground attack and to cut off KLA supply routes from Albania. The cease-fire agreement was in tatters, and now not only were the Serbs prepared for all-out war with the KLA but seemingly with NATO, as well.

Kofi Annan, the new UN Secretary General, met with the members of the NAC on January 28, 1999, and (unlike his predecessor) urged them to consider using military force if necessary, stating, “The bloody wars of the last decade have left us with no illusions about the

⁴⁰² Quoted in *New York Times*, December 25, 1998, p. A1.

⁴⁰³ *Washington Post*, December 25, 1998, p. A41.

difficulty of halting internal conflicts—by reason or by force...nor have they left us with any illusions about the need to use force, when all other means have failed.”⁴⁰⁴ Annan’s statement suggested to the members of the NAC that NATO had his blessing to threaten or even use force against Yugoslavia, a sovereign UN member state, should that become necessary—and without the explicit approval of the UN Security Council. Interestingly, this seems to be the first instance of any UN Secretary General deliberately and specifically giving his blessing to another international actor to militarily intervene in a civil war without a UNSC resolution specifically authorizing such action.

6.6 FAILURE AT RAMBOUILLET

Alarmed by the sudden collapse of the agreement it had backed, the Contact Group organized a peace conference to be held in Rambouillet, France, on February 6-23, 1999. Serb and Kosovar Albanian (including both the KLA and LDK) leaders were invited, as well as representatives of the rump Yugoslavia. The conference was sponsored by the Contact Group, hosted by France, and chaired by the British and French foreign ministers (Robin Cook and Hubert Védrine, respectively), but the agenda and diplomatic activity were essentially driven by the United States. The actual negotiations were in the hands of three diplomats: Christopher Hill (representing the U.S.), Wolfgang Petristsch (representing the EU), and Boris Mayorski (representing Russia). The European allies had deeply resented their being “shut out” of the 1995 Dayton peace conference, where they were allowed a presence but were largely ignored by the American team of negotiators. At Rambouillet, they thus took a more visible public role in

⁴⁰⁴ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 75.

the negotiations and sought to project a more equal partnership with the U.S. in addressing Balkan security issues.

The U.S. administration's strategy at Rambouillet was to offer the Kosovo Albanians interim self-government for three years (but with no guarantee of independence), a NATO peacekeeping force to protect them from the Serbs, and the threat of NATO air strikes to induce Serbian cooperation.⁴⁰⁵ The self-government plan would establish democracy in Kosovo through a unicameral parliament, a president chosen by the legislature, and an independent judiciary.⁴⁰⁶ Various international organizations were invited to help reinforce implementation of the political agreement.

On January 30, before the conference began, the North Atlantic Council issued a declaration stating that:

“The crisis in Kosovo remains a threat to peace and security in the region. NATO's strategy is to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political settlement, thus averting a humanitarian catastrophe. Steps to this end must include acceptance by both parties of the summons to begin negotiations at Rambouillet by 6 February 1999 and the completion of the negotiations on an interim political settlement within the specified timeframe; full and immediate observance by both parties of the cease-fire and by the FRY authorities of their commitments to NATO...and the ending of excessive and disproportionate use of force in accordance with these commitments.

If these steps are not taken, NATO is ready to take *whatever measures are necessary*⁴⁰⁷ in light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements...to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, by compelling compliance with the demands of the international community and the achievement of a political settlement. The Council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorize air strikes against targets on FRY territory. The NATO Secretary General will take full account of the position and actions of the Kosovar leadership and all Kosovo armed elements in and around Kosovo in reaching his decision on military action.”⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁵ Hooper, *op. cit.* in note 380, p. 161.

⁴⁰⁶ Marc Weller, “The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 2, 1999, pp. 240-242.

⁴⁰⁷ Italics added by author.

⁴⁰⁸ Weller, *op. cit.* in note 398, p. 223.

The Rambouillet draft agreement did not include any mechanism to determine the final status of Kosovo, however. Instead, the Kosovar Albanians were expected to put aside their goal of independence for at least three years while implementing self-government. Because the Kosovar Albanians demanded language on a referendum on the province's status, the U.S. delegation ultimately provided them with an informal *bilateral* letter promising a referendum after three years, although this was certainly not binding.

The security annex⁴⁰⁹ to the agreement would have NATO peacekeepers ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of most Serbian security forces and supervise those forces allowed to remain. Yugoslavia was allowed to retain 2,500 army troops indefinitely for border security. These forces would be assigned to specific areas and be under the supervision of the NATO peacekeepers. The Serbs would also be permitted to keep up to 2,500 Interior Ministry special police in Kosovo for up to two years. This police force was to be placed under OSCE supervision, with OSCE consultation with NATO. A 3,000-person multiethnic police force was also outlined in the agreement. Serbian and Albanian paramilitaries were to be disarmed and disbanded by NATO peacekeepers. The KLA delegates at the conference firmly refused to accept this clause, as it would essentially mean the complete dissolution of their group and thus the loss of their newly found political power.

When the conference opened on February 6, several problems immediately became apparent. First, the Kosovars protested the absence of any official NATO representation. They learned that the French, with the full acquiescence of the Americans, had insisted on NATO's nonparticipation in order to accentuate the "leading" role of the Europeans at the talks. The Kosovar Albanians immediately requested the presence of NATO SACEUR General Wesley

⁴⁰⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 246-247.

Clark at the negotiations, but the chief U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Christopher Hill, bowing to the wishes of the French, refused their request. Another warning sign was the selection of the leadership of the sixteen-man Kosovo Albanian delegation. With no protests from the U.S. or other conference organizers, the five KLA members secured the chairmanship of the delegation for their political director, Hashim Thaci. Thaci dominated the delegation and all but pushed out the views of Rugova and other moderates.

When U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright arrived at Rambouillet on February 20 for final negotiations, she found that the conference was on the verge of collapse, as the Serbs (showing their somewhat expected intransigence) were unwilling to accept the final agreement. Unexpectedly, however, Thaci was also refusing to sign on, despite pleas from most of the other members of the delegation to sign. As a result, the conference was extended for three extra days to February 23. Thaci claimed that the proposed agreement contained insufficient guarantees for independence. But others have argued that Thaci's real concern was the desire to keep the KLA intact rather than accepting its dissolution as called for by the agreement.⁴¹⁰

Finally, on February 23, as the result of a last-minute compromise proposal, the Kosovar Albanians said they would conditionally accept the agreement, pending their return to Kosovo to obtain the reaction of the Albanian people during the next two weeks. The Serbian delegation, however, still refused to sign the agreement. The conference was to be reconvened on March 15. But in the meantime, the Serbs had begun another major military buildup in and around Kosovo.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

6.7 NATO GOES TO WAR

As late as March 22 and 23, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan continued to demand that the Yugoslav armed forces immediately cease their offensive in Kosovo. On March 23, 1999, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, in a letter to Annan, outlined a series of incidents demonstrating a rapid decay of the situation in Kosovo. In particular, he noted the dramatic increase in Yugoslav military activities following the pullout of the OSCE KVM. Solana also warned of a humanitarian catastrophe resulting from the excessive force used by the Yugoslav forces. On the same day, the Yugoslav government declared a state of emergency. On March 24, NATO aircraft started the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, dubbed Operation Allied Force.

President Clinton articulated the goals of the NATO campaign in a television speech on March 24: to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's response to aggression, to deter Milosevic's escalating attacks in Kosovo, and to seriously damage Yugoslavia's military capacity to wage war in the future.⁴¹¹ Clinton also stated at the time that the U.S. government had no intention of deploying ground troops to fight a war, and the other NATO governments took the same position. Congressional approval for the air campaign was barely achieved, as the U.S. House of Representatives only passed a resolution endorsing it after a 213-213 tie was broken (in favor).⁴¹²

European leaders said about the same as Clinton but also stressed more that the NATO intervention was necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. From the very beginning, the

⁴¹¹ Weller, *op. cit.* in note 398, p. 498.

⁴¹² Charles A. Kupchan, "Kosovo and the Future of U.S. Engagement in Europe: Continued Hegemony or Impending Retrenchment?" in Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (eds.), *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 77.

French government justified the war by arguing that it was a battle for a certain conception of Europe and European values, for human rights, for “European civilization,” and/or, more simply, a defense of European security and regional stability.⁴¹³ Throughout the conflict, however, French leaders felt uncomfortable with the decision to bypass the United Nations and took great pains to insist that NATO’s intervention represented an exception that should never be construed as a precedent.

For Germany, the war was a watershed event. For the first time since 1945, German armed forces undertook offensive military operations against a sovereign state—and without a UN Security Council resolution authorizing it. Yet the German debate over and decision to go to war still reflected three of the core features of its political culture: a deeply ingrained antimilitarism, an almost instinctive multilateralism, and a commitment to human rights.⁴¹⁴ In the fall of 1998, the newly elected Social Democratic-Green coalition government, which had strongly committed itself to human rights, was eager to avoid any impression that it would pursue an independent foreign policy that would set it apart from its Western friends and allies. When it became clear that coercive diplomacy meant resorting to war, the German government saw no alternative to participating in limited NATO air strikes, despite heavy opposition from the its own Green Party.⁴¹⁵ Participation was seen as a precondition for preserving the multilateral framework of transatlantic and European security. And the humanitarian justification for the war made it easier for Germany to follow NATO’s lead. Thus, the Social Democrats and Greens in the coalition government supported the decision made by the outgoing

⁴¹³ Alex Macleod, “France: Kosovo and the Emergence of a New European Security” in *ibid.* p. 117.

⁴¹⁴ See Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ‘Civilian Power’?” *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer) 2000, pp. 56-80.

⁴¹⁵ See Sabrina P. Ramet and Phil Lyon, “Germany: The Federal Republic, Loyal to NATO” in Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds.), *The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), pp. 88-91 and 97-100.

Kohl government to support NATO air strikes on October 12, 1998. An October 16 vote in the Bundestag to authorize *Luftwaffe* aircraft to participate in the operation passed 500 to 80, with the bulk of the dissenting votes coming from the former Communist Party in East Germany (the Party of Democratic Socialism or PDS).⁴¹⁶

The United Kingdom was not only an enthusiastic supporter of the NATO action in Kosovo, but Prime Minister Tony Blair quickly assumed the role of the leading hawk in the transatlantic security regime. Far from being a case of the United States “imposing its will” on its closest ally, it was the British leadership that repeatedly tried to strengthen U.S. resolve. As General Clark described, there was “a stormy discussion on ground troops between President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair, the result of which was that there would be no (further) discussions of the ground option.”⁴¹⁷ More specifically, throughout the military campaign, the UK argued relentlessly that the allies had to consider the option of sending ground troops to evict the Serbs from Kosovo and enable the return of the ethnic Albanians. The UK was in no real position to take a military lead in Kosovo, but Blair led the charge on the issue of ground troops. Even before the fighting broke out, the British already had such a plan.⁴¹⁸ British officials were convinced that the Americans consistently undermined the position of the West (both during the negotiations at Rambouillet and subsequently throughout the bombing campaign) by failing to demonstrate a credible threat of a ground invasion.

The underlying NATO assumption was that a relatively short bombing campaign (a few days of limited and relatively precise air strikes) would persuade Milosevic to come back to sign

⁴¹⁶ Peter Rudolf, “Germany and the Kosovo Conflict” in Martin and Brawley (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 412, p. 134.

⁴¹⁷ Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 268.

⁴¹⁸ Louise Richardson, “A Force for Good in the World? Britain’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis” in Martin and Brawley (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 412, p. 146.

the Rambouillet agreement.⁴¹⁹ Failing that, NATO would increase the pressure, moving from phase one attacks on air defense systems to phase two attacks on Serb forces in and around Kosovo to phase three attacks on military and strategic targets throughout Serbia, including Belgrade.⁴²⁰ However, no one seriously considered what would happen if this escalation failed to force Milosevic to halt Serb attacks on Kosovo's population and return to negotiations to restore autonomy for ethnic Albanians. Asked what would happen then, one senior U.S. official admitted after one week of bombing, "There is no phase four."⁴²¹ As a result of this NATO miscalculation, NATO had initially only developed a two-day air strike plan.⁴²² It soon became apparent, however, that American and NATO officials had vastly underestimated the amount of force needed to induce Milosevic to capitulate. The Serbs believed that NATO would not have the political cohesion to be able to agree on more than a few days of bombing. And the Americans believed that a brief, two or three-day bombing campaign was all that it would take to ensure Yugoslav compliance. Both were proven tragically wrong. The British believed that by failing to demonstrate resolve by ruling out a ground invasion, NATO actually enabled the Serbs to withstand the bombing campaign.

In addition, NATO also obviously underestimated the obvious risk that Milosevic would reciprocate by more aggressively attacking Kosovar Albanians. In what seems to be a dramatic failure of Western intelligence, there was no contingency planning for refugees. Milosevic's goals were simple: keep NATO out of rump Yugoslavia, maintain control of Kosovo, crush the KLA, and use the war as a pretext to expel the Albanian population from Kosovo—hopefully for

⁴¹⁹ See Adam Roberts, "NATO's Humanitarian War over Kosovo," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn) 1999.

⁴²⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Lessons from the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 21.

⁴²¹ *New York Times*, April 1, 1999, p. A1.

⁴²² *Ibid.* and James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, Adelphi Paper 333 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 47.

good, but at least as a bargaining card in future negotiations.⁴²³ Milosevic clearly seemed to be counting on the NATO alliance splitting and may also have expected more help from Russia; in addition, he had his own brutality to use as an advantage over the West. As he allegedly once told German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, “I can stand death—lots of it; but you can’t.”⁴²⁴

The war quickly took a direction that surprised (although it should not have) and shocked the world. As General Clark put it, “We thought the Serbs were preparing for a spring offensive that would target KLA strongholds....But we never expected the Serbs would push ahead with the wholesale deportation of the ethnic Albanian population.”⁴²⁵ The Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces launched a well-planned, vicious campaign of terror and expulsion against the Kosovar Albanian population. This campaign of “ethnic cleansing” was intended to drive many, if not all, ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, destroy the foundations of their society, and prevent them from returning.⁴²⁶ The Yugoslav forces could not hit NATO, but they could hit the Albanians who had asked for NATO’s support and intervention. It was thus both revenge against the Albanians and a deliberate strategy of the Serbs at the same time.

The horror and devastation inflicted upon the Kosovar Albanian civilian population between March and June of 1999 has been documented in detail by numerous organizations, but a brief summary will be provided here. During the course of the NATO air campaign, approximately 863,000 civilians sought or were forced into refuge outside of Kosovo, and an estimated additional 590,000 were internally displaced.⁴²⁷ Together, these figures demonstrate that over ninety percent of the Kosovar Albanian population was displaced from their homes—

⁴²³ See Barry Posen, “The War for Kosovo,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring) 2000.

⁴²⁴ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 94.

⁴²⁵ Quoted in *Washington Post*, April 11, 1999, p. A1.

⁴²⁶ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *op. cit.* in note 356, p. 88.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

virtually all of them forced from their homes by members of the Yugoslav armed forces or Serbian police or paramilitary units, in a process routinely accompanied by shelling by heavy weapons, physical abuse (including rape), extortion, killings, pillaging, and looting.

For all intents and purposes, the U.S. conducted the war on behalf of its European allies, dominating both the operation's planning and its execution.⁴²⁸ Throughout the conflict, there were doubts about whether the Yugoslav regime would ultimately comply with NATO's demands to withdraw from Kosovo. The NATO allies were in danger of losing policy cohesion had the war dragged on much longer than it did, since this most likely would have led to a ground invasion—at least by some NATO members (namely the U.S. and UK), if not all. Several allies, including Germany, Italy, and Greece, strongly opposed any ground intervention, and there was little enthusiasm for it in the U.S.⁴²⁹ The lack of coordination among the major allies on targeting before the air campaign began also made decisions taken during actual operations more contentious. Parallel U.S. and NATO command-and-control structures complicated the operation's planning and execution, while the absence of allied casualties only reinforced the misguided belief in the West that the war was relatively free of risk.⁴³⁰

NATO's limited preparations were quickly replaced by *ad hoc* operational planning, and, as the campaign went on, the responsibility for target selection and mission planning steadily shifted from NATO to the U.S. joint task force "Noble Anvil."⁴³¹ While the target approval process was multilateral, target selection remained almost entirely in U.S. hands.⁴³² The bombing campaign was eventually stepped up to include civilian "dual-use" strategic infrastructure targets such as bridges, roads, communications networks, oil and gasoline depots

⁴²⁸ Cordesman, *op. cit.* in note 420, p. 22; and Thomas, *op. cit.* in note 422, pp. 45-46.

⁴²⁹ See *New York Times*, May 20, 1999, p. A1.

⁴³⁰ Cordesman, *op. cit.* in note 420, pp. 66-72; and Thomas, *op. cit.* in note 422, pp. 46-47.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

⁴³² *New York Times*, November 11, 1999, p. A1.

and refineries, and electric power plants. Target selection and approval for all targets was slow and difficult. Although General Clark was ultimately given the authority to approve most military targets, those that were politically sensitive or where higher collateral damage was possible (which included most dual-use targets) required unanimous approval of the NAC. As Clark put it, “Once we moved past the obvious air defense target set, every target—headquarters buildings, communications towers, ammunition storage sites, and military maintenance facilities—was, in one way or another, likely to become controversial.”⁴³³

These delays made it difficult for NATO to efficiently use its air power, as there was usually a time gap in target selection and approval that reduced the overall effectiveness of the air strikes. In addition, air strikes were severely limited by President Clinton’s insistence that allied aircraft bomb from no lower than 15,000 feet in order to avoid being shot down.⁴³⁴ The bombing ultimately had little effect on Serb military and security forces in Kosovo, and they mostly left the province undamaged and operationally intact.⁴³⁵

Russia was infuriated by the air war against the Serbs. Many Russians viewed it not only as an attack on a long-term ally but as a direct threat to their own security and an insult to their perceived position as a great power. At an emergency UN Security Council meeting, Russian President Boris Yeltsin condemned the action, saying: “This is, in fact, NATO’s attempt to enter the twenty-first century as global policeman. Russia will never agree to it.”⁴³⁶ Russia threatened to veto any UN Security Council specifically authorizing use of force against Yugoslavia (as did China), and thus, none was ever passed.

⁴³³ Clark, *op. cit.* in note 417, p. 201.

⁴³⁴ Kupchan, *op. cit.* in note 412, p. 77.

⁴³⁵ See Cordesman, *op. cit.* in note 420, pp. 139-166.

⁴³⁶ Quoted in *Washington Post*, March 25, 1999, p. A1.

Allied consultations during the war produced numerous disagreements among the major regime member states. At every stage of the conflict, France attempted to exert its influence within the international organizations involved (the UNSC, NATO, EU, and Contact Group) and took full advantage of its potential veto power in each of them. After the war, French President Jacques Chirac boasted of France's role in vetoing various dual-use targets in the NAC not only as attempts to limit the escalation of violence but also as a demonstration of his country's "capacity for independence."⁴³⁷ Throughout the war, France intervened to halt attacks on Yugoslav civil installations.⁴³⁸ French strategic independence thus seems more important to Chirac than either maintaining NATO unity and cohesion or winning the war.

The UK and Germany also disagreed with the U.S. over issues such as targeting. For instance, the UK allowed U.S. B-52 bombers based at Fairford, England to be used only against airfields and other isolated military targets, so as to avoid collateral damage.⁴³⁹ For the same reasons, Germany had reservations about targets proposed by the U.S. in Serb cities.⁴⁴⁰ These tensions sometimes became public and led to the gradual erosion of regime political and policy cohesion.

From the start of the crisis, the leaders of the major regime member states excluded the possibility of using ground forces in a "non-permissive environment," that is, in a combat role. President Clinton had repeatedly stated in 1999 that he did not intend to put ground troops into Kosovo and that an air war would bring the Serbs back to the negotiating table. This sentiment was shared by France and Germany, as well, and Prime Minister Blair, while pressing for at least a plausible threat of a ground invasion, went along with the consensus. Before the start of the

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁸ Macleod, *op. cit.* in note 413, p. 122.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

bombing campaign, there was thus a clear regime consensus to rule out using ground troops for anything other than helping to implement a peace agreement reached by the Serbs and ethnic Albanians at the negotiating table. As Daalder and O'Hanlon argue, publicly ruling out the use of ground forces at the outset of the war was necessary to keep both the fragile alliance consensus on and domestic support for the use of force intact—a consensus and support that would have shattered if the U.S. or anyone else had raised the possibility of having to go in on the ground.⁴⁴¹

NATO's bombing campaign produced many challenges within the regime—including among some of the smaller regime member states. There were massive demonstrations against the war in Greece—a member of both NATO and the EU. In fact, the Greek population remained strongly opposed to Operation Allied Force throughout its course.⁴⁴² Greeks felt solidarity with their fellow Orthodox Christians in Serbia, with whom they shared not only a religion but also a long history of struggle against Muslim expansion in the region. Greek leaders, by contrast, believed that their country's long-term interests were best served by being a good ally within NATO and thus supported the war effort, despite widespread domestic opposition.

The governments of the new NATO members (Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary) generally supported the war, although they too faced difficulties doing so. The Czech government was divided on the war. President Vaclav Havel supported it, but Prime Minister Milos Zeman did not; and only 35 percent of the Czech public supported air strikes.⁴⁴³ The Polish government strongly supported the operation, and sixty percent of its population did

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁴⁴³ *Washington Post*, April 12, 1999, p. A17.

too.⁴⁴⁴ Hungary, with 300,000 ethnic Magyars (Hungarians) living in Vojvodina, Serbia, was divided. Budapest officially supported NATO's air war, and its government opened Hungarian airspace, military bases, and transportation routes for NATO use.⁴⁴⁵ However, the Hungarian government opposed any ground invasion, and opinion polls showed that two-thirds of the public opposed NATO's launching air strikes from Hungary.⁴⁴⁶

As the air war went on with little sign of Milosevic capitulating, pressure mounted for NATO to use ground forces or lose credibility in its attempt at armed coercive diplomacy, and President Clinton finally changed his mind, while characteristically denying that he was doing so. He said, "I don't think that we or our allies should take any options off the table, and that has been my position from the beginning."⁴⁴⁷ But, of course, it had not been his position from the beginning. The war polarized opinion (both inside and outside of government) in the U.S., but many increasingly advocated the use of ground forces the longer the war went on. Notable proponents of a ground invasion in the U.S. included Republican Senators John McCain, Richard Lugar, and Chuck Hagel, and Democratic Senators Chuck Robb, Joe Biden, Joseph Lieberman, and John Kerry.⁴⁴⁸ Within the Clinton administration itself, Secretary of State Madeline Albright became a staunch advocate of a ground invasion.⁴⁴⁹

In France, most official public declarations indicate that President Chirac strongly opposed the idea of a ground invasion. There seemed to be a great deal of internal debate, however, especially in the early stages of the war. For example, Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin refused to rule out the possibility of a ground offensive even just one week after the

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁷ Quoted in *New York Times*, August 25, 1999, p. A1.

⁴⁴⁸ *New York Times*, April 29, 1999, p. A1; and *Washington Post*, March 31, 1999, p. A29.

⁴⁴⁹ *New York Times*, March 29, 1999, p. A9.

beginning of the air war—despite a claim to the contrary by Foreign Minister Védérine the day before—and then one week later announced that the question was “completely premature.”⁴⁵⁰ Less than a week afterward, in an apparent reference to the use of ground forces, President Chirac talked of the need to use “additional means” in an address to the nation.⁴⁵¹ Ultimately, however, Chirac seems to have rejected the idea due to a combination of domestic opposition (especially from the political left) and fear of provoking Russia.⁴⁵²

The German government was adamantly opposed to any sort of ground invasion, and the idea was rather bluntly publicly rejected by Chancellor Schröder.⁴⁵³ Indeed, the biggest concern within NATO at this point was that Germany or Greece might veto the use of ground troops in the NAC. Chancellor Schröder made little effort to hide his annoyance at any British suggestions concerning the use of ground troops. He stated at a press conference at NATO headquarters, “I will not participate in this specifically British debate on war theory.”⁴⁵⁴ He argued that since the Bundestag was unanimous in its opposition, change in NATO strategy was “impossible.” He pointed out: “The strategy of an alliance can only be changed if all the parties agree, so I trust that NATO’s strategy is not going to change”; he then went on to blame the UK for rifts in NATO unity.⁴⁵⁵

By late May (coinciding with President Clinton’s abrupt about face), however, the allies were finally persuaded that plans for a ground invasion should be prepared. NATO officials began discussing the possibility, and General Clark was told to devise a plan for a ground invasion of Kosovo. The NATO plan that emerged called for 150,000 troops for such an

⁴⁵⁰ Macleod, *op. cit.* in note 413, p. 122.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

⁴⁵³ *New York Times*, May 20, 1999, p. A14.

⁴⁵⁴ Richardson, *op. cit.* in note 418, p. 148.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

operation.⁴⁵⁶ On May 31, President Clinton gave General Clark permission to make preparations for a ground invasion. But then, on June 3, Milosevic suddenly ended the war.

President Yeltsin had first responded to the air war by threatening the West but then (when that did not do any good) intervened diplomatically to bring the war to an end. Initially, Yeltsin went so far as to warn that NATO's air war against Yugoslavia could lead to World War III, but he later backed away from such bombastic statements.⁴⁵⁷ Former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin worked out a deal with Milosevic to stop end the war, and the rest of the Contact Group, NATO, and the UNSC eventually agreed to most of it. The negotiations produced most of what NATO demanded. All Serb police and military had to leave Kosovo, all refugees would return, and Kosovo would remain within the Yugoslav republic. In addition, the UN (and not NATO) would control the peace accords and administration in Kosovo. But the final agreement was only possible because NATO did not insist on a vote on autonomy after three years—as the Rambouillet Accord had called for (and the Kosovar Albanians had demanded).

Much debate exists even to this day as to why Milosevic ultimately capitulated—and did so at the time that he did. While interesting and of serious policy importance, such debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In summary, there are three basic explanations as to why the war ended when it did. The author personally believes that no one explanation is likely sufficient, and a combination of the three is the most likely answer. The first reason is the intensified NATO bombing campaign. While tactically/militarily ineffective, the air war did inflict serious economic damage on Serbia and degraded some degree of support for both the war and Milosevic among the Serbian people over time. Second, the Russian diplomatic intervention

⁴⁵⁶ *New York Times*, May 29, 1999, p. A1.

⁴⁵⁷ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 127.

must have not only applied political pressure on Milosevic but also led to a realization that Russia was not prepared to risk war with NATO over Kosovo. In short, the Russians made it clear to him that he was on his own. The third (and perhaps strongest) explanation is the shift in NATO planning and policy from strictly fighting an air war to at least the implied decision to initiate a ground offensive. Such a ground war would have led to a serious rift in NATO—and may very well have led to its collapse. But the threat of a ground war was perceived as being sufficiently legitimate by both Milosevic and Russia that it intimidated Belgrade enough to back down, lest he risk complete collapse of his own regime in Yugoslavia.

6.8 ANALYSIS OF THE VARIABLES

6.8.1 Dependent Variable: Measuring Regime Policy Preferences in Kosovo

As in the Bosnia case, collective regime policy shifted over time (although the time period of consideration/deliberation is much condensed compared to the Bosnia case). Those shifts were as follows. (Note that a given level of escalation also includes acceptance of all lower levels of intervention.)

Through Early-Mid 1998: Nonintervention (0)

Mid-1998 through Early-1999: Punitive Attacks (6) = 6.0

Early-Mid 1999: Sustained Air Bombardment (7) = 7.0

Mid-Late 1999: Regime Split over Possible Active Use of Ground Forces (9)

USA/President Bill Clinton

Preferred Level of Regime Intervention = Punitive Attacks (6)

- Maximum Acceptable Level = Active Use of Ground Forces (9)
- Average Preferred Intervention Rating = **7.5**

United Kingdom/Prime Minister Tony Blair

Preferred Level of Regime Intervention = Punitive Attacks (6)

- Maximum Acceptable Level = Active Use of Ground Forces (9)
- Average Preferred Intervention Rating = **7.5**

France/President Jacques Chirac

Preferred Level of Regime Intervention = Punitive Attacks (6)

- Maximum Acceptable Rating = Sustained Air Bombardment (7)
- Average Intervention Rating = **6.5**

Germany/Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention = Punitive Attacks (6)

- Maximum Acceptable Level = Sustained Air Bombardment (7)
- Average Intervention Rating = **6.5**

6.8.2 Independent Variable 1: Power as Influence in Regime Policy Congruence

Relative power was a factor in the Kosovo case but not in the way that might be assumed from traditional international relations theory. The regime was so heavily dependent on U.S. military power that no serious escalation to a sustained bombing campaign (or higher) could have been seriously contemplated by NATO without American participation and leadership. Given the highly unequal distribution of military resources (with the U.S. being preponderant), this should lead one to expect that any debate or decision about using military force would have been dominated and driven by the U.S. But, as discussed earlier, this is not what happened.

The data (see Appendix Four) clearly show that the United States' share of aggregate power had remained relatively static during the time period between the end of the Bosnia crisis

(1995) and the beginning of regime debate over the crisis in Kosovo (1998). A slight increase between 1998 and 1999 is seen, but not enough to be significant. Likewise, despite some moderate fluctuation, the U.S. share of military power alone also remained similar in size as that during the Bosnia crisis.

It does not seem that (like Bosnia) the role of relative power distribution had any direct influence in formation of a collective policy regarding use of force in Kosovo. Once again, the share of relative power among the major regime members remained relatively static over not only the two-year Kosovo period but also since the time of the Bosnia crisis. Relative power fluctuated even less than in the Bosnia case, the highest fluctuation being a drop of 14.3 percent in the case of France between 1995 and 1998, followed closely by a drop of 13.7 percent in the case of Germany between 1998 and 1999. The American share of relative power was generally higher in comparison to the time period during the Bosnia crisis, but it never fluctuated more than 4.4 percent (an increase between 1998 and 1999). Using only military spending (MS) as a measurement of intra-regime power does not seem to have much effect on the analysis, as the largest change was a drop of 17.9 percent that took place with Germany, from 1995-1998.

In this case, the United States was once again clearly dominant in both measurements of power, but that is difficult to apply in this case, since regime policy was relatively congruent at the outset of the crisis—quite unlike the situation in Bosnia. In fact, with Kosovo, one can see the opposite of the “Bosnia effect.” That is, with Bosnia, regime policy was incongruent early on and then coalesced over time. With Kosovo, regime policy was initially congruent but became less cohesive over time. As such, according to this hypothesis being tested, the U.S. should have remained *uninfluenced* by other regime members in its policy preferences, and if it did change preferences, it *also should be able to sway other members to adopt a similar*

preference. In fact, the opposite of both occurred. First, the U.S. did change its intervention policy preference later in the war, moving from being opposed to any ground invasion to supporting the possibility of such. Thus, the U.S. moved toward the British position despite an overwhelmingly preponderant power/influence advantage over the UK. And second, once the U.S. did change its policy preference, it was unable to use the combined power/influence of the U.S. and UK to sway Germany, which was adamantly opposed to that position—and whose own relative regime power had dropped significantly since Bosnia.

The transatlantic balance of power once again seems to have had little impact on this particular regime policy change. Thus, in conclusion, both realist, material-oriented measures of power as influence failed to demonstrate any correlation with either the formation of the original regime policy preference or its steady decline in cohesion over time during the period of the Kosovo case study. Once again, the U.S., despite having an *overwhelming* relative share of power (measured in either manner) among the major regime members was *not able* to translate that power into influence under the Clinton administration. This may indicate one of two things. First, that the realist perception of state power is not translatable into influence between or among regime members (and thus the first independent variable fails). *For purposes of the second case study, power as influence in the transatlantic security regime has no correlation with regime policy congruence or changes over time therein, and the H1 hypothesis may be rejected.*

6.8.3 Independent Variable 2: Threat Perception and Regime Policy Congruence

Similar to the Bosnia crisis, the transatlantic security regime justified multilateral military intervention in Kosovo as necessary to promote humanitarian efforts, prevent a wider European

war, curb refugee flows, and preserve NATO credibility. In fact, although widely disputed, officials (especially in the U.S., UK, and NATO headquarters) argued that the struggle in Kosovo was vital to the security of NATO member states. Many scholars, in contrast, argue that only the remotest geopolitical interests were at stake in Kosovo.

In regards to a “wider European war” as a specific security threat to the region, the fear (real or imagined) was that somehow Greece and Turkey—both members of NATO—would get dragged into the war on opposite sides of the conflict.⁴⁵⁸ Yet, there is virtually no historical evidence to support this argument. While certainly sympathetic to and politically and economically supportive of different sides in the conflict, neither of those countries had any interest or possible gain by getting involved militarily (other than through multilateral organizations). In fact, if either Greece or Turkey had wanted to more directly support or intervene in the conflict without Western or NATO “meddling,” then surely one or both would have exercised its veto within the NAC to prohibit NATO intervention. The fact that each country chose to not exercise such a veto logically demonstrates that each had no interest in any kind of unilateral intervention of its own. Turkey did not need such a unilateral option, as it supported and encouraged NATO intervention. Whereas Greece, while opposed to the NATO intervention, did not have either the political will or the military capabilities to affect the outcome of the war through any type of intervention of its own; in addition, there is strong evidence demonstrating that Greece condoned the NATO intervention (despite domestic opposition) because its government both valued the Greek relationship with NATO and feared Turkish reprisal or counter-intervention.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁸ See Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 156; and *New York Times*, March 8, 1999, p. A3.

⁴⁵⁹ See especially Mark R. Brawley and Pierre Martin “Balancing Acts” in Martin and Brawley (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 412, p. 228; Daalder and O’Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 129; Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 203 and Nikos

With regard to the possibility of a wider war involving Albania and/or Macedonia, this too was relatively unlikely, as by the time NATO launched its air strikes, Serb forces on the ground had already achieved most of their initial operational objectives in attacking the KLA and had a fully developed war plan (“Operation Horseshoe”) to destroy the KLA without resorting to invasion or intervention anywhere outside of Kosovo.⁴⁶⁰ If, on the other hand, Albanians outside of Kosovo were willing to go to war for their cousins in Kosovo, they displayed no identifiable signs of preparing to do so or of a desire to do so. And in terms of wider escalation within the former Yugoslavia, this threat simply did not exist as it had during the Bosnia war, for the simple fact that Milosevic had already recognized Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian independence; and NATO’s SFOR peacekeeping force (which included a sizable Russian contingent) was already on the ground in Bosnia. There is simply no indication that any of these other former Yugoslav republics would have in any way been drawn into the Kosovo conflict.

In regards to the security “threat” posed to the region by an increase in refugee flows, in fact, the refugee exodus from Kosovo increased dramatically *after* NATO began its air campaign.⁴⁶¹ As discussed previously, the Serbs used NATO air strikes as a pretext to escalate their ethnic cleansing campaign, and the NATO air war did virtually nothing to hinder their effort or to protect the fleeing ethnic Albanian civilians. Thus, if the *causus belli* was a perceived security threat to NATO one or more members or the region from instability arising from massive refugee flows, the evidence shows that: 1) no such “threat” existed before the NATO air war; and 2) the NATO air war may have *escalated* such a perceived security threat.

Raptis, “The Greek ‘Participation’ in Kosovo” in Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman (eds.), *Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 170-176.

⁴⁶⁰ See Cordesman, *op. cit.* in note 420, pp. 235-241; Daalder and O’Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 101; and the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *op. cit.* in note 360, pp. 88-92.

⁴⁶¹ Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *op. cit.* in note 360, pp. 88-92.

Although the existence of a shared external threat is one of the major factors identified by alliance theory as fostering collective cooperation among states, in this case study, the hypothesis seems to have little relevance. Despite the absence of an acknowledged and shared external threat, the regime was still able to achieve a higher degree of policy congruence more quickly than in the Bosnia case study. Proponents of stronger action (led by the UK) may have tried to *create* the perception of a direct security threat that could be used to encourage other major regime members to take a stronger stance against Milosevic, but any evidence that this succeeded is lacking. Logically, if it had succeeded, then the UK's stronger position on possible use of ground forces would have been adopted earlier on by the regime as its collective policy. The fact that it was not demonstrates that there simply was not a collective perceived major threat to the regime or its member states.⁴⁶²

In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to the continuum of threat level intensity, regime participation in military intervention responding to the Kosovo conflict represented a low level of threat to regime members (as defined in chapter four). (See Table Three below.) The only real traditional security threat to the major regime member states represented by the Kosovo war was the refugee crisis and possible subsequent regional instability derived from it, but there is simply very little evidence that such a collective threat perception (if it existed at all) was instrumental in any way in helping achieve policy congruence.

One interesting note, however, are the geographic positions and roles of Italy (as a medium-sized regime member but full member of the Contact Group) and Greece (as a smaller regime member), each of which would be more directly affected by events in Kosovo than other

⁴⁶² Indeed, two of the member states that were most directly threatened by massive refugee flows were Italy and Greece, and these two countries remained the most resistant to the more aggressive collective regime policy that evolved.

regime members. If one added Italy, for example, to the threat matrix below, its threat perception for the Kosovo crisis would be the following: Imminence=Medium; Probability=Medium; Proximity=High; and Severity=Low. Thus, Italy, in fact, had a different threat perception of the conflict based upon its obvious geographic proximity (as well as historical ties). At the outset of the crisis and debate over intervention, collective regime policy coordination still depended on and revolved around the four major member states. Yet, as the air war continued and the perceived regime security threat of possible refugee flows and regional instability became an *actual national security* threat for individual members Italy and Greece, their support for “official” regime policy began to very quickly erode (along with that of Germany) due to increases in the categories of the threat matrix. Additional research and analysis on Italy and perhaps Greece in this case study therefore might provide further, interesting insights on a possible *negative or inverse* affect of differences in *national* (as opposed to collective) threat perception on regime policy congruence.

Finally, as with the Bosnia case study, given the nearly complete lack of debate among the major regime members about a specific security threat (or its absence) during the time period *preceding or during* of the Kosovo case study, this variable may also be classified as irrelevant (or at least non-causal) in *antebellum* regime policy congruence but possibly highly relevant for regime policy congruence *during actual war fighting*. Simply put, a non-existent or limited threat before the crisis became an actuated threat once hostilities commenced. But that threat was shared unequally by the regime members, and thus some altered national strategic priorities as the war went on. There is some (albeit limited) evidence to support a thesis that threat perception’s affect on regime policy congruence is therefore an unstable variable that may change in importance during the course of an individual case study.

The fact that regime policy congruence was achieved without the presence of any shared external threat *before the policy was implemented* initially seems to cast doubt on the relevance of this hypothesis. But the fact that regime policy congruence began to fragment *after policy implementation* seems to support the hypothesis. This distinction between policy formation stage and policy implementation stage is highly relevant for public policy analysis and may present an opportunity for future research to link the literatures of international relations theory and public policy analysis. *Thus, for purposes of the second case study, perceived external threat to the transatlantic security regime has no correlation with regime policy congruence during the policy formation stage but has a possible correlation with changes over time therein—especially in the implementation stage of public policy, and the H2 hypothesis should not be rejected altogether.*

Table Three: Threat Matrix for Kosovo Case Study⁴⁶³

	<u>Imminence</u> ⁴⁶⁴	<u>Probability</u> ⁴⁶⁵	<u>Proximity</u> ⁴⁶⁶	<u>Severity</u> ⁴⁶⁷
<u>France</u>	Very Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low
<u>Germany</u>	Low	Low	Medium	Very Low
<u>United Kingdom</u>	Very Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low
<u>United States</u>	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low

6.8.4 Independent Variable 3: International Institutions and Regime Policy Congruence

As was seen earlier, one of the most striking aspects of the failure to more quickly achieve regime policy congruence during the Bosnia crisis was perhaps the initial refusal of both the United States and its European allies to appeal to the most relevant regime institution (NATO) as an internal dispute resolution mechanism. In this case study, however, one of the central factors different from the Bosnia case study was the relatively rapid involvement of NATO and virtually no involvement of the EU in regime policy-making. As one observation

⁴⁶³ In this case, specifically the dual threats of conflict spillover and/or refugee exodus that would directly threaten that country. Note that there are, in effect, no real security “threats” to individual states in the traditional military-based view of security. Rather, the threats being analyzed are to *regional stability as it would impact the state* and *domestic economic stability*.

⁴⁶⁴ Imminence is the amount of warning time available for the country to prepare for or respond to a security threat. Very High=Warning/reaction time measured in seconds or minutes; High=Warning/reaction time greater than one hour but less than one day; Medium=Warning/reaction time measured in more than one day but less than one week; Low=Warning/reaction time measured in more than one week but less than one month; and Very Low=Warning/reaction time measured in more than one month.

⁴⁶⁵ This is easily the most difficult type of threat to estimate. The estimates are based on the historical evidence as provided in this chapter. Probability indicates likelihood of occurrence without any outside intervention. Very High=Greater than 80%; High=60-80%; Medium=40-60%; Low=20-40%; Very Low=Less than 20%.

⁴⁶⁶ Geographic proximity of potential threat. Very High=Bordering country; High=Nearby country separated only by major geographic impasse; Medium=Nearby country separated by a single interposed country; Low=Country is in same continent; Very Low=Countries are in different continents.

⁴⁶⁷ Likely number of short-term (i.e. within hours, days, or weeks) human casualties or economic costs suffered if threat is actuated. Very High=Tens of thousands of deaths (or more) and/or tens of billions of dollars in economic costs; High=Thousands of deaths and/or billions of dollars in economic costs; Medium=Hundreds of deaths and/or hundreds of thousands of dollars in economic costs; Low=Scores or dozens of deaths and/or tens of thousands of dollars in economic costs; Very Low=Few or no deaths and/or thousands of dollars or less in economic costs.

bluntly described it, “Few events in the history of European integration have undermined the EU’s image as much as the member states’ collective impotence in the Kosovo crisis.”⁴⁶⁸ The EU was nearly inconsequential (in terms of policy-making) during the Kosovo crisis (especially regarding the debate over using military force) and ultimately simply voiced *post hoc* support for the policy initiatives of others (the UNSC, NATO, and/or Contact Group).⁴⁶⁹ Between the two regime institutions, only NATO played any real *policy* (as distinguished from political or diplomatic) role regarding use of force or military intervention during this case study.

In direct contrast to Bosnia, throughout the period of the Kosovo crisis, both the U.S. and Europeans sought to use NATO for policy coordination—even more so once Russia began to obstruct discussion of any options involving the application of military force against the Serbs in both the UN Security Council and the Contact Group.⁴⁷⁰ Because it had been making clear for months that any attempt by NATO to use the UN would be doomed to failure, the Russian government, in effect, aided those NATO countries (the U.S. and UK) that were not all that predisposed to using the UN in the first place.

Also throughout the period of the case study, both France and Germany (and Italy) used NATO as a mechanism to attempt to ward off any more aggressive military action other than air strikes (by threatening to obstruct or even veto any proposed authorization to launch a ground invasion).⁴⁷¹ By limiting the intervention/use of force debate in the NAC to only air strikes,

⁴⁶⁸ Juan Diego Ramirez and Manuel Szapiro, “The EU: Old Wine from New Bottles” in Weymouth and Henig (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 415, p. 122.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁴⁷⁰ See Allin, *op. cit.* in note 96, pp. 57-61; Paul Latawski and Martin A. Smith, *The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War European Security* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 97; and Martin A. Smith, “Kosovo, NATO, and the United Nations” in Stephen Badsey and Paul Latawski (eds.), *Britain, NATO, and the Lessons of the Balkan Conflicts, 1991-1999* (New York: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 159-172.

⁴⁷¹ See Martin Clark, “Italian Perceptions”; Adrian Hyde-Price, “German Perceptions”; and Richard McAllister, “French Perceptions” in Buckley and Cummings (eds.), *Kosovo: Perceptions of War and Its Aftermath* (New York: Continuum, 2001), pp. 122-135, 109-114, and 92-103 respectively. See also Maurizio Cremasco, “Italy and the Management of International Crisis”; Alex Macleod, “France: Kosovo and the Emergence of a New European

France, Germany, and Italy hoped to pressure the UK (and later U.S.) into avoiding any more aggressive actions and restrict regime policy to its initial position (specifically regarding the necessity of a UNSC resolution to authorize any use of force and ruling out any possible use of ground forces other than post-conflict peacekeepers). The big risk for France and Germany was whether the U.S. and UK would consider unilateral intervention (i.e. outside of the NATO command structure) if regime policy did not coalesce around their (much more aggressive) position. Thus, France and Germany seemed to value the political and institutional *cohesion* of NATO more than the *credibility* or *effectiveness* of the alliance.

The U.S. and UK, in turn, seemed willing to risk the possible collapse of NATO (or at least a very serious rift) rather than allow that institution to restrict their national policy means and objectives (which, in fact, were identical to the publicly stated initial *regime* policy objectives, if not its initial *means of implementation*). By stating that they would commit to an invasion using ground forces, the Clinton administration and Blair government appeared willing to risk undermining the *cohesion* of NATO in favor of maintaining its current *credibility and effectiveness*—a position in direct opposition to that of France and Germany. Indeed, U.S. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger argued that victory in Kosovo was more important than keeping the alliance together over this issue. America, he said, was going to win “in or outside NATO.”⁴⁷² To some observers, this was difficult to believe, as, after all, the U.S. and UK were (and are) arguably the strongest supporters of NATO, and NATO remains the United States’ primary instrument of influence in European security affairs.⁴⁷³

Security”; and Peter Rudolf, “Germany and the Kosovo Conflict” in Martin and Brawley (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 412, pp. 169-176, 116-125, and 132-138 respectively.

⁴⁷² Daalder and O’Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 160.

⁴⁷³ There is still a good deal of controversy over the question of how serious the U.S. and UK were about launching a ground invasion without NATO approval (which most likely would never have been given). For this (less

Ryan C. Hendrickson argues that an additional factor in the institutional influence played by NATO in achieving regime policy congruence was that of the role of its Secretary General, Javier Solana, arguing that throughout the crisis, Solana played a highly visible and instrumental role within the alliance.⁴⁷⁴ In most assessments of the politics and differing viewpoints within the alliance during the Kosovo crisis, however, little attention is given to Solana as playing any sort of major role, and it is unlikely that this is due to simple oversight. But Hendrickson's unique review of Solana's role in the crisis is thorough, and he argues that Solana essentially played three important roles for NATO: 1) helping to craft a legal justification and consensus for use of force without a UNSC resolution; 2) acting as a "go-between" between the NAC and SACEUR General Clark; and 3) providing political leadership to mirror (and buttress) General Clark's military leadership during the actual air war.⁴⁷⁵

Unfortunately, these roles (however important) had nothing to do with NATO *policy formation and congruence in decision-making* about the use of force. The latter two were roles that Solana played only after a common/collective policy had been decided upon and the decision to begin bombing had been made by the NAC. The first aspect may have been indirectly helpful in getting unanimous NAC support for air strikes without a UNSC resolution. However, Hendrickson provides no evidence that such a decision would not have been made *without* the involvement of the Secretary General. There is simply no evidence to suggest that either the man as a personality or utilizing his position as Secretary General in any way led to a change in policy position or preference by any member state in NATO—much less one of the four major members. In fact, when it came to the much more divisive question of a ground

common) view, see especially Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter) 2002/2003, pp. 124-157).

⁴⁷⁴ Ryan C. Hendrickson, "NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana and the Kosovo Crisis," *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September) 2002, pp. 240-257.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

invasion, there is virtually no empirical information that demonstrates that Solana would have been able to play any role whatsoever in overcoming the serious chasm between opposing member state viewpoints on that subject (nor, frankly, any evidence that he would have even wanted to try, as he was most likely opposed to that option, as well).

Most significant in any analysis of Solana's role (or lack thereof) in facilitating policy congruence is Hendrickson's admission that another, completely exogenous, factor contributed to the Secretary General's diplomatic skills and efficiency during the Kosovo crisis.⁴⁷⁶ Simply put, Solana benefited greatly from the support and influence of the United States within NATO. From the outset of the crisis, the U.S. made a conscious decision and effort to coordinate policy through NATO rather than bilaterally (or multilaterally through a "coalition of the willing") and to allow the Secretary General a significant *diplomatic* role within the alliance. Without the diplomatic and military weight of the United States behind him, Hendrickson admits, "The Secretary General would have found it difficult to exercise such a prominent role in the Alliance."⁴⁷⁷ Indeed, while one would not want to discount the role or importance of NATO's Secretary General, it is simply too uncertain as to whether the more active and visible role played by Solana during the Kosovo crisis *aided* in achieving regime policy congruence or *benefited from it*.

It is clear that the involvement of an international institution (in this case NATO) may have affected regime policy formation and congruence. But a more stringent test would have come as to whether desire to maintain NATO cohesion could have overcome a much more controversial and divisive debate, such as launching a ground invasion. Fortunately for the real world (but perhaps unfortunately for this dissertation), the world never found out. Thus, like the

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

Bosnia case study, different aspects of this case appear to be both *consistent and inconsistent* with the hypothesis; and those aspects of the case that do seem to support the hypothesis do so in a *corollary* rather than a *causal* manner. There is similarly enough cursory and counterfactual evidence that merits further investigation, however. *Thus, for purposes of the second case study, the presence of an “enforcing” regime institution and/or policy entrepreneur has a correlation with regime policy congruence or changes over time therein, but it does not conclusively prove to be a causal factor. The H3 hypothesis therefore should not be rejected.*

Additional research and analysis is necessary to make any further assessments, in particular, the differing roles played by simple institutional membership versus actual institutional participation. Specifically, further research should examine a larger selection of regime member states in order to evaluate if this type of institutional constraint is more applicable (or applicable at all) to smaller regime member states, which the institutionalist literature argues are more susceptible to such constraint and have less freedom of action. In particular, Italy’s role in this case study is perhaps more relevant than in others, and its policy pursuits and diplomatic efforts during this case study period may merit further study and analysis.

6.8.5 Independent Variable 4: Risk Assessment and Regime Policy Congruence

At the stage of the Kosovo conflict at which the transatlantic security regime acted, Milosevic was unwilling to give up his political/strategic aims and negotiate—even after four weeks of NATO air strikes. As the Independent International Commission on Kosovo points out: “The most promising window of opportunity to resolve the Kosovo crisis without war was existed in (the) pre-1998 period. Paradoxically, the political will to mount such a (major)

diplomatic effort could only be mobilized only *after* the conflict escalated into full violence, while this violence, in turn, severely constrained the responsiveness of local players to diplomatic initiatives.”⁴⁷⁸ Even after concessions were made, NATO forces would still be necessary to enforce/implement any peace agreements. Thus, any efforts to halt the ethnic conflict were likely to result in a long-term NATO commitment. Certainly, any NATO involvement (but especially an open-ended, extended commitment) could become costly and result in substantial political risks.

In terms of costs, the U.S. alone spent approximately \$6 billion for the air war in Kosovo,⁴⁷⁹ and postwar peacekeeping and reconstruction costs for the international community were even higher (\$200 billion in the first four years alone).⁴⁸⁰ However, NATO human costs in Kosovo in terms of lives lost were extraordinarily light, as NATO suffered no casualties until after major combat operations had ended.⁴⁸¹

While there was strong political resistance to the use of ground troops in Kosovo by several of the regime members, as well as non-regime countries such as Russia, China, and India, air strikes were generally supported by the governments of regime members. However, an extended, open-ended air campaign with increasing destruction inside Serbia and increased civilian casualties would have most likely been increasingly criticized in many regime member states. While the regime proved to be relatively cohesive at the outset of the air war, differing national interests and practices caused serious debates and disagreements among the members of the regime.

⁴⁷⁸ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *op. cit.* in note 360, p. 134. Italics added by author.

⁴⁷⁹ Stephen Daggett, *Kosovo Military Operations: Costs and Congressional Action on Funding*, RS20161 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1999).

⁴⁸⁰ Official United Nations website at www.un.org.

⁴⁸¹ Cordesman, *op. cit.* in note 420, pp. 51-52.

While NATO (really primarily American) military capability was extraordinary, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo points out that the Yugoslav military was well-organized, well-trained, well-equipped, and well-motivated.⁴⁸² The Yugoslav air defense capability was efficient enough to lead to the U.S./NATO decision to keep all NATO air sorties above 15,000 feet, which, in turn, restricted NATO aircrafts' ability to successfully attack Yugoslav military forces.⁴⁸³ The Commission further notes that Yugoslav forces maintained military superiority over KLA forces:

“At the start of the NATO bombing campaign, the Yugoslav armed forces enjoyed a clear advantage over the KLA forces, with 40,000 combat troops, a unified police and paramilitary task force, and anti-aircraft and ground artillery units available in Kosovo or at its borders. In contrast, before mid-March 1999, the KLA was not yet a centrally organized military force. The Albanian resistance consisted of 8,000-10,000 lightly armed, poorly trained men in Kosovo, with an additional 5,000-8,000 men training in northern Albania. These men belonged to different armed resistance groups. Most of the groups had some connection to the KLA, but they also maintained their individual identity.”⁴⁸⁴

In addition to Yugoslavia's military power, the climate and terrain also provided serious obstacles to any NATO military campaign—air and/or ground. Foul weather in Yugoslavia frequently interfered with NATO pilots' line of sight and with the lasers that directed precision-guided munitions.⁴⁸⁵ Additionally, the mountainous terrain and heavy forests limited military reconnaissance systems' line of sight and diminished the effectiveness of satellite intelligence imagery.⁴⁸⁶ Finally, Milosevic's political aims provided additional challenges to NATO forces and diplomatic mediation. For Serbia, the war involved the highest stakes for which a nation can fight: the defense of its sovereign territory. In conflicts such as Kosovo, this vital national interest of the Serbs clearly outweighed the non-vital humanitarian interests of the transatlantic

⁴⁸² The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *op. cit.* in note 360, p. 86.

⁴⁸³ Cordesman, *op. cit.* in note 420, pp. 191-234.

⁴⁸⁴ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *op. cit.* in note 360, pp. 86-87.

⁴⁸⁵ Cordesman, *op. cit.* in note 420, pp. 48-51.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

regime or any of its individual members. And this meant that, rationally, one could and should expect that Serbia's national will and resolve would be greater than NATO's—and thus, the former would be willing to accept much higher risks than the latter in pursuit of its interests.

By engaging in military intervention in Kosovo, the transatlantic security regime's prestige and relationships with other major countries was also adversely affected (and this was well-known as a political risk before the decision to go to war was made). The military intervention especially had important strategic consequences with regard to Russia and China. According to a Russian political analyst:

“Few people in Russia believe(d) that NATO undertook its military action in response to a humanitarian catastrophe. On the contrary, the widespread view (was) that NATO instigated instability by supporting the Kosovo Liberation Army and other extremist forces as a pretext to further split up Yugoslavia—the only country in the region not aspiring to join the alliance—and to increase its military presence in the Balkans.”⁴⁸⁷

Russia's engagement in the Kosovo crisis was primarily to counterbalance NATO, which (from the Russian point of view) was encroaching into a traditional Russian sphere of influence (through the air war) and threatening Russia's own sovereignty (by setting a precedent in Kosovo for possible foreign intervention on behalf of Chechens in Russia). Writing about the attitudes of Russia's political elites, Christopher Williams and Zinaida T. Glonkova state:

“From a Russian perspective, the West failed to give Serbia time to reach a compromise with the Kosovo Albanians. Instead, the West tried to force the February 1999 Rambouillet agreement....Meanwhile, the European Union and the USA pursued their own aims; they wanted a radical solution—to return the ‘powder keg’ of the Balkans to what it used to be....NATO's hard-line reaction received a cold reception from many quarters in Russia....The West therefore risked severing ties with Russia and forcing Moscow to resume full military cooperation with Belgrade and to seek new alliances elsewhere if NATO bombing continued.”⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸⁷ Quoted in Allin, *op. cit.* in note 96, p. 58.

⁴⁸⁸ Christopher Williams and Zinaida T. Glonkova, “Russia: Walking the Tightrope” in Weymouth and Henig (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 415, pp. 211-213.

Concerns about NATO's relationship with China were also raised—especially after the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

In the final analysis, NATO's military intervention in Kosovo constituted a significant risk to the transatlantic security regime in terms of the perceived benefits of intervention (as expressed by the publicly stated goals mentioned earlier) versus the possible political, economic, and human costs of intervention. High-level costs/risks were present as a result of the expected long-term and possibly open-ended military and economic involvement, the costs associated with intervening in an ongoing active war, generally limited support for escalation beyond the air campaign, the perception on behalf of Serbs that their vital national interests (and, in fact, sovereignty) were at stake, increased costs due to the physical operational environment, and the potential for very negative consequences to relations with other major powers (especially Russia and China), and the fact that the Serbs had sufficient military power to prolong or even escalate the conflict, and the uncertainty of public support—especially the longer the war continued. It is also noteworthy that these perceived and acknowledged costs of the air war would have been dramatically greater had a ground invasion been launched—including an exponential increase in the human costs (in terms of casualties) and material costs for the regime members who may have participated. The perceived benefits of military intervention were ending the humanitarian crisis, and the need to maintain the credibility of NATO.

The case of Kosovo does seem to support the hypothesis regarding the cost-benefit conditions under which the transatlantic security regime will adopt a cohesive, collective policy regarding military intervention. When NATO first launched limited air strikes, no member state other than the UK seemed to believe that a prolonged air war would be necessary, and thus, regime cohesion was quite strong. Thus, the military and human costs were initially perceived as

quite low, and there was little disagreement among the major regime members. When the limited air strikes had no effect on the Serbs and a prolonged strategic air campaign was launched, however, major regime members began to diverge in views about how to proceed. And once it became clear that even the strategic bombing campaign might not achieve the desired effect, the regime members began to openly and bitterly disagree about executing the ground war option.

Basing their military strategy on the perceived low-cost success of the limited air strikes during the Bosnia war, the regime members readily chose the same option to pressure Milosevic over Kosovo—a very rational option that reflected a balance between the greater perceived human costs of non-intervention and the higher military and economic costs of a more aggressive and robust intervention. *But it was changes in the perceived cost-benefit analysis that (in part) pushed the regime members to move from policy agreement to disagreement. When the low-cost, limited, coercive use of force was adopted as regime policy, there was cohesion and widespread agreement—despite some very real political costs. But it was when the human and military costs increased for the regime that there was increasing divergence and disagreement.* This leads to the conclusion (in this case study) that regime cohesion is relatively stable in the face of perceived high political and economic costs *but not in the face of perceived high military and human costs.*

Like Bosnia, then, the Kosovo case seems to provide (qualified) support for this hypothesis. It is also obvious that if NATO—or any of its individual members—had launched a ground invasion, the regime would have faced a completely different set of risks and associated costs than were associated with the air war alone. The U.S. and UK, by the very act of threatening a ground invasion, expressed a higher degree of perception of utility gained by such

an action than did their allies (credibility versus cohesion, as discussed earlier). Thus, unlike in Bosnia, wherein the *U.S. and Europeans* had diametrically opposite views of perceived costs and benefits associated with increasing military intervention, during the Kosovo crisis, it appears that the *U.S. and UK* had diametrically opposite views than those of France, Germany, Italy, and other European governments—but with the U.S. position *changing during the war*. This clearly led to increasing degradation of regime policy cohesion as the war went on.

The greater the perceived costs of intervention in Kosovo compared to the perceived benefits, the more unlikely any individual regime member was to support increased intervention (i.e. a ground war). It was differences among major regime members in this cost-benefit analysis that began to cause (to some degree) the erosion of a congruent intervention policy. When perceptual differences began to change, so too did the ease of collective policy formation and implementation. *Thus, for purposes of the second case study, the perceived risk analysis or cost-benefit ratio of the policy also has a strong correlation with regime policy congruence (and, in fact, seems to play a relatively strong causal role). The H4 hypothesis therefore should not be rejected.*

6.8.6 Independent Variable 5: Perceptual Lenses and Regime Policy Congruence

As discussed earlier, throughout most of the course of the Bosnia conflict, the Clinton administration had little in terms of shared political ideology with the leaders of the major European regime members. The Clinton administration was a center-left Democratic one, and the major leaders of Europe were either from center-right political parties (Major in the United Kingdom and Kohl in Germany) or even farther left than Clinton and his advisors (Mitterand's socialist government in France). In stark contrast, throughout the period of the Kosovo crisis, the

government leaders of all the three of the major European states were different from those in place at the outset of the Bosnia crisis. In the United Kingdom, Tony Blair's "New Labor" center-left government had replaced John Major's center-right Conservative government. And in Germany, Gerhard Schröder's and Joschka Fischer's leftist Socialist-Green coalition had replaced Helmut Kohl's center-right government. Out of the four major regime member states, only France did not have a left-leaning political party in power. The question, then, is did this significant change in the political dynamics of the leadership of the major regime member states enable the regime to more readily adopt a more cohesive policy choice regarding use of force in Kosovo (in comparison to Bosnia)?

Due to the significant change in national leadership, the Kosovo case thus provides an opportunity to evaluate the applicability of the perceptual lenses and ideological belief structures of individual political leaders outside the traditional context of domestic politics and policy (and make a comparison to the Bosnia case study) using the same framework of analysis developed in the previous case study. A similar model may be utilized in order to determine the belief typologies of the leaders of the four major member states within the transatlantic security regime during the Kosovo crisis. As described in the previous chapter, the neo-isolationist group identified by Posen and Ross in the United States corresponds with a "non-intervention" typology within the transatlantic regime. Similarly, their selective engagement group corresponds to a "limited intervention" typology. And finally, the American cooperative security group corresponds to an "active intervention" typology in transatlantic security policy making. The primacy group is non-existent in this particular case study. Table Four outlines the various beliefs of the three typologies.

Table Four: Transatlantic Belief Structures in Kosovo Intervention Policy

<u>Belief Category</u>	<u>Non-intervention Typology</u>	<u>Limited Intervention Typology</u>	<u>Active Intervention Typology</u>
1. Normative Core Beliefs			
Analytical Anchor	Isolationism/ Pacifism	Realism	Idealism/Liberalism
Priority of Values	National/Domestic Interests	Balance of Power	Peace & Human Welfare
Primary Goal of Foreign Relations	Maintain National Security/Prosperity	Avoid great power war/Maintain balance(s) of power	Maintain peace/ Uphold human rights
2. Policy Core Beliefs			
Major Challenge Posed by Kosovo War	Avoid becoming involved	Maintaining peace among the great powers/Avoiding “spillover” of conflict into neighboring states	Establishing a lasting peace in the region
Preferred Political Order in Kosovo	Irrelevant	Maintain Yugoslav sovereignty/ territorial integrity	Reestablish Kosovo self-determination/ autonomy
Conception of Security Interests	Strictly National or Non-existent	Regional	Global
Political Priorities	National/Domestic	Formal Alliances/Treaties	Western Norms & Values
3. Instrumental Policy Beliefs			
Perception of Cause of Kosovo War	Historical Ethnic Animosities	Kosovar Albanian War for Self-determination	Serbian Human Rights Abuses against Kosovar Albanians
Role of United Nations	Policy Legalization	Policy Legitimization	Irrelevant/Useless
Role of NATO	Territorial Defense/ Military Alliance (i.e. no role)	Political-military Alliance; “In Area” Collective Security/ Policy Implementation	Socio-political Regime; “Out of Area” Collective Security/ Policy Making
View on Military Intervention in Kosovo	Abstain Completely	Contain Conflict/ Impartial Intervention	End Conflict/ Intervention specifically against Serbs
Implementation Preference in Former Yugoslavia	Zero intervention preferable; humanitarian intervention at most	Diplomatic solution first; NATO Postwar Peacekeeping Only	Use force to reach diplomatic solution; NATO Peacemaking

As in the Bosnia case study, each of the leaders of the four major regime members had strong political/ideological core values that appear to translate into their varying positions on military intervention during the crisis in Kosovo. The key members of each typology are as follows. Interestingly, the non-intervention typology during the Kosovo crisis *did not include any* of the four major leaders. The limited intervention typology included French President Jacques Chirac and German Christian Democrat Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The active intervention typology included U.S. President Bill Clinton and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. Also interesting to note is that, unlike during the Bosnia crisis, the Kosovo crisis saw no change in government leadership of any of the “big four” (although the Schröder government began the crisis in transition from the Kohl government).

The foreign policy of the Blair government exhibited some continuity with that of John Major’s Conservative government. However, it is quite distinctive on topics such as the concept of an international community, humanitarian intervention, morality in world politics, and Britain’s international role—including relations with other European countries and the EU. During the Kosovo conflict, Prime Minister Blair’s “doctrine of the international community” speech in Chicago (April 1999) outlined the issues that his government placed greater importance on in British foreign policy than had his predecessor (or indeed most of his predecessors).⁴⁸⁹ In the speech, he posited the existence of an international community, and he argued for spreading “our values” of liberty, the rule of law, human rights, and an open society and suggested reforming the UN Security Council.⁴⁹⁰ The Blair government has indicated a serious commitment to strengthening the rules and values of the international community in a

⁴⁸⁹ Speech by the Prime Minister to the Economic Club of Chicago on the “Doctrine of the International Community,” www.fco.gov.uk/news, April 22, 1999.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

series of measures, including pursuing the following: reducing poverty and debt in developing countries, and supporting the establishment of an international criminal court.

However, the core of Prime Minister Blair's Chicago speech was a plea for a modification of the principle of non-intervention in international affairs that he linked to the ruin brought on the peoples of the former Yugoslavia by Slobodan Milosevic and on the people of Iraq by Saddam Hussein. The rationale for, and timing of, his proposal was certainly meant to not only bolster the legitimacy of NATO's military intervention in Kosovo—but *also to prepare for future cases where he deemed intervention was necessary* (like Iraq). Blair argued for a new framework permitting intervention in cases of genocide, to deal with cases of “massive flows of refugees,” and when regimes “are based on minority rule” as in the previous case of South Africa (or Iraq).⁴⁹¹ These far-reaching proposals marked a major break with the traditional “rules” of international relations and use of military force.

One of the most striking characteristics of the approach of the Blair government's approach to foreign policy is the concept of moral righteousness—as is evident in the response to ethnic cleansing by the Serbs in Kosovo. The stance of the Blair government on intervention in Kosovo owed much to the passionately held view that it was a vital test of a commitment to protect human rights and defend civilized values. This commitment, which is a core element in the pledge by the Blair government for the UK to be a “force for good in the world,” was espoused in the early months of the government and reiterated in the British Strategic Defense Review of 1998.⁴⁹² In September 1999, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook commented that in cases such as Kosovo: “To know that such atrocities are being committed and not to act against them is

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*


⁴⁹² Dan Keohane, “The Response of the British Government to the Attack on America,” in Bülent Gökay and R.B.J. Walker (eds.), *11 September 2001: War, Terror, and Judgment* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 115.

to make us complicit in them, and to be passive in the face of such events is to make it more likely they will be repeated.”⁴⁹³ These comments made by Blair and Cook encapsulate the philosophical, political, and policy foundations of the “active interventionists” of the political left. And in the Kosovo conflict, the Blair government was particularly effective in advancing its humanitarian and international agenda—and thus influencing regime policy.

Using the measurements discussed previously, the political/ideological typologies may be placed within the parameters of the dependent variable in a ratio manner: 0-2=non-intervention typology; 2.1-5=limited intervention typology; and 5.1-8=active intervention typology. Thus, President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder fall within the limited intervention typology; and President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair fall within the active intervention typology. Of particular interest in this case is the fact that Chancellor Schröder and the German government, despite having a very strong leftist coalition in power, remained in the “limited intervention” bloc (which is traditionally more right-leaning). This may be explained due to the unique domestic situation within Germany and the German population’s traditional pacifism. The German government certainly desired and supported a more active intervention in Kosovo, but it was reluctant to openly support such a position due to domestic pressures (which will be discussed later). This is a clear case of a government or government leader being constrained in personal beliefs/ideology by domestic pressures. Additionally, Schröder’s government was also in support of a more active/robust intervention *conducted by other nations but without German participation*. In other words, official German *national* policy was in support of limited intervention; but unofficial German *regime* policy was in favor of more active intervention.

⁴⁹³ Robin Cook, “Human Rights into a New Century,” www.fco.gov.uk/texts, July 17, 1997.

Ideologically, then, during the Kosovo crisis, one can see a sort of horseshoe-shaped ideological graph in which political leaders may be placed based upon the joining of their political beliefs and policy preferences about military intervention and use of force during the crisis which is identical to the one previously noted for the Bosnia crisis (see below). A major difference from Bosnia was thus a shift in the ideological balance of the leadership of the four major regime member states, from somewhat in the middle of the “horseshoe” during the Bosnia crisis to further left during the Kosovo crisis.



Similar to the Bosnia crisis, policy core beliefs clearly came into conflict during the crisis in Kosovo. In competition this time, however, were the limited interventionists’ core beliefs of maintaining the Westphalian concepts of national sovereignty and territorial integrity versus the active interventionists’ core beliefs of upholding the Wilsonian concepts of human rights and self-determination. Unlike during the Bosnia crisis, no major regime members state leaders fit the non-intervention typology, and this fact may very well have played a strong role in the much quicker decision to use military force as well as the stronger regime cohesion at the outset of the crisis.

⁴⁹⁴ See remarks in text for an explanation as to the unique position of the German government.

Similar to Bosnia, both groups protected their normative core beliefs by making adjustments in secondary (policy core) aspects of their belief systems, and this may be why the “least common denominator” of limited intervention evolved as regime policy. It required the least amount of change (in terms of secondary beliefs) on behalf of the limited interventionists and active interventionists. It is clear, based on this analysis, that not only did each major political leader possess his own set of belief structures regarding the issue-area but that the change in leadership (and therefore belief structures) in two of the major leadership positions (from the time of the Bosnia intervention) coincided with greater initial agreement and cohesion in regime intervention policy. While similarly (but conversely), the stronger push by the active interventionists for policy change later in the conflict coincided with rapidly degrading regime agreement and policy cohesion.

Thus, for purposes of the second case study, the degree of congruence in the ideological beliefs/structures of the leaders of the major regime member states also has a strong correlation with regime policy congruence and, in fact, also seems to play a relatively strong causal role—including influencing changes in regime policy over time. The H5 hypothesis thus should not be rejected.

6.8.7 Independent Variable 6: Domestic Political Pressures and Regime Policy Congruence

It seems logical to assume (as do most theoretical approaches to foreign policy behavior) that the more internally “unified” and actor is, the more likely it will succeed in achieving its foreign policy goals and objectives. The Bosnia case study raised interesting questions about this premise, and the Kosovo case study explores it further.

The United States

At the time of the Kosovo conflict, successive American administrations since Gerald Ford had consistently applied the “lesson” of Vietnam: not to deploy ground troops in a conflict where large-scale casualties might occur. The exception (the Gulf War of 1991) was hailed by President George H.W. Bush as ending “Vietnam syndrome.” The Clinton administration nevertheless clearly continued to operate on the basis that significant American casualties would not be tolerated and (as discussed earlier) thus began the Kosovo crisis with a firm position against the use of ground troops. On May 18, however, nearly two months into the war and in the face of mounting criticism over the administration’s declared position against ground troops, Clinton announced, “We have not and will not take any option off the table.”⁴⁹⁵

Maintaining regime unity was certainly one reason for the U.S.’s reluctance to give the ground force option serious consideration until later in the conflict. But there is abundant evidence to suggest that the Clinton administration saw the deployment of ground forces to the area as crossing a risky political threshold on the domestic front as well. President Clinton was not really vulnerable to being removed from office (despite his impeachment), but he did have to worry about losing control of the decision-making agenda in Washington to the Republican-controlled Congress. Since he was in his second, final term of office, Clinton also did not have to worry about reelection, but he did have to contend with congressional involvement (some might say “meddling”) in Kosovo policy and the uncertainty that brought. As a result, he was ultimately willing to move toward the ground force option but only after it appeared that not using ground troops would lead to a terrible *national* foreign policy failure. The cost of such a

⁴⁹⁵ Philip E. Auerswald and David P. Auerswald (eds.), *The Kosovo Conflict: A Diplomatic History through Documents* (Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 982.

failure for American (and NATO) prestige and Clinton's own political legacy were thus considered intolerable.

During the war, the domestic political threshold between supporting air power and resisting ground troops was clear in both public opinion and congressional sentiment, which the administration recognized explicitly. According to one U.S. official involved in the crisis, "The administration was operating on the assumption that ground troops would raise this to a new level, and we hadn't prepared the public for that."⁴⁹⁶

President Clinton's close attention to public opinion posed particular dilemmas with regard to Kosovo. On the one hand, both the Gulf War and Bosnia had shown that once American forces were committed (and if they had the backing of the international community), the public traditionally rallied behind them and the president's leadership. But on the other hand, until they were deployed, that endorsement was either absent, uncertain, or even opposed by at least a substantial minority (if not actual majority) of Americans.

The American public's attitudes on Kosovo were muddled and divided, and, like Bosnia, a significant portion of the population seemed fairly apathetic, even in the latter stages of the air war. Most Americans did not believe that any vital American interests were at stake but also believed that U.S. involvement in Kosovo was morally appropriate. Gallup polls taken in February and March 1999 showed that the public was relatively supportive of NATO air strikes at the outset of the conflict (about sixty percent favoring) but was evenly split over the U.S. participating in them (43 and 46 percent favoring and 45 and 43 percent opposed, respectively).⁴⁹⁷ A slightly larger number believed that the U.S. had a "moral obligation to help

⁴⁹⁶ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 97.

⁴⁹⁷ David P. Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No.3 (September) 2004, p. 641; and Steven B. Redd, "The Influence of

keep the peace in Kosovo” (52 and 58 percent agreeing and 43 and 37 percent disagreeing, respectively).⁴⁹⁸ And a fairly large majority believed that the U.S. had no vital national interests in Kosovo (55 and 50 percent versus 37 and 42 percent, respectively).⁴⁹⁹ Polls for ABC News taken later in the year in April, May, and June, however, found that narrow minorities (56, 54, and 55 percent, respectively) supported U.S. military involvement (with 41, 42, and 41 percent, respectively, believing that intervention would be a mistake).⁵⁰⁰ Other surveys found that most Americans supported air strikes against Serbia.⁵⁰¹ Although a majority even supported the use of American ground troops to force a resolution to the conflict, this disappeared if *any* casualties occurred (something both rather unavoidable and strangely puzzling in public opinion).⁵⁰²

The surveys revealed an American public (to the extent that it was paying attention to Kosovo) that endorsed a limited U.S. military action for humanitarian reasons. That response was a function partly of doubts about the merits of intervention where national interests are not clearly at stake and partly of concerns about casualties. Such mixed public reactions strongly contributed to Clinton’s decision to wage the bombing campaign at no lower than 15,000 feet and (initially) to rule out any use of ground forces in order to minimize U.S. casualties. These decisions were also, however, a result of discordant political reactions in Washington. The administration feared that any escalation would spark a national debate over the war and embolden anti-war members of Congress, who would feel more confident in challenging the President’s policy. “As the air campaign got underway,” noted Wesley Clark in his memoirs,

Advisers and Decision Strategies on Foreign Policy Choices,” *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 6, No. 1, (February) 2005, p. 136.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁰ Robert Singh, “American Perceptions” in Buckley and Cummings (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 471, p. 68.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

“political considerations came to dominate Washington.”⁵⁰³ It was not public opinion primarily but the prospects of congressional intervention that caused the administration the most domestic political difficulty regarding Kosovo.

Thus, politically, Kosovo became almost a sort of proxy for the conflicts between President Clinton and the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress. Uncertainty over what Congress would do about the question of escalation put the administration in a difficult position. Republican congressional leaders even derisively labeled the conflict the “Clinton-Gore War.” Political tensions peaked in late April and early May 1999 when the House of Representatives voted to require congressional approval for the use of ground troops and deadlocked on a vote authorizing U.S. involvement in the air war (which was ultimately broken by a single deciding vote).

The most important short-term factor shaping the U.S. domestic influence on its Kosovo policy was probably the President’s impeachment. The Lewinski scandal and the independent counsel investigation by Kenneth Starr had dominated the news in 1998. Allegations that Clinton’s foreign policy was an imitation of the film *Wag the Dog* plagued the President throughout the year, undermining the political credibility of U.S. military strikes against Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iraq. However much these charges lacked evidential support, Clinton’s preoccupation with the scandal contributed to a sense of stasis that surrounded administration policy on Kosovo during 1998 and assisted Secretary of State Albright’s taking a lead role in formulating a more aggressive U.S. policy.⁵⁰⁴

The impeachment and partisan and institutional conflict of the late 1990s were more delayed rather than determined administration action on Kosovo. The war offered Clinton a

⁵⁰³ Clark, *op. cit.* in note 417, p. 426.

⁵⁰⁴ See Redd, *op. cit.* in note 496.

chance to put impeachment behind him and regain some of the leadership authority he had lost during the scandal. Democrats were naturally reluctant to dissent from administration policy, whereas Republican Party divisions (ideological, strategic, tactical, and bicameral) were significant enough to preclude any concerted resistance or coherent alternative to the administration's developing Kosovo policy.

While the likely outcome of any congressional vote on the use of ground troops is unclear and was never actually tested, a congressional vote on this escalating step would clearly have presented a political risk to the President. If air strikes alone could not gather majority support in the House of Representatives, it is doubtful that the more dangerous ground force option would have. More importantly, the President had a strong interest in avoiding the uncertainty of a congressional vote in the first place. The safer political option was to keep the use of force below the ground troops threshold, thereby avoiding domestic challenges (both in Congress and in public opinion) to his policy that would have been produced if that threshold had been crossed. It was only when the administration realized that it risked actually losing the war altogether that the President was willing to accept the political risk of escalation. Thus, even more than in the Bosnia case study, domestic political pressures not only *constrained* U.S. policy goals and decisions but also actually played a strong role in *determining* them.

United Kingdom

From the beginning of the transatlantic security regime's deliberations over what should be done about the civil conflict in Kosovo, the United Kingdom was a persistent advocate of the use of force. In fact, at no time in the months preceding the war or during the air campaign itself did the British government demonstrate even a hint of reluctance to employ military force. The

UK was the first NATO member to suggest the use of force, and by August 1998, the British cabinet agreed to play a major role in any NATO action, including the deployment of a large ground force.⁵⁰⁵ During the war, the UK was the only regime member consistently ready and willing to support a ground invasion to achieve NATO's stated objectives.

In early April, General Clark briefed Prime Minister Tony Blair on the disposition of Serbian forces in Kosovo, the ongoing expulsion of Kosovar Albanians, and the effects of the two-week old air war underway. The briefing apparently solidified Blair's already strong support for a ground invasion of Kosovo. According to Clark, the "British were leaning hard to push ahead for planning the ground option. The Prime Minister was determined to do all required to win."⁵⁰⁶ On April 21, two days before the NATO summit, Blair flew to Washington to meet with Clinton administration officials to press the case for a ground invasion.⁵⁰⁷ On May 20, while doubts over the air campaign's effectiveness increased, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook flew to Washington to again lobby for escalating the conflict. Despite failing to convince its allies, the British government went so far as to call up 30,000 army reservists for possible duty in a ground war in Kosovo.⁵⁰⁸

An important reason for Prime Minister Blair's greater willingness to escalate the conflict was certainly his insulation from the kinds of domestic political pressures faced by his counterparts in the other major regime member states. Unlike his counterparts in the U.S., France, and Germany, Prime Minister Tony Blair did not have to balance uncertain domestic political considerations against the UK's commitment to NATO action. The British commitment of forces to Kosovo was popular both with public opinion and with rival political parties.

⁵⁰⁵ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 35 and p. 54.

⁵⁰⁶ Clark, *op. cit.* in note 417, p. 264.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁵⁰⁸ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit.* in note 376, p. 157; see also Clark, *op. cit.* in note 417, p. 330.

Traditionally in the UK, it had been Blair's Labor Party that had opposed to the use of military force. Indeed, the party's support for the Gulf War in 1991 had caused a small internal rebellion. But if there was opposition to the Kosovo war within the Labor Party, it remained relatively quiet.

There were thus no major, mainstream political disagreements over the Kosovo crisis during the lead up to the war from October 1998 to March 1999 or over course of the bombing campaign itself. The day before the air war began, even the opposition Conservative Party offered "wholehearted support for the British force who (sic) might have to take part in the NATO action."⁵⁰⁹ General support from all the major British political parties continued throughout the air campaign. As late as April, the Conservative Party opposition made it clear that, "We continue support the government. We continue to believe that it was right to take action against the regime that has inflicted so much terror on those whom it regards as its own citizens."⁵¹⁰ Overall, the opinion of the center-left tended to be in favor of any action that could prevent ethnic cleansing and that would deal decisively with the dictatorship in Belgrade, while center-right opinion was more skeptical about humanitarian intervention.⁵¹¹ This near reversal of traditional positions regarding military action had the effect of dampening political criticisms during the course of the operation.

Given that the Kosovo crisis was far away from the UK and did not appear to have any strategic importance beyond the humanitarian principles involved, there was great public curiosity about the campaign but not an enormous amount of public interest at stake in it. But,

⁵⁰⁹ Michael Clarke, "British Perceptions" in Buckley and Cummings (eds.), *op. cit.* in note 471, p. 86.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

like the U.S. public, while the British public was generally supportive of the war, it was also highly critical of the possibility of British casualties.

The government and Prime Minister's handling of the crisis received high praise from the public throughout the crisis, but Blair's eagerness to pursue the option of deploying ground troops was certainly not shared by the British public. In March 1999, 62 percent of those polled disagreed with the statement that Britain should send ground troops into the conflict and only 26 percent agreed; in April, the figures were 43 and 47 percent, respectively.⁵¹² Support was strong for the air war, however, as in polls conducted throughout the war, public support generally weighed in at 58 to 72 percent supporting the air war.⁵¹³ When asked how many British lives would be worth losing to protect ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, however, in repeated polls, 45 to 56 percent said "none," while most others indicated very low numbers (less than 100) or "don't know."⁵¹⁴ Thus, it seems that, in stark contrast to President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair was able to conduct British policy on Kosovo with little domestic constraint. However, the caveat is that the British public's and Parliament's apparently higher support for the war was never seriously questioned, as NATO never had to follow through on its threat to launch a dangerous and expensive ground invasion.

France

Unlike the British government, which enjoyed a large majority in Parliament and could depend on the support of the two major opposition parties and the British public, the French executive under President Jacques Chirac faced possible domestic division at two levels:

⁵¹² *Observer* poll cited in Richardson, *op. cit.* in note 418, p. 158.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

between the President (Chirac) and the government (led by Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin) and from French public opinion.

The former situation, which the French call *cohabitation*, certainly seemed as if it could cause serious internal division over a serious an issue such as going to war. Aside from Socialists, Jospin's cabinet also contained Communists, Greens, and members of the small but influential left-wing Citizens' Movement (MDC). The Communists and MDC, in particular, were generally pro-Serb and adamantly opposed to the war. The Socialists and Greens, while having initial misgivings, decided to support the war on humanitarian grounds.⁵¹⁵

The main criticism over France's role in the Kosovo conflict came from within the major political parties, French intellectuals, the right-wing National Front Party, and small groups on the far-left. Divisions over the war in mainstream parties tended to reflect a deeper split between "sovereigntists" (who want to maintain France's autonomy in international affairs) and "internationalists" (who are more concerned with France's role and participation in international institutions).⁵¹⁶ The latter formed the majority opinion within the Socialist Party, the parties of the center-right, and the Gaullist RPR (*Rassemblement pour la République*), while the Communists, the MDC, National Front, and some traditional Gaullists espoused the "sovereigntist" position.⁵¹⁷ The forces of the sovereigntists within both the government and the opposition never gained enough strength to seriously challenge the Kosovo policies adopted by President Chirac, however.

French public opinion appeared even more ready than the government to prosecute a war (air or ground) against Serbia. Support for air strikes in France was reported as between forty

⁵¹⁵ Macleod, *op. cit.* in note 413, p. 123.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

percent early in the campaign to a high of 72 percent in April; significantly, support for use of ground troops was also relatively high, fluctuating between 47 and 68 percent.⁵¹⁸ Like public opinion in many Western countries, the French public's backing for NATO action against Serbia appears to have been more an emotional response to the human rights abuses than due to strategic or political reasons, as the support increased after reports of such abuses by the Serbs. But also like other Western publics, French support for the war was fragile and often confused.⁵¹⁹

Germany

German participation in the NATO air strikes provoked surprisingly little domestic political dissent, considering Germany's generally pacifistic post-Cold War political culture. The fact that military intervention occurred under a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens seems to have helped contain public opposition. The Green Party's traditional views on international relations had been grounded solidly in strict pacifism and anti-NATO protest.⁵²⁰ In the Kosovo crisis, however, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (the senior Green Party member in Schröder's government) was an unwavering advocate of the use of air power against the Serbs. But what German domestic politics also demonstrated during the crisis was a clear threshold between using air power and ground forces.

The Schröder government was able to portray the war to the German people as a moral war for human rights, and this proved a difficult proposition for the political left in Germany to

⁵¹⁸ *The Economist*, April 10, 1999, p. 25.

⁵¹⁹ See Macleod, *op. cit.* in note 413, pp. 124-125; and McAllister, *op. cit.* in note 471, p. 97.

⁵²⁰ See Margit Mayer and John Ely, *The German Greens: Paradox between Movement and Party* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998).

oppose.⁵²¹ In addition, however, German participation in the NATO air war was also seen as an affirmation of the country's full reintegration into the Western community of nations by many German political elites and intellectuals. This aspect was especially important to the opposition Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which passed a resolution supportive of NATO's intervention at its party convention in April 1999.⁵²² No major political party in Germany favored the use of ground troops, however.

This favorable political support for limited military intervention in Kosovo was also reflected in public opinion. Among the German public, there was initially broad support for NATO air strikes, but this support gradually eroded over time. The issue of state sovereignty and lack of UN Security Council authorization also added to the controversy in the German public. As of April 1999, 63 percent of Germans supported German participation in the NATO air campaign, with 34 percent opposed.⁵²³ As with the Bosnia case, however, there were striking differences between former West and East Germany. Whereas 68 percent of western Germans supported the NATO air campaign, only 38 percent of eastern Germans did.⁵²⁴ By late May, however, German public support for the war had declined to just 51 percent.⁵²⁵ The constitutionality of German participation was even challenged in the Constitutional Court, but the Court later dismissed the charges.

On the other hand, the most consistent and decisive impediment to the escalation of NATO's war in Kosovo to a ground phase was the persistent and vigorous opposition of Germany. And German reluctance can, in turn, be traced to domestic politics. Specifically, it is rooted in Chancellor Schröder's vulnerability to opposition within his own government and the

⁵²¹ Peter Rudolf, *op. cit.* in note 416, p. 135.

⁵²² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁵²³ *The Economist*, April 24, 1999, p. 51.

⁵²⁴ Ramet and Lyon, *op. cit.* in note 415, p. 92.

⁵²⁵ *New York Times*, May 26, 1999, p. A12.

danger of the Social Democratic Party losing power if NATO proceeded with a ground invasion. Nearly everyone in Germany—political left or right, western or eastern, elite or average person—opposed a ground war. This fear led Schröder to make a bold pledge that Germany would block any effort by NATO to escalate the conflict with ground forces—*regardless of the position of the rest of the NATO allies or of the original, publicly stated objectives of the NATO intervention.*⁵²⁶ Thus, when forced to choose between several of its dominant foreign policy beliefs (pacifism versus humanitarian aid and intervention) when the *limited* NATO military intervention appeared to be failing, both the German political leadership and German public clearly chose pacifism in the case of Kosovo.

Analysis

It is obvious that the degree and character of domestic policy differences within the major regime member states did not initially prevent consensus on the use of military force to achieve regime objectives regarding the Kosovo crisis. Regime policy cohesion was also maintained (with significant effort) during the air campaign, despite increasing civilian casualties from NATO attacks and the general lack of coercive effect that the bombing had on the Serb leadership. However, analysis of domestic influences during this period reveal an important aspect that had a crucial impact on regime policy congruence—the importance of domestic political variation among the four major regime members, especially in comparison to their domestic political situation during the Bosnia crisis. As General Clark noted, “In all allied countries, Kosovo was a domestic political issue, but from different angles.”⁵²⁷

⁵²⁶ Kaufman, *op. cit.* in note 195, p. 193.

⁵²⁷ Clark, *op. cit.* in note 417, pp. 427-428.

Prime Minister Blair was the most thoroughly insulated politically of the four leaders, as he was in no danger of being removed from office, and his Labor government was supported by such a large majority in Parliament that he did not have to be concerned with interference in Kosovo policy from the legislature. As a result, he had tremendous freedom of action to press for a ground assault and all of the risks that this entailed. Like Blair, President Chirac had a significant degree of institutional political leeway in deciding French policy regarding Kosovo, but he was still limited by French historical and strategic considerations, as well as a certain amount of pressure from public opinion.

President Clinton was not in danger of being removed from office over Kosovo, so his decision-making was relatively free from concerns over his own political future. He did have to worry about congressional activism and opposition, however, which could potentially have placed serious restraints on his freedom of action regarding Kosovo. As a result of these two factors, he had a strong interest in keeping the war limited to the air campaign in order to keep Congress as quiescent as possible on Kosovo policy. This helps explain his reluctance to condone a ground invasion until it appeared that NATO risked actually losing the war unless it escalated.

Chancellor Schröder was the most vulnerable political leader of the four. Military escalation would have stimulated legislative opposition that would have greatly complicated Germany's relationship with other NATO members and certainly had a negative impact on maintaining regime policy cohesion. Schröder also faced the very real possibility of losing power if his coalition government collapsed over the issue (something none of the other three leaders had to worry about). As a result, Schröder was a persistent critic of launching a ground

invasion, even going so far as to say that Germany would veto any effort to pursue this option in the NAC.

Underlying the domestic influences on all four regime members was the issue of public opinion. Based on data from a number of different polls, public support for the Kosovo air war was strongest in the UK and France, followed by Germany, and then the U.S. The evidence suggests that the British and French publics strongly supported NATO's intervention, and even a ground war would have been supported by a significant proportion of their populations (although this would obviously depend on additional factors such as allied and civilian casualties). German popular support for the air war was also surprisingly strong, although it declined substantially as the air campaign continued. But at the same time, the German public displayed nearly overwhelming opposition to a NATO ground war, with support never moving above thirty percent (and support for German participation even less).⁵²⁸ Finally, in the U.S., public support was mixed but also dropped later in the campaign; support in the U.S. for a ground invasion was quite low.

Unlike the Bosnia case study, there was no transatlantic "gap" within the regime regarding public opinion and the issue of using military force in the conflict. During the Kosovo crisis, public opinion in the U.S. and public opinion in the three major European regime members was relatively congruent, with general support for NATO air strikes but a distinct lack of support for a ground invasion. This varied somewhat *within* individual countries over time but not to a high degree *across* the regime members.

The second domestic "gap" found in the Bosnia case (between the *publics* and the *governments* of the major regime member states) was also not found in the Kosovo case.

⁵²⁸ Auerswald, *op. cit.* in note 494, p. 640.

National governmental policy-making regarding Kosovo appears to have been relatively congruent with national public opinion and level of domestic governmental cohesion. The UK and France, which had strong domestic political cohesion, were stronger advocates of using force. In the U.S. and Germany, weaker domestic political cohesion translated into higher resistance concerning escalation.

In terms of the variable being tested, *for purposes of the second case study, the degree of domestic political and public support congruence across the four major regime members has a strong correlation with regime policy congruence and (unlike Bosnia) seems to also play a strong causal role—including influencing changes in regime policy over time. The H6 hypothesis thus should not be rejected and might, in fact, be a causal factor in this case study. Further research is necessary to prove this more conclusively, however.*

7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

7.1 EVALUATION OF THE VARIABLES AND FINAL ANALYSIS

The two cases examined suggest the diversity of decision-making influences and processes when the decision unit is an international security regime comprised of several sovereign states—and the sharply divergent outcomes that can result. A further point is also highlighted by these cases. Foreign policy crises are usually viewed as sequences of events for decisions that extend over time. The time frame leading up to military intervention may be as little as a few weeks or months, as in the Kosovo intervention, or it may be as long as several years, as the Bosnia crisis demonstrated. In each of the cases described here, the four governments in question made numerous decisions, both domestically and diplomatically/internationally. These two cases thus also illustrate that regime-level policy formation—even when seemingly deadlocked for prolonged periods, as in the Bosnia case—is not stagnant but instead is dynamic and ongoing. A key factor to understanding regime-level policy formation, change, and cohesion, however, is that (like national foreign policy-making) it has to be seen within the context of domestic political contexts.

These various factors will influence not only regime-level military intervention policy but also more general regime security policy in the near future. They will not, in themselves, determine regime security policy content, but policy-makers seeking effective regime-level

policies must consider how these factors, both international-level and domestic-level, are now shaping and will further shape the transatlantic security environment.

When the hypotheses were tested against the two cases, some proved to be far more relevant (and with a much greater explanatory role) than did others. A summary of the findings appears in Table 6 (below). The collective risk analysis and ideological compatibility variables, in particular, proved generally more useful in understanding collective regime intervention policy congruence. Only two variables (collective threat perception and collective domestic pressures) proved to be inconsistent with the evidence in these cases, and neither varied to a highly significant degree across the two cases (with collective threat perception rating a weak-to-moderate influence, and collective domestic pressures rating a moderate-to-strong influence). Only one variable (distribution of relative power as influence) was found to be completely irrelevant to regime policy congruence. Of course, this variable, while judged irrelevant here, might have an impact under different circumstances, but it would even then be difficult to consider it an essential element in regime policy congruence, given the findings here. Two variables (collective risk analysis and ideological compatibility) were judged to be both consistent (having the same level of impact) and confirmed (having a strong level of impact) in each case, thus proving to be the most reliable explanatory elements in regime intervention policy congruence.

Table 6: Summary of the Variables

	<u>Bosnia</u>	<u>Kosovo</u>
Variable 1 (Relative Power as Influence)	Weak	Weak
Variable 2 (Collective Threat Perception)	Weak	Moderate
Variable 3 (Role of Institutions)	Moderate	Moderate
Variable 4 (Collective Risk Analysis)	Strong	Strong
Variable 5 (Ideological Compatibility)	Strong	Strong
Variable 6 (Collective Domestic Pressures)	Moderate	Strong

7.1.1 International-Level Variables

The international level of analysis has frequently been the major focus of international relations theory, yet international-level variables generally turned out to be the least useful in explaining regime intervention policy congruence. The power as influence variable, in particular, turned out to be irrelevant across both cases, and the collective threat perception variable turned out to be inconsistent across the two cases. In realist and neorealist theory, comparative power resources has long been considered a defining variable of state interaction: the most powerful state is expected to be dominant. In this study, however, a simple comparison of relative power resources did not prove reliably predictive of the outcome of either case.

While the importance of power in the absolute sense was difficult to judge, the relative balance of power (and small changes therein over time) either between the United States and its

European allies or among the major European powers seems to have had little or no impact on the outcome of these cases. In neither of the cases did judgments about the relative power standings (or shifts therein) seem to be relevant to individual government calculations.

Shared external threat was judged inconsistent; yet, the two cases do closely resemble each other in terms of their threat assessment. With the end of the Cold War and absence of the Soviet Union as an immediate threat, what is most noticeable in the two cases is the difficulty in reaching agreement on a shared threat among regime members (although more so in the Bosnia crisis). In both of these interventions, NATO forces were deployed (whether in stability or offensive operations) primarily for humanitarian reasons and concerns related to refugee flows. Consequently, the overall threat level for these cases was low, since there was no real direct military or other security threat to any regime member states—and certainly not to the four major member states. In both cases, the general threat of regional instability seemed to be recognized, but it was not sufficient by itself to lead to force regime policy congruence.

Of the three international-level variables, the one most relevant to regime intervention policy congruence was the involvement of an international institution in which all four major regime countries were active members. This obviously means NATO and not the EU. Indeed, the evidence from these two case studies would seem to indicate the more active the role and participation of the EU in a given crisis (especially at the expense of NATO), the *less likely* the regime will be to agree on an intervention policy. Conversely, in both cases, NATO provided a format and mechanisms that proved fairly important for moving a common regime policy forward.

The variable's impact was only judged moderate in both cases, however, due to the fact that by itself, it did not seem to be able to drive (or hinder) collective policy-making. In other

words, NATO as an institution was able to help facilitate collective policy formation *but only when there were other, stronger variables present*. While not a strong facilitator of policy-making, however, NATO was able to perform a strong *policy implementation* role for the regime in the two cases.

The general lack of importance ascribed to the international-level variables in these cases has several important implications. It might be argued that the irrelevance of power and the moderate value of international institutions seem to indicate the superiority of liberal international relations theories (especially neoliberal institutionalism). But it should be remembered that this dissertation deals with diplomatic relations within a security regime—in other words, among states that have a predetermined set of common beliefs and interests and enjoy typically quite friendly relations with one another. And where such a dense interdependence exists across wide array of issue-areas, it perhaps should not be surprising that relative power is not be the most effective indicator of state behavior.

7.1.2 Domestic-Level Variables

In contrast to international-level variables, those centered on domestic political factors turned out to have a great deal of explanatory power in these two cases. Two hypotheses, the impact of collective risk analysis and ideological compatibility, were judged confirmed in both cases. And collective domestic pressure had a moderate to strong influence in both cases (being stronger in the Kosovo case), demonstrating reasonable consistency. Overall, this set of variables seems especially significant.

While the importance of each risk factor may be contingent partly on other circumstances specific to the context of a given proposed intervention, some general conclusions can be made.

The historical evidence of the two cases strongly supports the hypothesis that perceived risk analysis can increase or decrease the likelihood of regime intervention policy congruence, with the regime more easily able to come to agreement in potentially lesser risk interventions but finding it more difficult to come to agreement in potentially greater risk interventions. In addition, several specific factors may be identified that influence the common risk assessment, including (but not limited to): type of intervention, expected duration of the intervention, expected economic costs of intervention, expected casualties from intervention, and possible domestic or international political costs of intervention (or not intervening, in terms of credibility).

The basic argument presented by the fifth variable (ideological compatibility) hypothesizes that competing normative ideas and beliefs and the advocacy of these ideas and beliefs plays a central role in the outcomes of when, where, and how the transatlantic security regime collectively decides to militarily intervene in another country. The general research presented in this dissertation supports this basic hypothesis in both cases. U.S. and European government leaders, officials, and policy elites do hold different normative beliefs about the use of military force, and they do engage in intense disputes for public and political support for their views—both within their home country and across the regime. In both cases, each government leader (or administration) established his preferences regarding military intervention based to some degree on underlying normative predispositions. Once that preference was established, each leader (or group of leaders) engaged in diplomatic and public activity to frame and shape information about the crisis in an effort to cultivate support for his advocated policy. This clash of normative beliefs regarding military intervention clearly played out in both cases.

As for the last variable, it has long been surmised that internal divisions or strong public opposition weaken a government, making it less likely to achieve foreign policy objectives. The same seems to hold true to some degree for policy formulation at a regime level. While decisions regarding the use of military force or military intervention are not made by public referendum, Western governments do understand that their publics can be highly sensitive to such questions. It is precisely because of publics' heightened interest in "high politics" matters of war and peace that government leaders are particularly sensitive to the views of their constituents.

The impact of this variable is largely borne out to a strong degree in the Kosovo case, wherein public opinion in all four major countries coalesced around regime policy, and wherein suggested changes in that policy (i.e. launching a ground invasion) were hindered by heavy public opposition. But the Bosnia case offers some interesting complications. In that case, there was a more significant division between the government of U.S. on one side and the European governments on the other, as well as between the American public and European publics. Ironically (and perhaps sadly), the transatlantic difference in public opinion had the effect of making each side better able to resist any attempt at regime policy change by the other. Thus, while domestic political pressure could not explain the regime policy that was eventually adopted, it had a strong explanatory role in the initial lack of regime policy congruence.

7.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

This study has sought to contribute to the understanding of the interrelated processes of national foreign policy-making and influence in international affairs. In doing so, this work has

contributed to understanding in three additional areas: the use of influence generally in the international arena, the behavior of states in an interdependent international security regime, and the intricacies of transatlantic relations. Additionally, however, it has made specific contributions to the literature on international relations and foreign policy-making.

The first significant theoretical contribution of this research is the further demonstration of the inherent weakness of distribution of materialist power-based realism and realist threat perception arguments.⁵²⁹ Neither fared well in analyzing regime policy cohesion. First, as previously mentioned, realist arguments often fail to fully conceptualize or specify an accurate portrayal of what constitutes power, much less what constitutes security or national interests. Because the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia did not directly threaten the major regime members' political independence or territorial integrity, the exact nature of threats to their security and interests is very difficult to measure with any objective precision. Power, security, and national interests are rather ambiguous with respect to such regional and civil conflicts, and scholars and policy-makers alike in a single country will rarely agree among themselves as to what constitutes a threat to national security and interests—much less scholars and policy-makers across different countries within the regime.

The research presented here also provides additional empirical content to the recent scholarship on the role of ideas and foreign policy in liberal democratic states. Ideas and ideological compatibility are critical factors in explaining regime policy congruence. The research presented here suggests that ideology and normative beliefs can and do have an effect on policy. The research here, however, adds an additional element on the role of ideas and

⁵²⁹ See Chapter Four, Sections 1 and 2.

beliefs and the ways in which they can influence policy outcomes. In the existing literature,⁵³⁰ policy outcomes are seen as a function of how well various individuals and groups can change the minds of decision-makers. In the case studies of this dissertation, however, ideological perceptions gained influence through highly charged political battles for public opinion. In that sense, institutional resources and domestic bureaucratic cohesion were important means through which normative beliefs about military intervention were (to some degree) “sold” to the publics of the four major regime member states.

7.3 INTO THE FUTURE: RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF THE REGIME

As many pundits noted, the Cold War was followed by a “hot peace”—a period of regional and global security challenges for leaders of all four countries. Ironically, although Western nations were more secure, instability, disorder, and frequent military operations dominated headlines. Throughout history, states have often established long- or short-term political and military ties in order to preserve peace, win wars, or pursue other purposes despite seemingly incompatible philosophies, policies, and even values. Alliances and coalitions have varied remarkably, but regardless of characteristics, each member of any multilateral security endeavor must make strategic decisions that concern the compatibility of partners, the merits of formal versus informal agreements, command and control arrangements, and respective contributions. Domestic goals, ideological links, perceived threats, geographic circumstances, anticipated benefits, probable costs or liabilities, individual personalities, and other diversified

⁵³⁰ See Chapter Four, Section 5.

factors may affect the formation, configuration, cohesion, utility, effectiveness, and longevity of every military coalition, formal alliance, or security regime.

As the case studies in this dissertation demonstrate, there have been, and doubtless will continue to be, deep differences over both *policy* and *process* among the four major powers of the transatlantic security regime. Largely, this is due to the fact that the leaders, governments, and policy elites of these countries represent different constituencies and thus tend to see the same issues from different policy perspectives. NATO officials, for instance, can (or at least should) view a matter of military intervention from the perspective of the Alliance as a whole and how that policy will influence overall regional security or stability. Individual national governments and their leaders, however, tend to view the same issues from the perspective of its impact on their particular country and constituents, sometime regardless of the overall international or regional impact.

All political leaders act in what they perceive as being in the interest of their constituency. For American national government leaders, their constituency is their country first, political party and supporters second, and allied countries third. For European leaders, however, the constituency is their country first, political party and followers second, their fellow EU member states third, and other non-EU allies (including the U.S.) fourth. The interplay of these separate and unique interests, viewed and tested in this dissertation through a lens of several causal mechanisms, is what will determine the degree of convergence or divergence in both U.S.-European relations and intra-European relations in the future. This dissertation has given a brief glimpse (and analysis of that glimpse) into one particular issue-area (multilateral military intervention) in which that interplay occurs, and it has attempted to identify causal

mechanisms that shape the outcomes of the convergence of these constituencies and the study of collective regime policy formation, change, and implementation.

The operations in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate the difficulties involved in forming and maintaining regime-level policy and undertaking regime-level multilateral military action. However, the U.S. and its European allies will continue to face threats to their common interests that may necessitate *collective* action. As the four largest and militarily most capable regime members, the U.S., UK, France, and Germany must therefore increase the exchange of policy ideas, intelligence, and operational planning *in peacetime*. If U.S. operational planning for contingencies outside of Europe is to take greater account of potential European interests and contributions, the European allies must also demonstrate *in advance* that they are both willing and able to participate. Otherwise, future collective regime military intervention policy is likely to remain *informal* and *ad hoc*. Decisions about where, when, and how to intervene militarily in regional or global crises necessarily call for subjective judgments. Nevertheless, based upon the findings in this dissertation, some guidelines for collective regime intervention may be suggested.

First, military intervention in the absence of highly valued (not necessarily vital) collective regime interests is difficult to justify—both to reluctant regime member state governments and their domestic populations. The advisability of armed action is most evident when strong political and/or economic interests are at stake for all four major regime members. Humanitarian and intangible interests, such as international credibility, may muster immediate support, but they are much harder to sustain in the long-term.

Third, national security planners must balance interests, objectives, and available power against risks and costs, taking policy guidance into account, as they search for feasible, suitable,

and politically acceptable solutions to security problems and threats. This process is fraught with difficulties at the national level, much less the regime level. Thus, developing agreed upon contingency plans *in advance* in case of a failure of regime agreement in any one of these areas may help facilitate greater acceptance of and cohesion in the overall policy. NATO's revitalized flexible organizational and operational structures are, once again, an obvious forum for development of such planning.

And fourth, strong public support within the individual regime members ideally should *precede* rather than follow military intervention; but that is not always possible, as seen in this dissertation; and such support may be ephemeral at best anyway. The leaders of all the major regime member states therefore must continue to more actively rally and sustain public support that may not otherwise be spontaneous or long lasting. Government leaders should also make greater effort to explain and outline reasons and necessities for regime intervention to their constituents and never assume such reasons are obvious to their publics or that public support is equal across national populations or guaranteed.

This study contributes most directly to our knowledge of transatlantic relations. Above all, this analysis indicates that issues of collective security policy coordination are—and will continue to be—an essential element in the relationship. In part, this is because there is so much interaction among the major regime member states, but also in part because each of them has so much at stake in not only their relationship with each other but also in the existing international order. Disagreements will be inevitable, and these disagreements will be important. The four major regime members must find ways to address these differences, for the collective good of the entire regime, as well as for regional (and perhaps even international) stability as a whole.

The implications for the future of the regime are clear. As the regime members address and interact across an ever-widening range of diverse international security issues (humanitarian intervention, terrorism, rogue states, failed states, proliferation of WMD, etc.), there will be increasing opportunities for disagreement—as the rift over the Iraq war has demonstrated. In some cases, they may simply agree to disagree, because the stakes of that particular issue or crisis do not require a cooperative or coordinated approach. But in other cases, the regime members may decide that collective policy cohesion (even if reluctantly secured, as was the case with Greece and Italy in the Kosovo crisis) is essential if certain goals are to be reached...and the process will begin again.

APPENDIX A

INSTITUTIONAL MEMBERSHIP

NATO Membership

Founding Members (1949)

Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States

Cold War Enlargement

Greece (1952), Turkey (1952), (West) Germany (1954), Spain (1986)

Post-Cold War Enlargement

Round One (1999):

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland

Round Two (2004):

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia

NATO Partner Countries

Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Egypt, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

EU Membership

European Economic Community Founding Members (1957)

Belgium, France, (West) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands

EEC Enlargement/European Union Founding Members

Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), Spain (1986)

EU First Round Enlargement (1995)

Austria, Finland, Sweden

EU Second Round Enlargement (2004)

Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia

APPENDIX B

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Ranked from Lowest Level of Conflict to Highest

- 1) Normative Social Conflict
- 2) Peaceful Civil Conflict
- 3) Low-level Criminal Behavior/Normal Crime
- 4) Organized Crime/Gang Violence/Criminal Networks
- 5) Rioting/Disruption/Civil Disorders
- 6) Terrorism
- 7) Guerrilla War
- 8) Low-intensity Conflict
- 9) Limited Conventional War
- 10) Conventional War (“Full-scale War”)
- 11) War of Limited Mass Destruction
- 12) War of Unlimited Mass Destruction

APPENDIX C

DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT

On November 25, 1995, the signatories of the peace accords that negotiators drafted in Dayton, Ohio agreed to “recreate as quickly as possible normal conditions of life” in war-torn Bosnia. Provisions of particular interest were:

- Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain an independent state that retained Sarajevo as its capital and contained two semi-autonomous “entities”
- The predominantly Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would comprise approximately 51 percent of its territory
- The predominantly Bosnian Serb Republica Srpska would comprise approximately 49 percent
- Boundaries in each instance would generally coincide with agreed upon cease-fire lines
- International peacekeepers would patrol a narrow buffer zone between the two “entities” and secure a corridor within the Gorazde salient
- All armed forces “not of local origin” were to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina within thirty days (except for international peacekeepers)
- All indigenous forces were to remain within designated locations and demobilize assets that prescribed facilities could not accommodate
- All armed civilian groups were to disband
- All refugees had the right to return home without risk of harassment, intimidation, or persecution for ethnic, religious, or political reasons.⁵³¹

⁵³¹ *Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement Fact Sheet* (Washington: U.S. Department of State, December 11, 1995).

APPENDIX D

DISTRIBUTION OF REGIME POWER OVER TIME⁵³²

D.1.1 Part One: Measured as Combined Economic and Military Power

1992

Group Total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Billions = \$10,039.12

Group Total Military Spending (MS) in Billions = \$401.19

France: $(\text{GDP}=1,270.5)/(\text{10,039.12}) + (\text{MS}=37.4)/(\text{401.19})$
 $= (.127+.093)/2 = \mathbf{.11 \text{ (11\%)}}$

Germany: $(\text{GDP}=1,774.9)/(\text{10,039.12}) + (\text{MS}=35.2)/(\text{401.19})$
 $= (.177+.088)/2 = \mathbf{.1325 \text{ (13.25\%)}}$

United Kingdom: $(\text{GDP}=1,048.02)/(\text{10,039.12})+(\text{MS}=41.7)/(\text{401.19})$
 $= (.104+.104)/2 = \mathbf{.104 \text{ (10.4\%)}}$

United States: $(\text{GDP}=5,945.7)/(\text{10,039.12})+(\text{MS}=286.89)/(\text{401.19})$
 $= (.592+.715)/2 = \mathbf{.6535 \text{ (65.35\%)}}$

1993

Group Total GDP in Billions = \$10,626.4

Group Total MS in Billions = \$395.6

France: $(\text{GDP}=1,348)/(\text{10,626.4}) + (\text{MS}=37.2)/(\text{395.6})$
 $= (.127+.094)/2 = \mathbf{.1105 \text{ (11.05\%)}}$

Germany: $(\text{GDP}=1,807)/(\text{10,626.4}) + (\text{MS}=31.8)/(\text{395.6})$
 $= (.17+.08)/2 = \mathbf{.125 \text{ (12.5\%)}}$

⁵³² All data from *The Military Balance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1993-2004).

$$\begin{aligned}\text{United Kingdom: } & (\text{GDP}=1,100.4)/(10,626.4) + (\text{MS}=34.2)/(395.6) \\ & = (.104+.086)/2 = \mathbf{.095 \text{ (9.5\%)}}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{United States: } & (\text{GDP}=6,374)/(10,626.4) + (\text{MS}=292.4)/(395.6) \\ & = (.6+.739)/2 = \mathbf{.6695 \text{ (66.95\%)}}\end{aligned}$$

1994

Group Total GDP in Billions = \$10,924.4

Group Total MS in Billions = \$385.88

$$\begin{aligned}\text{France: } & (\text{GDP}=1,329.3)/(10,924.4) + (\text{MS}=35.9)/(385.88) \\ & = (.122+.093)/2 = \mathbf{.1075 \text{ (10.75\%)}}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Germany: } & (\text{GDP}=1,834.9)/(10,924.4) + (\text{MS}=36.3)/(385.88) \\ & = (.168+.094)/2 = \mathbf{.131 \text{ (13.1\%)}}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{United Kingdom: } & (\text{GDP}=1,023.3)/(10,924.4) + (\text{MS}=34.88)/(385.88) \\ & = (.094+.09)/2 = \mathbf{.092 \text{ (9.2\%)}}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{United States: } & (\text{GDP}=6,736.9)/(10,924.4) + (\text{MS}=278.8)/(385.88) \\ & = (.617+.723)/2 = \mathbf{.67 \text{ (67\%)}}\end{aligned}$$

1995

Group Total GDP in Billions = \$11,796

Group Total MS in Billions = \$397.6

$$\begin{aligned}\text{France: } & (\text{GDP}=1,538)/(11,796) + (\text{MS}=48)/(397.6) \\ & = (.13+.121)/2 = \mathbf{.1255 \text{ (12.55\%)}}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Germany: } & (\text{GDP}=1,908)/(11,796) + (\text{MS}=41.8)/(397.6) \\ & = (.162+.105)/2 = \mathbf{.1335 \text{ (13.35\%)}}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{United Kingdom: } & (\text{GDP}=1,104)/(11,796) + (\text{MS}=34.2)/(397.6) \\ & = (.094+.086)/2 = \mathbf{.09 \text{ (9\%)}}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{United States: } & (\text{GDP}=7,246)/(11,796) + (\text{MS}=273.6)/(397.6) \\ & = (.614+.688)/2 = \mathbf{.651 \text{ (65.1\%)}}\end{aligned}$$

1998

Group Total GDP in Billions = \$12,900

Group Total MS in Billions = \$382.3

$$\text{France: } (\text{GDP}=1,400)/(12,900) + (\text{MS}=40.6)/(382.3) \\ = (.109+.106)/2 = \mathbf{.1075 \text{ (10.75\%)}}$$

$$\text{Germany: } (\text{GDP}=2,100)/(12,900) + (\text{MS}=33)/(382.3) \\ = (.163+.086)/2 = \mathbf{.1245 \text{ (12.45\%)}}$$

$$\text{United Kingdom: } (\text{GDP}=1,300)/(12,900) + (\text{MS}=37.4)/(382.3) \\ = (.101+.098)/2 = \mathbf{.0995 \text{ (9.95\%)}}$$

$$\text{United States: } (\text{GDP}=8,100)/(12,900) + (\text{MS}=271.3)/(382.3) \\ = (.628+.71)/2 = \mathbf{.669 \text{ (66.9\%)}}$$

1999

Group Total GDP in Billions = \$13,900

Group Total MS in Billions = \$397.2

$$\text{France: } (\text{GDP}=1,400)/(13,900) + (\text{MS}=37.1)/(397.2) \\ = (.101+.093)/2 = \mathbf{.097 \text{ (9.7\%)}}$$

$$\text{Germany: } (\text{GDP}=1,900)/(13,900) + (\text{MS}=31.1)/(397.2) \\ = (.137+.078)/2 = \mathbf{.1075 \text{ (10.75\%)}}$$

$$\text{United Kingdom: } (\text{GDP}=1,400)/(13,900) + (\text{MS}=36.9)/(397.2) \\ = (.101+.093)/2 = \mathbf{.097 \text{ (9.7\%)}}$$

$$\text{United States: } (\text{GDP}=9,200)/(13,900) + (\text{MS}=292.1)/(397.2) \\ = (.662+.735)/2 = \mathbf{.6985 \text{ (69.85\%)}}$$

D.1.2 Part Two: Measured as Military Power Only

1992

Group Total Military Spending (MS) in Billions = \$401.19

$$\text{France: } (\text{MS}=37.4)/(401.19) = \mathbf{.0932 \text{ (9.32\%)}}$$

$$\text{Germany: } (\text{MS}=35.2)/(401.19) = \mathbf{.0877 \text{ (8.77\%)}}$$

$$\text{United Kingdom: } (\text{MS}=41.7)/(401.19) = \mathbf{.1039 \text{ (10.39\%)}}$$

$$\text{United States: } (\text{MS}=286.89)/(401.19) = \mathbf{.7151 \text{ (71.51\%)}}$$

1993

Group Total MS in Billions = \$395.6

France: $(MS=37.2)/(395.6) = .094$ (**9.4%**)

Germany: $(MS=31.8)/(395.6) = .0803$ (**8.03%**)

United Kingdom: $(MS=34.2)/(395.6) = .0865$ (**8.65%**)

United States: $(MS=292.4)/(395.6) = .7391$ (**73.91%**)

1994

Group Total MS in Billions = \$385.88

France: $(MS=35.9)/(385.88) = .093$ (**9.3%**)

Germany: $(MS=36.3)/(385.88) = .0941$ (**9.41%**)

United Kingdom: $(MS=34.88)/(385.88) = .0904$ (**9.04%**)

United States: $(MS=278.8)/(385.88) = .7225$ (**72.25%**)

1995

Group Total MS in Billions = \$397.6

France: $(MS=48)/(397.6) = .1207$ (**12.07%**)

Germany: $(MS=41.8)/(397.6) = .1051$ (**10.51%**)

United Kingdom: $(MS=34.2)/(397.6) = .086$ (**8.6%**)

United States: $(MS=273.6)/(397.6) = .6881$ (**68.81%**)

1998

Group Total MS in Billions = \$382.3

France: $(MS=40.6)/(382.3) = .1062$ (**10.62%**)

Germany: $(MS=33)/(382.3) = .0863$ (**8.63%**)

United Kingdom: $(MS=37.4)/(382.3) = .0978$ (**9.78%**)

United States: $(MS=271.3)/(382.3) = .7097$ (**70.97%**)

1999

Group Total MS in Billions = \$397.2

France: $(MS=37.1)/(397.2) = .0934$ (**9.34%**)

Germany: $(MS=31.1)/(397.2) = .0783$ (**7.83%**)

United Kingdom: $(MS=36.9)/(397.2) = .0929$ (**9.29%**)

United States: $(MS=292.1)/(397.2) = .7354$ (**73.54%**)

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